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ABSTRACT
Amid the milieu of ethical theories and presuppositions about morals, a significant
disconnect exists at the confluence of moral theories and human behavior. One may parse the
issue as follows: If objective morals exist, humans are to live by them; however, no one lives a
perfectly moral life. According to the moral standards identified by different theistic ethical
theories (i.e., divine command theory, natural law, and virtue ethics), one may surmise that
objective morals exist and that humans imperfectly live a moral life according to these standards.
If it is the case that both secularists and theists recognize this issue, then explanations and
solutions must be offered to alleviate the tension or else dispel the problem altogether. This study
seeks to demonstrate that a person must receive some form of divine assistance from a perfectly
moral being to live a moral life. Since God is both the source and the arbiter of morals, this study
proposes that is it at least possible that He also provides the assistance needed for humans to live
up to His expectations.
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“Morality is a mountain which we cannot climb by our own efforts; and if we could we should
only perish in the ice and unbreathable air of the summit, lacking those wings with which the rest
of the journey has to be accomplished. For it is from there that the real ascent begins. The ropes
and axes are ‘done away’ and the rest is a matter of flying.”1
-C. S. Lewis
Chapter 1: The Research Problem
Introduction
Why be moral? This question has dominated philosophical, sociological, and theological
conversations throughout human history. Every society and culture has had to wrestle with
identifying, evaluating, and implementing morality. This constitutes an essential element for
creating a worldview. Although various worldviews explain why morals exist, there is still a gap
between why someone feels compelled to live a moral life and why they fail to live by it
perfectly.2 Even within Christianity, the gap exists. The great theologian and apologist, C. S.
Lewis, explained the issue best in responding to the perennial question, “If Christianity is true,
why are not all Christians obviously nicer than all non-Christians?”3 In response to this question,
he says,
What lies behind that question is partly something very reasonable and partly something
that is not reasonable at all. The reasonable part is this. If conversion to Christianity
makes no improvement in a man’s outward actions—if he continues to be just as
C.S. Lewis, “Man or Rabbit,” in God in the Dock, ed. Walter Hooper (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans,
1970), 113.
1

2

At this point in the research the author assumes there is an objective moral law, but this will be developed
further in a later section. The following list of authors do not necessarily provide an argument for theism, but they
provide reasons for taking objective morality seriously. Russ Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism: A Defence (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2005); David O. Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, Cambridge studies
in philosophy (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Terence Cuneo, The Normative Web:
An Argument for Moral Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Kevin Michael DeLapp, Moral Realism,
Bloomsbury ethics (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013); Andrew Fisher, Metaethics: An Introduction (Durham: Acumen
Publishers, 2011).
3

C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity: A Revised and Amplified Edition, with a New Introduction, of the Three
Books, Broadcast Talks, Christian Behaviour, and Beyond Personality, 1st HarperCollins ed. (San Francisco:
HarperSanFrancisco, 2001), 207.
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snobbish or spiteful or envious or ambitious as he was before—then I think we must
suspect that his “conversion” was largely imaginary; and after one’s original conversion,
every time one thinks one has made an advance, that is the test to apply. Fine feelings,
new insights, greater interest in “religion” mean nothing unless they make our actual
behavior better. . . .4
The problem elucidated by Lewis is a sad reality. Many people may accept in varying degrees a
belief in objective morality. Still, if they exhibit no change or not even a desire to change, then
they fail to respond to the very thing God established as a sign giving directions to him (i.e.,
morals).5
A person’s acquiescence to the moral law varies widely upon a spectrum. On one
extreme, one may follow the moral law but fail to acknowledge God as the moral lawgiver. This
is a crucial concept for moral apologetics because the moral argument rests upon the assumption
that objective morals are identifiable by all people. However, their acquiescence to the moral law
does not get them down the road. If it is possible to live a moral life with no assistance, God is
removed from the equation. On the opposite extreme, there may be those who have bought into
the fact that morals are a result of a divine moral lawgiver but fail to respond to them due to their
rebelliousness or volitional obstinance. To this point, Lewis, once again, fitly describes the
necessity of moral transformation,
The Christian way is different: harder, and easier. Christ says “Give me All. I don’t want
so much of your time and so much of your money and so much of your work: I want
You. I have not come to torment your natural self, but to kill it. No half-measures are any
good. I don’t want to cut off a branch here and a branch there, I want to have the whole
tree down. I don’t want to drill the tooth, or crown it, or stop it, but to have it out. Hand
over the whole natural self, all the desires which you think innocent as well as the ones
4

Ibid.

Immanuel Kant said it this way, “Two things fill the mind with every new and increasing admiration and
awe, the more often and steadily we reflect upon them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me. I
do not seek or conjecture either of them as if they were veiled obscurities or extravagances beyond the horizon of
my vision; I see them before me and connect them immediately with the consciousness of my existence.” Immanuel
Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, 4th revised ed., 1889.
5

2

you think wicked—the whole outfit. I will give you a new self instead. In fact, I will give
you Myself: my own will shall become yours.” 6
The case Lewis makes is what Immanuel Kant called “Spener’s problem”: How do we become
not just better men, but other men, new men?7 In Kant’s view, humanity is under the evil maxim,
and requires the “revolution of the will.”8 Kant explains that a maxim is the subjective principle
behind an action (i.e., the prescription behind an action). There are only two maxims: evil and
good. A morally good maxim meets three criteria. First, they are specific enough to prescribe one
good action rather than another. Second, they are general enough to be taught to children. Third,
they are exceptionless, so it is never the case they should be broken. These are hard to illustrate
with a good example, which has been one challenge in Kantian moral philosophy; however, Kant
uses the categorical imperative as a litmus test.
The revolution of the will reverses the order of the evil maxim, which prioritizes
inclination over duty, with the exact opposite. The prioritizing of the good is continual progress
from bad to better, but in the sight of God, it is viewed as a unity which “amounts to his being
actually a good man (pleasing to Him); and thus viewed, this change can be regarded as a
revolution.”9 Lewis also addresses the same problem and insists that “God became man to turn
creatures into sons: not simply to produce better men of the old kind but to produce a new kind
6

C. S Lewis, The Complete C.S. Lewis Signature Classics (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 2007),

156–7.
Immanuel Kant’s coining of the term “Spener’s Problem” is based on his response to the German pietist,
Philipp Jakob Spener, who made the original statement. See Immanuel Kant, The Conflict of the Faculties, trans.
Mary J. Gregor (New York: Abaris Books, 1979), 97.
7

More will be said concerning Kant’s view of the revolution of the will when John Hare’s view of moral
transformation is assessed below.
8

9

Immanuel Kant, Allen W. Wood, and George Di Giovanni, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere
Reason and Other Writings, Cambridge texts in the history of philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1998).
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of man.”10 The point to be derived from these statements is that humanity finds itself in a
predicament regarding paltry attempts of living morally. Since people continually fail to live a
moral life, one must appeal to some resource outside of himself or herself to resolve the problem
or else lower the moral standard.
The requirement that humans must become someone or something new is a central tenet
in Christianity. Although it comes in different forms of doctrine, the universal principle is the
same—humans live a moral life imperfectly and need help. This observation raises a
quintessential question for both theists and non-theists: Is it possible to live a moral life apart
from outside assistance?
The moral landscape ranges drastically about this one point. The moral law is a vital
component in establishing a multipronged defense of Christian theism—namely the defense of
the monotheistic God of the Bible. The apologetic method of using the moral law to make a case
for theism has been widely used throughout time. 11 It is a misnomer to say, “The Moral
Argument,” as if there is but one definitive formulation or variant. There are many forms of the
moral argument, which all share the common goal of showing how morality prescriptively
construed points to theism. 12 Different apologists have created unique ways to structure the
moral argument that land significant blows to naturalism. However, each argument elicits
different objections. The variety of moral arguments, in addition to other theistic arguments—
10

Lewis, The Complete C.S. Lewis Signature Classics, 170.

11

For a few notable examples of authors who have accomplished the task of categorizing different ethical
systems and their representatives as they use a version of the moral law, see John Hare, God and Morality: A
Philosophical History (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009); David Baggett and Marybeth Baggett, The Morals of
the Story: Good News about a Good God (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2018); David Baggett and Jerry L.
Walls, The Moral Argument: A History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019).
12

For an explanation of various moral arguments see Baggett and Walls, The Moral Argument.
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such as the cosmological, teleological, and ontological arguments—are what make a cumulative
case for theism so compelling. One particular cumulative case advanced by David Baggett and
Jerry Walls uses an abductive method. 13 The attractiveness of their approach enables theists to
use information gathered from varying sources, even secular theories, to point to theism as the
likely best explanation for moral phenomena. Overall, the advantage of the moral argument is
that a case for objective morals can be created that points to the existence of God based on
making sense of what all people know and experience about morals. Thus, this places the first
cog in moving toward the need for divine assistance for moral transformation as it relates to
morality and perfection.
One’s worldview must include a grounding for morality, which affects the motivation
factor for being moral. Regardless of one’s belief in the grounding of morality, a common
thought generally surfaces in people’s lives: humans want to be moral. 14 However, immorality
continues to be a universal and rampant issue. Since there is no common consensus between
societies and cultures for the grounding of morality each person seemingly is left to their own
beliefs.15 This has become a defining characteristic in postmodernity. Subjectivism in western
society dominates philosophical, sociological, and even theological discussions. If one’s
13

For an explanation of their abductive case, see David Baggett and Jerry L. Walls, Good God: The
Theistic Foundations of Morality (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 27–9. For a more detailed
explanation, see David Baggett and Jerry L. Walls, God and Cosmos: Moral Truth and Human Meaning (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 54–78. Their approach affirms, “So it is not that secular theories fail
altogether to explain anything morally. . .they don’t explain as many moral facts. . .nor do they explain moral facts
as well as theism, but they are not without their resources and insights. . . . Recognizing such a point is entirely
consistent with our argument that an explanation that includes this world conjoined with God makes a fuller case
and provides the better explanation of the full range of moral facts in need of explanation.” Ibid., 72.
14

Exceptions exist to this point, but the general aggregate of humanity shows a common desire to strive for
a moral life.
15
See Lewis’ appendix to The Abolition of Man for examples. C. S. Lewis, “The Abolition of Man,” in The
Complete C. S. Lewis Signature Classics (New York: HarperOne, 2002), 731–8.
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convictions or beliefs about morality are grounded within humanity, it is easy to run into
problems. One major problem is that the reason to be moral is individualistic and subjective.
However, one may ask, can the drive to be moral, or more specifically, the desire to be perfect,
be grounded and satisfied by natural, non-spiritual means?16
The argument that moral facts exist and are likely best explained by the existence of a
divine creator leads one to ask for further clarity on the matter. If theism provides the likely best
explanation for moral facts, then there must also exist an expectation on God’s part for humans
to live up to those morals. The reality exists that humans continually fail to live according to the
moral law. A myriad of reasons may be adduced for why humanity fails to live up to the moral
law. The Apostle Paul contends that individuals fail because they, “do not honor [God] as God or
give thanks to him, but they became futile in their thinking” (Rom. 1:21). 17 Augustine of Hippo
identified the evil within him as “foul,” but it was still attractive to him. He states, “I loved my
own perdition and my own faults, not the things for which I committed wrong, but the wrong
itself.”18 Thomas Aquinas quotes another one of Augustine’s statements about sin by saying that
sin is a “languor of nature.”19 Furthermore, Aquinas identifies people’s choice to sin as an
“inordinate act.”20 Kant stated that humanity follows the evil maxim because of the “dear self”
that is “curved in on itself.” These few statements serve as illustrations of the teachings
associated with humanity’ problem with sin. One need not get into different theological doctrines
16

The definition of these terms will be made clearer in chapters two and three below.

17

Unless otherwise noted, all biblical passages referenced are in the English Standard Version (Wheaton,
IL: Crossway, 2011).
18

Augustine of Hippo, Confessions, 2.4.

19
Thomas Aquinas in Summa Theologiae, question 82, article 1, quotes Augustine’s statement in Psalm
118, Sermon 3.
20

Ibid.
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of sin (i.e., original sin, total depravity, etc.) to understand that sin prohibits a person from living
a moral life.21
If it is identifiable and observable that humans do not live moral lives and are far from
living them perfectly, what then is the resolve from a theistic view? Is it true that God would ask
individuals to live moral lives, but know they are not able to do so? John Hare asserts there is a
gap between the requirements of the moral law and humanity’s ability to live up to it. He aligns
with Kant in saying that “‘ought’ implies ‘can.’”22 The dictum “ought implies can” is a major
assumption to explain because it carries the weight of moral obligations and the expectation to
follow them. The “moral gap,” Hare posits, must be closed either by divine assistance or some
other comparable secular theory. 23 The non-theistic solutions Hare proposes for consideration
include 1. Puffing up human capacity; 2. Reducing the demand; or 3. Secular substitutes for
divine assistance. 24 Hare shows these options fail to close the gap like divine assistance can. He
leaves open the discussion for Christian doctrine because he only addressed the issues
philosophically to show that divine assistance must be involved. His final comment to his book
is, “My own belief is that there is a God who loves us enough both to demand a high standard
from us and to help us meet it.”25 Hare’s version of the moral argument offers a simple point of
21

More will be said below regarding how these doctrines impact moral transformation, but at this juncture
only a cursory mention is necessary to point to man’s inability to live a moral life perfectly.
John Hare, The Moral Gap: Kantian Ethics, Human Limits, and God’s Assistance, Oxford studies in
theological ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 23.
22

Hare’s postulation is that, “The effect of these two points [ought and can] is to bring it about that
morality, in its full critical form, is, first, something I ought to be practising [sic]; second, something for which my
natural capacities are inadequate. . .; and, third, something that I should treat as the command of some other at least
possible being who is practising [sic] it.” Ibid.
23

24

Hare addresses each one of these options in detail in the following sections of his book: 1. Puffing up the
capacity, Ibid., 99–115., 2. Reducing the command, Ibid., 142–69., and 3. Secular substitutes, Ibid., 170–88. A
secondary explanation of his position can be seen in Baggett and Walls, God and Cosmos, 214–42.
25

Hare, The Moral Gap, 275.
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clarity: humanity is expected to live according to the moral law, but only when offered assistance
from the One who created it can humanity actually live by it. “Ought implies can” thus stands in
need of a qualification: “with God’s assistance.”
If Christian theism is to be valid, it must be able to respond to humanity’s desire to live a
perfectly moral life and offer the assistance needed to meet that goal. This is possible because of
the Christian doctrine of unity with Christ, which closes the gap, offers needed assistance, and
fulfills the desire for perfection.

Research Statement
The purpose of this study will be to create and develop a new apologetic argument based
on humanity’s desire to strive for moral perfection. This will be accomplished by first explaining
the various theoretical foundations for morality and how they respond to the problem of moral
perfectionism. Second, a defense will be made against secular theories and interlocutors to show
their deficiencies in changing people’s hearts to meet the universal standard of moral perfection
and transformation. Third, a case will be made that the Christian doctrine of “unity with Christ”
is the likely best explanation for divine assistance in moral transformation.

Research Significance
This project has the potential to make a major impact on postmodernity in Western
culture. First, it simultaneously validates humanity’s desire to live a moral life and invalidates
secular substitutions for God’s divine assistance for moral perfection. This delivers a fatal blow
to postmodernity’s failed attempts of creating a moral system that is epistemically, ontologically,
and experientially true.

8

Second, it can marry together moral apologetics and orthodox Christian teachings. Since
moral arguments generally try to show that God is the likely best explanation for moral
phenomena and then reason to the God of the Bible, this argument from moral perfection arrives
at the more robust theology of an Anselmian Christian God.
Third, this project seeks to teach orthodox and sound Christian doctrine that gives glory
to God, honor to the church, and presents the Gospel message to those outside of Christ.

The Purpose and Method
Why another work on the moral argument? Both secularists and theists of varying stripes
and everyone in-between have attempted to weigh in on what a moral life is and how to evaluate
it. Issues arise when establishing the metaphysical nature of morals and the veracity of their
axiomatic components. This has resulted in more contentions with little consensus and minimal
resolve. Philosophers have offered a broad spectrum of solutions to the metaphysical and
epistemic questions generated out of the milieu of promulgated views. Still, these are met with
more objections and responses as new perspectives are touted. Not surprisingly, Christians
generally and apologists specifically have continued to wrestle with the topic of morals and
ethics. The task of apologists has been to make sense of these issues from a Christian worldview
and to offer detailed, systematic explanations for why theism provides the likely best account for
the existence of these issues. A secondary task of apologists is to propose pragmatic ways for a
Christian to live a moral life and to disseminate those teachings in a practical manner that
remains true to biblical teachings and human capacity.

9

Amid the milieu of ethical theories and presuppositions about morals, a significant
disconnect exists at the confluence of moral theories and human behavior.26 One may parse the
issue as follows: If objective morals exist, humans are to live by them; however, no one lives a
perfectly moral life. According to the moral standards identified by different theistic ethical
theories (i.e., divine command theory, natural law, and virtue ethics), one may surmise that
objective morals exist, and that humans imperfectly live a moral life according to these
standards. If it is the case that both secularists and theists recognize this issue, then explanations
and solutions must be offered to alleviate the tension or else dispel the problem altogether.
This problem introduces the need for moral transformation. If a person fails to live
morally, there must be an explanation for the failure, not only an explanation but also a solution.
Given this observation, a theist may derive a few different conclusions from the issue. First, there
may be a misunderstanding about God’s expectations for a moral life and the performative aspect
of it. Second, humans may actively and willfully choose to live contrary to God’s expectations
for a moral life. Third, it may be the case that humans either lack the ability or the capacity to
live morally. Fourthly, a person must receive some kind of assistance to live a moral life.
Emphasis will be placed upon the fourth conclusion as the most viable option for a solution to
the above issue. If God is both the source and the arbiter of morals, is it at least possible that he
also provides the assistance needed for humans to live up to his expectations?
How will this project accomplish the goal of creating a new apologetic argument from the
desire for moral perfection? The purpose of this research is to extend the discussion of moral
26

A gap exists between the ethical theories advanced by moral apologists and the practical nature of their
resolutions. This is not to say they fail in their attempts or evade the topic; but rather many of these apologists only
give a cursory nod toward the performative nature of their views in their works. Granted, the purpose of their
primary sources is to establish a particular ethical theory; however, the information leaves the reader wanting more
of a resolution.
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apologetics to the performative aspect of morals. There are three legs to this project. The first leg
will explain the theoretical foundations that undergird the form of morality advanced throughout
this project. Specifically, the works of moral apologists who have paved the way for this
discussion will be analyzed to show their arguments only take individuals to theism but not to the
Christian God.
The second leg will be a defense against secular theories and various interlocuters who
present challenges to the argument advanced in this project. The goal will be to show that other
worldviews outside of Christian theism are deficient in changing human hearts to meet the
universal standard of moral perfection and transformation.
Finally, having argued for the need for a bridge that spans between moral arguments and
the solution for moral transformation, a case will be made that the Christian doctrine of “unity
with Christ” is the likely best explanation for divine assistance in moral transformation. The
orthodox doctrine of unity with Christ explains the need for moral perfection and satisfies the
requirements necessary to make it possible.

Key Concepts and Terms
As this study advances toward creating a new apologetic method, it is essential to
delineate clear and decisive terms used throughout the project. Establishing a proper definition of
these key concepts and terms will aid the reader.
Perfectionism
Before a deeper dive can be taken into the vast world of Christian theism as a solution for
humanity’s needs, it is essential to establish a definition for perfection as it will be used
throughout this project. Semantically, the term takes on a wide range of definitions. In its most

11

simplistic form, perfection means, “The quality or state of being perfect: such as freedom from
fault or defect, the quality or state of being saintly, an exemplification of supreme excellence or
an unsurpassable degree of accuracy or excellence.”27 In one respect, these definitions demand a
degree of objectivity of completeness. That is to say that perfection, whether anyone has actually
obtained it or not, insists upon actually being accomplished. On the other hand, there is a degree
of subjectivity or progression. It is not so much the fact that one will actually reach perfection as
it is that someone or something is considered perfect because they are perceived as being perfect.
The wide semantic range of this term makes it amorphous. Unless it is understood in a
univocal context, hemmed in with proper parameters, and bolstered with adequate scaffolding,
much of the discussion will crumble. Consider that one may speak of perfection regarding
aesthetics. Aesthetically, a sunset over a mountain landscape may be deemed as perfect. An
artist, architect, or craftsman may call the result of their hard work, “perfect.” An athlete can
execute a complicated maneuver perfectly. A triangle can be perfectly symmetrical having all
sides and angles equal, but at the same time it may not be a proper fit for a certain occasion. In
fact, an isosceles triangle may fit perfectly in one instance rather than an acute triangle and vice
versa. This brings to light another important aspect of perfection; it requires a standard and a
judgment.
It is hard or nearly impossible to speak of perfection in any constructive way if no
standard exists by which to judge perfection. Individuals express this by “judging the judges.” 28
27
Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, “Perfection,” accessed March 27, 2022, https://www.merriamwebster.come/dictionary/perfection.
28

Ravi Zacharias is credited with this illustration. In The Logic of God, Zacharias explains that the way we
speak about judgment calls in life shows a deeper, universal understanding about how we view objectivity. What
does this say about standards and judgments of perfection? Consider the way people act during sporting events
drives this point home in an illustrative way. How many baseball players get in an uproar over whether the umpire
called the correct ball or strike? The comical comparison between modernists and postmodernists in a game of
baseball makes the point. The postmodernist umpire exclaims, “There’s balls and strikes, and they aren’t anything
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How many judges go uncontested in a sporting event that utilizes subjective standards by which
to weigh contestants? It is usually the loser who approaches the judge insisting they were scored
unfairly. One need not look any further than the most recent Olympics to illustrate this. A figure
skater who executes a seemingly flawless routine can receive differing points between judges. If
she believes she deserves more points than she was awarded, who is at fault? Who has the final
say in the matter? The expectation is there must exist some universal standard for the action, a
presupposition that the action is executable, and an assumption that one can recognize it and
judge it correctly.
The matter becomes more difficult when thinking about humans on a more intrinsic scale.
In one respect, human perfection is spoken of in ontological terms. One may call humans perfect
if they fit the mold for what the ideal human should be. Once again, this is generic unless it is
narrowed down. A perfect human is based on more than physical descriptors. If naturalism is
true and humans are no more than material beings composed of atoms colliding together, then
many conversations humans have about perfection are spurious. However, human experience
seems to speak to the contrary. There appears to be a basic, universal assumption that values and
principles do exist even in respect to humans and their actions. Thus, the conversation turns to
other philosophical complexities. Humans not only desire physical perfection, they search
existentially for perfection beyond physical limitations. This difficulty is highlighted throughout
Michael Hyde’s book on the history of perfection. 29
until I call them.” His call contrasts with the modernist who asserts, “I call them as I see them.” These anecdotes
show that people typically do not like to be judged by relative and subjective standards. This applies even in
conversations about aesthetics. People have this unique expectation that there can be a standard of perfection.
29
In chapter two, a case will be made for moral realism. It is the assumption thus far in the research that an
objective moral standard must exist because it makes the most sense for why humans speak in the way they do about
moral perfection.
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Hyde sets out trying to answer why humans “embody a metaphysical desire for
perfection.”30 He explains that humans desire acknowledgment. This desire for
acknowledgement is more than affirmation or validation, it is a search for completeness or
wholeness in life. This understanding is driven by his definition of perfection. He explains that
perfection is “achieving a state of completeness in our lives whereby, at least for the moment, we
feel secure, comfortable, and at home with ourselves, others, and our immediate surroundings.” 31
He further states that, “perfection admits a certain ontological significance: perfection is essential
to our well-being.”32 When taken generally, Hyde’s definition and understanding of perfection
make sense, but this project desires to delve deeper into perfection as it relates to morality and a
moral life.33
The options for human perfection likewise are elucidated in John Passmore’s work, The
Perfectibility of Man. He posits that human perfection can be spoken of in the following
distinctions:
(1) there is some task in which each and every man can perfect himself technically;
(2) he is capable of wholly subordinating himself to God’s will;
(3) he can attain to his natural end;
(4) he can be entirely free of any moral defect;
(5) he can make of himself a being who is metaphysically perfect;
(6) he can make of himself a being who is harmonious and orderly;
(7) he can live in the manner of an ideally perfect human being;
(8) he can become godlike.34
30
Michael J. Hyde, Perfection: Coming to Terms with Being Human (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press,
2010), xi–xii.
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Ibid., xii.

Ibid. “Our passion for perfection is admirable; it defines who we are as metaphysical animals, creatures
who have a longing, a nostalgia, for security, comfort, and completeness in our lives.” Ibid., 1.
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34

John Arthur Passmore, The Perfectibility of Man, 3rd ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2000), 21.

14

Passmore’s observations are valid, although one can see they cannot all be true simultaneously.
Unless one delineates what is being discussed, a wide range of interpretations can be granted.
Therefore, perfection will be narrowed down to the realm of morality. The desire humans feel to
live perfect lives and to strive for perfectibility is a major part of humanity. It is one thing to
recognize the desire, it is another thing to find a solution for why people do not feel as if they are
perfect.
In philosophy, perfectionism became a theory for how one should live life. Although
perfectionism reaches back further than the twenty-first century, modern authors have sought to
coalesce previous views to establish a firmer definition for perfection. One author, Thomas
Hurka, explains the moral theory in these terms,
This moral theory starts from an account of the good human life, or the intrinsically
desirable life. And it characterizes this life in a distinctive way. Certain properties, it says,
constitute human nature or are definitive of humanity—they make humans human. The
good life, it then says, develops these properties to a high degree or realizes what is
central to human nature. Different versions of the theory may disagree about what the
relevant properties are and so disagree about the content of the good life. But they share
the foundational idea that what is good, ultimately, is the development of human nature. 35
For Hurka, and other advocates of perfectionism, they place the emphasis of a perfect life on
something obtainable by humans: happiness, experiences, a good life, etc. Hurka gives two
definitions for perfection, one from last century by Sir Hamilton Williams and a more recent
version by John Rawls.36 The culmination of their definitions sets perfectionism in completely
humanistic terms. In Hurka’s use of the word, he says, “the human good rests somehow in
35

Thomas Hurka, Perfectionism, Oxford Ethics Series (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 3.

The reader may be interested in seeing both Hamilton and Rawls’s definitions for perfection. Hamilton
states that perfection is, “the full and harmonious development of all our faculties, corporeal and mental, intellectual
and moral.” Rawls shows that perfectionism leads one to, “maximize the achievement of human excellence in art,
science, and culture.” Cited in Ibid., 4.
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human nature.”37 That is to say that when one develops their natures, it is “to develop some
capacities and also defines an ideal of excellence.” 38 Many who discuss perfectionism focus on
the human and naturalistic explanation for perfection. Whether or not one is talking about human
nature or morals, the foundation is to be understood on human terms.
This fits within a naturalistic worldview, which believes nothing exists outside of the
material world. If there are no non-natural aspects of life, then human nature is based on one’s
current understanding of how humans function. This brings to light several issues. One obvious
issue is that human nature, from an evolutionist perspective, is subject to change and is ever
progressing. Identifying “humanness” becomes even more complicated because it is based on
knowledge of what humans are in a specified time. Hurka says, that, “the best perfectionism,
then, equates human nature with the properties essential to humans and conditioned on their
being living things.”39 Other moral perfectionists agree with Hurka’s statement, but others seek
to find the purpose of living outside of human nature or at least in a different component of it.
One example is within a moralistic perfection, which,
. . .Takes one human essential property to be something like practical rationality and
characterizes this property in such a way that realizing it to a high degree requires
developing the dispositions commonly considered virtuous, such as temperance, justice,
and honesty, or abiding by the rules—“Do not kill,” “Do not lie”—commonly counted as
moral. Moralism makes goodness by perfectionist standards in part the same as goodness
by the lights of commonsense morality. It makes the degree to which humans develop
their natures depend on the degree to which they fulfil popular notions of morality. 40
37
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A naturalistic perfectionist will continue to struggle with determining what constitutes a perfect
life until they can identify what the ultimate good is for humans. If the ultimate good is only
found in natural terms—like human nature—one must still wrestle with the fact that humans do
not only speak in natural terms. There appears to exist a standard for living beyond simple
humanistic ideals. In step with the proposal above, some solution must be offered that resolves
the tension of incomplete perfection. The solution being proposed here is that Christianity offers
the exact option needed to correspond to actual human experience and expectations.
Unity with Christ
If Christianity offers the likely best solution for the problem elucidated above, then there
needs to be a clear, decisive understanding of that solution. It has been proposed that unity with
Christ is that solution.
The Bible uses perfection in different contexts. Typically, perfection is used
synonymously with “complete” or “full.” A handful of interchangeable terms are used between
the Old and New Testaments to convey the concept of perfection. In the Old Testament, at least
two Hebrew terms are used to denote an individual as perfect. 41 The first term is shālēm. It is
used to describe persons who are “finished, whole, or complete.” Specifically, shālēm describes
someone’s heart as perfect because of their singular devotion to God. A second Hebrew term is
tāmīm, which is used to characterize someone or something as “sound or unblemished.” Often,
tāmīm is used to describe God, his way, and his word (e.g., Psa. 18:30, 19:7).
41

There are other terms used throughout the Hebrew Old Testament, but they are used only once. The focus
of this study is to examine the topic from a moral apologetics standpoint. However, there is rich and fertile ground in
regard to how Judaism has treated the topic of perfection. For a treatment of the various terms and the interaction
with Jewish positions see M. L. Satlow, “Philo on Human Perfection,” The Journal of Theological Studies 59, no. 2
(2008): 500–519.
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In the New Testament, there is one term translated as “perfect.” The New Testament term
is Teleios. Teleios conveys the concept of something being “full, complete, or perfect.” Out of
the more familiar instances of this word, one may recognize its use in Matthew 5:48 where Jesus
says, “You therefore must be perfect, as your heavenly father is perfect.” Jesus’ statement brings
to light two but intricately connected concepts. First, there is a call to perfection. Second, the
standard of perfection is derived from God’s own ontology.
The biblical expectation for perfection is tied to the demand to live “innocent” or
“blameless” lives. Throughout the Bible individuals like Noah (Gen. 6:9), Job (Job 1:1), and
Jesus (Heb. 7:26) are labeled as innocent or blameless. They not only stand out as interesting
examples, but also as moral exemplars. By their example, these men establish a general call to all
people to be found innocent and blameless (Psa. 15:2–5; Phil. 2:14–15). Noticeably, the
uniqueness of Jesus stands out from the others and will be explained further.
The uniqueness of these individuals is that the standard imposed on them is not from a
subjective human standpoint, rather, the ideal of innocence, blamelessness, and perfection is
from God. In moral terms, perhaps God is not only the very definition for goodness, but he
himself is goodness. This is the case Robert Adams makes in his book, Finite and Infinite Goods.
Specifically, Adams argues how to define the good. In Platonic terms, within Adams’ model,
God is the good. “If God is the Good itself,” Adams posits, “then the Good is not an abstract
object but a concrete (though not a physical) individual. Indeed, it is a person, or importantly like
a person.”42 Therefore, when people are called to a standard of perfection—goodness—they are
called to live like God. Once again, the overarching issue resurfaces in Adams’ discussion. He
42
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insists that, “One of our main problems in being for the good is that because of our finitude we
can be for it only in very imperfect and fragmentary ways. We cannot attend to more than a
small fraction of actual and possible good, and what we can do about what we do attend to is
very limited.”43 Humans are called to live a good life, but they must also realize the standard of
perfection is unattainable due to humanity’s finitude.
Typically, Christian theologians contend against human perfectibility in relation to this
world. Due to the pervasiveness of sin, no one can be perfect. However, a broader view of
perfection shows that although one may not reach perfection, per se on this earth, there is an
other-worldly component that looks beyond this world for the desire for perfection to be
fulfilled. This can be found in one’s connection to Jesus and the hope for eternal life after one’s
existence on this earth.
When considering what it means to be united with Christ, one must bring together
multiple Christian doctrines; namely, those doctrines that relate to salvation. Paul the Apostle
explains that the Christian life is characterized by being in Christ (Eph. 1:7), united in his death
(Rom. 6:5), and clothed in him (Gal. 3:27). When reflecting on his own relationship to Christ,
Paul says, “I have suffered the loss of all things and count them as rubbish, in order that I may
gain Christ and be found in him, not having a righteousness of my own that comes from the law,
but that which comes through faith in Christ, the righteousness from God that depends on faith. .
.” (Phi. 3:8–9). Unity with Christ is the point where sin is removed from an individual’s life,
where the old person dies and a new one is born, and where a life is no longer lived for self but
for God. It is in this unity that God’s own Spirit is given as a seal/guarantee (Eph 1:13–14; Gal
3:14; Rom 5:5) and to provide aide for living a sanctified life.
43

Ibid., 8.

19

Without the salvation offered by Jesus Christ, no human could stand before God. When
Jesus died on the cross, he paid the price for sin. The apostle Peter explains, “[Jesus] himself
bore our sins in his body on the tree, that we might die to sin and live to righteousness” (1 Pet.
2:24). Again, he states, “For Christ also suffered once for sins, the righteous for the unrighteous,
that he might bring us to God” (1 Pet. 3:18). What Peter teaches here is that Jesus, who was
perfect, paid the cost of sin, so sinful humans might be able to live for God and one day be in his
presence perfected.
The gap created between God’s standard for morality and humanity’s failure to live up to
that mark requires assistance. As John Hare explained earlier, the dictum “ought implies can”
requires a qualifier: with God’s assistance. Hare believes that his solution for extra-human
assistance—atonement, justification, and sanctification—provide a “version of such
assistance.”44 He further remarks that “What has changed after incorporation [with Christ] is the
availability of the new life; there may still be a gap between what we ought to do and what we
do.”45 C.S. Lewis adds to this when he spoke of Jesus giving “a new self.” 46 The new self is to
be identified and understood as united with Jesus. In this new life, individuals are no longer
viewed as what they were, but as a new creation clothed in Jesus. The new life in Christ entails
transformation. This transformation is the removal of sin and bestowal of further assistance
needed to live a new life in Christ—sanctification. In this moment, an individual is sanctified,
and set apart for God’s purpose. Therefore, one can echo Paul’s benediction in saying, “Now
may the God of peace himself sanctify you completely, and may your whole spirit and soul and
44
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body be kept blameless at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ. He who calls you is faithful; he
will surely do it” (1 Thess 5:23–24). The degree to which one lives this new life in accordance
with the ultimate good is shaped by one’s view of sanctification. The views of Christian
sanctification explain to what extent one can expect to live a new life transformed into the image
of Jesus. If unity with Christ is to be considered the likely best solution for living a moral life,
then it must be able to offer a solution for the problem of sin and the assistance needed to live in
accordance with the standard of morality by which humans are expected to live.

Summary of Chapters
Now that the foundation of this research has been laid by examining the research
problem, methodology, and major definitions, it is important to see the general outline for how
this project will proceed. Chapter two will establish a case in defense of moral realism to show
there exists an objective standard for how humans should live morally. Although every objection
against moral realism cannot be handled due to the limitation of a work like this, those major,
salient objections that challenge the performative aspect of moral realism will be addressed.
Special emphasis will be placed on: 1. Taking objective morality seriously; 2. Understanding
moral values, judgments, and obligations; and 3. Tracing the impact of moral realism through the
performative aspect of the moral argument. Chapter three will attempt to show that the form of
theism found in Christianity is the likely best solution for the existence of these moral facts; and
that when married together with the Christian teaching of unity with Christ, Christian theism
offers a viable solution for humanity’s desire for moral perfection. The goal is to show that unity
with Christ has the ability to release the tension of living imperfectly while needing and
expecting perfection. Chapter four will develop a tripartite argument for Christian theism based
on a unified version of natural law, divine command theory, and virtue ethics. This will give a
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comparative analysis between naturalistic explanations of perfection and the argument
established throughout this work, thus showing that unity with Christ meets and exceeds the
criteria humans expect for perfection. Chapter five will discuss how unity with Christ fits into the
argument for Christian theism. The task will be to show that unity with Christ makes sense of
humanity’s desire for perfection and the failure to live a perfect life. Finally, chapter six will
conclude the study by addressing possible objections to the argument established throughout this
work and a few considerations for further study will be presented.

22

Chapter 2: Moral Realism
Introduction
For this project to advance in the proper direction toward a solution for humanity’s need
for perfection, one must first understand the nature of morality. A lot of ink has been spilled
discussing the importance of understanding morality in its various contexts. Grasping morality
entails more than a cursory look at generic discussions about what people consider ethical
decisions. Understanding morality means comprehending its objectivity, knowability, and
enforceability.47
A key component to any apologetic argument from morals is to show that morality,
properly construed, is objective. The claim that morality is objective has garnered considerable
attention from both sides of the argument. Furthermore, the debate is not limited to theism alone.
Many philosophers, both secular and theistic, have commented on the peculiar nature of
morality. The existence of moral phenomena has piqued the interest of individuals, which will
form the basis of this chapter. If morality is objective, then there is a definite standard by which
to live.
This chapter will seek to explain three main aspects of morality; thus, creating a
cumulative argument for taking the moral law seriously. First, a case will be made for moral
realism; that is to say morality is objective and potentially absolute. Second, it will be explained
that moral facts are knowable and discoverable by all rational humans. Third, based on the
objectivity and knowability of moral facts, a defense will be made for moral obligations.
47
David Baggett and Jerry Walls not only create an abductive argument for morality, but also a cumulative
one. In the second part of their work, God & Cosmos, they detail four moral facts—ontology, epistemology,
practical, and rational—that need further explanation in a moral argument. See Baggett and Walls, God and Cosmos,
115–272.
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Moral Realism
A popular genre of literature and entertainment that has flooded the bookshelves and
movie theaters takes place in post-apocalyptic/dystopian worlds. What does society look like
when it has been stripped of social and economic infrastructures, people live by their own rules,
and survival is the driving force for everyday life? Beyond the purely entertainment factor of
these works lies something deeper that speaks to the inner most complexities of humanity. These
complexities are usually revealed when the protagonist must wrestle with whether he should
compromise his own values, break some unenforced personal rule, or save an innocent life at a
great personal expense. The decision is usually exacerbated by taking place in a dark, vile
society that functions on chaos, disorder, and filth. A flood of examples may come to mind to
illustrate this point; which is the reason for speaking in generic terms. The pull humans feel to
relate to a character’s decisions in a society at rock-bottom speaks to something that is known
universally in all humans—moral decisions matter.
Even though society in the twenty-first century is not characterized as post-apocalyptic or
dystopian, the deeper complexities of humanity are revealed, nonetheless. There may exist, in
varying degrees, social and economic infrastructures with enforced societal laws, but humans
still struggle with dilemmas concerning how they should act. This shows that moral dilemmas
are not biased to time and place. Since a moral dilemma is characterized by two or more
competing value claims, herein lies the point of establishing moral realism. If objective moral
facts exist, they should be recognizable by all people. As illustrated above, there seemingly
exists a prima facie notion that moral facts are real and draw people’s attention.
An armchair sociologist can see that American society has become increasingly more
relativistic in its ideals. Relativism believes there is no such thing as a universal morality,
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because all that exist are plural moralities and social mores.48 In this respect, relativism equates
moral laws to human laws, which means they are founded on humanistic principles subject to
change. This pragmatic approach to morality places the foundation of morality on what
individuals or groups believe. Moral realism, on the other hand, insists that, “Moral judgements
enjoy a special sort of objectivity: such judgements, when true, are so independently of what any
human being, anywhere, in any circumstance whatever, thinks of them.”49 Similar to other
philosophical and ethical theories, there are various forms of moral realism. 50 These forms,
although different, share important features. First, as Kevin DeLapp explains, “[Moral realism] is
designed to help shed light on what morality itself is.”51 Second, moral realism uses the basic,
universal principles of logic to make a positive case for morality. Third, it employs common
sense and intuition as key factors in its argumentation. Fourth, it is not dependent upon theistic
arguments.52 Given these basic features of moral realism, a few apodictic conclusions may be
drawn regarding the present discussion.
48
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First, moral realism, if true, can provide a base foundation for discussing a universal
standard for living expected by all rational beings. Much of the current discussion is founded
upon the assumption that humans expect other humans to behave in particular ways. If there is
no standard for living, or a universal consensus, then many thoughts, feelings, and experiences
people have about morality are illusory. Second, if this universal standard of living is expected
by all humans, there must exist, to some degree, the potential capacity to actually do what is
expected. If a standard is imposed on humans that is unable to be accomplished, then objections
may be offered for why one should not expect the standard to be true.
A Case for Objective Morality
There are many reasons to take objective morality seriously. There appears to be a
universal consensus that humans are to behave in a certain way. Is it true that humans believe
certain actions are intrinsically or inherently right or wrong regardless of how someone thinks or
feels?53 One would be hard pressed to think that torturing babies for fun is wrong because a
society or culture decides it to be that way. The aversion and repulsion toward a horrendous act
reach deeper than cultural norms. When a skeptic needs evidence to prove that torturing babies
for fun is wrong, “He doesn’t need an argument,” Paul Copan notes, “he really needs
psychological and spiritual help.”54 Couched within these preliminary statements are
observations of human nature that point to why, for prima facie reasons, objective morality
should be taken seriously.
53
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The six observations highlighted below do not constitute an exhaustive list detailing
every aspect of objective morality. 55 However, these basic observations serve as presuppositions
that coincide to a universal human experience. They relate to the current study because they
show that humans have a pull or motivation to live up to some kind of standard and at least
expect others to do the same. If it is a human expectation to live in a particular way, is there ever
a reason to do otherwise? If objective morals exist, it should follow that humans expect them to
be done to some obtainable degree. An objectivist theory of morality insists that moral
statements are more than feelings of preference or based on cultural consensus, they actually
make claims about the moral status of persons and acts.
Discussing Moral Matters
It may be common in a relativistic society for people casually to cast off objective moral
statements under the guise of “Everything is relative!” However, their own standard quickly
betrays them when their views are given little respect. Most people, when it gets down to brass
tacks, believe there is an objective standard for living and for how to treat one another, whether
they openly acknowledge it or not. Consider how people discuss moral matters. If morality is
subjective, then people should not get upset when someone takes a different view than their
own.56 However, people argue, debate, discuss, and reason over issues. All one must do is listen
These six observations are derived from Scott Rae’s book, Moral Choices. Scott B Rae, Moral Choices:
An Introduction to Ethics, 2018, 35–7. As noted, this is not an exhaustive list, and many of these points are covered
in varying degrees throughout the works of those moral realists mentioned earlier in this work. For a longer list
consider the points made in a dissertation written by Stephen Jordan. He identifies 15 reasons to take morality
seriously: 1. Obviousness, 2. General consensus, 3. Moral reasoning, 4. Moral order, 5. Unlivable world, 6.
Measuring value systems, 7. Social reform, 8. Justice, injustice, and punishment, 9. Stand of behavior, 10. Praise and
blame, 11. Mistreatment, 12. Moral obligations, 13. Guilt, 14. Making excuses, 15. Moral progress/improvement.
Stephen S. Jordan, “Morality and the Personhood of God: A Moral Argument for the Existence of a Personal God”
(Liberty University, 2021), 34–57, https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/doctoral/2870/.
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to an agitated individual make statements like, “That is unfair!” “You cannot do that!” or “That
is wrong!” If everyone’s opinions should be given equal respect, then why do people get upset
about moral matters? If there is no universal, objective standard for fairness, good and evil, and
right and wrong; then it is impossible for one individual to impose their beliefs on someone else.
However, this happens all the time. Consider someone that admits good and evil are illusions. “A
moment after they have admitted that good and evil are illusions,” Lewis demonstrates, “you will
find them exhorting us to work for posterity, to educate, revolutionise [sic], liquidate, live and
die for the good of the human race.”57 This double speak is inconsistent, but goes to show the
point being advanced here.
One must take note that the way people discuss moral matters differs vastly from how
they discuss preferences. Discussions about morality, for example whether rape is acceptable,
usually differs greatly from a discussion about one’s favorite flavor of ice cream. The simple fact
that people discuss moral matters gives weight to the point that there is more to morality than
subjective opinions.
One of David Enoch’s arguments in establishing a robust realism is that the absence of
moral objectivity in discussions of interpersonal disagreements and conflicts has, “implications
that are objectionable on first-order, moral grounds, and should therefore be rejected.”58 While
establishing a positive case for realism, he attempts to show that detractors like subjectivism are
false. In one particular case, Enoch produces a Reductio argument for taking morality seriously

pointless; as pointless as, say, entering an intractable debate about whether red or orange was really the most
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in interpersonal disagreements and conflicts by showing that subjectivism cannot offer the
solutions needed.
1. Caricaturized Subjectivism. 59 (For Reductio.)
2. If Caricaturized Subjectivism is true, then interpersonal conflicts due to moral
disagreements are really just interpersonal conflicts due to differences in mere
preferences. (From the content of Caricaturized Subjectivism.)
3. Therefore, interpersonal conflicts due to moral disagreements are just interpersonal
conflicts due to differences in mere preferences. (From 1 and 2.)
4. Impartiality, that is, roughly: when an interpersonal conflict (of the relevant kind) is a
matter merely of preferences, then an impartial, egalitarian solution is called for, and
it is wrong to just stand one’s ground.60
5. Therefore, in cases of interpersonal conflict (of the relevant kind) due to moral
disagreement, an impartial, egalitarian solution is called for, and it is wrong to just
stand one’s ground. (From 3 and 4.)
6. However, in cases of interpersonal conflict (of the relevant kind) due to moral
disagreement often an impartial solution is not called for, and it is permissible, and
even required, to stand one’s ground.
7. Therefore, Caricaturized Subjectivism is false. (From 1, 5, and 6, by Reductio.)61
59
Enoch describes this metaethical view as: “Moral judgments report simple preferences, ones that are
exactly on a par with a preference for playing tennis or for catching a movie.” Ibid., 25.

Enoch explains that impartiality as a moral principle can be described in the following terms. “In an
interpersonal conflict, we should step back from our mere preferences, or feelings, or attitudes, or some such, and to
the extent the conflict is due to those, an impartial, egalitarian solution is called for. Furthermore, each party to the
conflict should acknowledge as much: Standing one’s ground is, in such cases, morally wrong.” Ibid., 19.
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As the argument shows, it is usually the case that an impartial, egalitarian solution is neither
expected nor sought after if someone is discussing a matter of great moral worth. In theory,
before the discussion begins, one may insist that it is possible; but in reality, this is not the way
people actually talk about moral matters.
Moral Reformers
Western society is indebted to the great work of moral reformers like Martin Luther King
Jr. who championed for the equal rights of all humans. King’s call for moral reform during the
civil rights movement entailed more than a request for culture to change. He appealed to a
higher, transcendent standard for morality. Although King advocated for people to acknowledge
God’s moral law, he appealed to the objective morality found within each human regardless of
their acceptance of his theological perspective. The call for racial equality and overall acceptance
of human dignity would be “logically impossible” in a normative relativistic society. 62
The argument for moral reformers can be construed in the following way. If M is a moral
reformer, then M is a person who believes culture x has an incorrect moral code; and M claims
the acts declared by culture x’s moral code are wrong and need to change. If cultural relativism is
true, then moral reformers like M are mistaken. However, not every moral reformer is mistaken;
therefore, cultural relativism is not valid. It would be a difficult task to convince someone that a
moral reformer like Martin Luther King Jr. was mistaken when he advocated for societal reforms
during the civil rights movement. Ethical systems must offer reasons why these reformers made
valid appeals. Martin Luther King Jr. and other reformers rarely argue from the standpoint of
societal codes; rather, they appeal to a higher, transcendent standard outside of humanity. “Social
62
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reformers have some degree of faith in the goodness and perfectibility of human beings,”
Passmore observes.63 The moral reformer dilemma thus gives another reason for taking objective
morality seriously.
Moral Mistakes
When people think about Hitler, Stalin, and Pol Pot they do not gloss over their deeds as
something deserving a simple slap on the wrist. There is a universal disgust at the thought of
genocide and other malevolent acts done to humans. These deeds are considered egregious moral
errors that must not continue. How should humans look at the infamous deeds of individuals who
touted for the removal of another people group because they did not fit their cultural standard? If
moral relativism is true, one cannot disapprovingly speak out against these acts, without some
logical inconsistencies, because they were being done for the advancement of their cultural
agenda. Even in a utilitarian moral system, these deeds can be justified because it brought about
the greatest good for the greatest number of people to exterminate those individuals who acted
contrary to the way their society was structured.
To follow an anti-realism theory of morality, one would have to say that the great evils
done in the twentieth century were not moral mistakes. However, human experience looks upon
these deeds with repulsion. There are no calculations needed to weigh out whether these deeds
are good or bad. They are wrong, whether people understand why they know them to be wrong
or not. The strangeness of identifying things as universally acknowledged moral mistakes fits
within a system of morality that is objective against one that is subjective. There is “nothing
63
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strange” about it, Shafer-Landau observes, “but something we all understand.”64 Therefore, the
way humans talk about moral mistakes points to taking objective morality seriously.
Victims of Injustice
So far it has been shown that people discuss and argue moral matters, expect certain
moral changes to be done, and believe moral mistakes happen. These points take on a personal
aspect when certain deeds are done to an individual. People on the receiving end of some actions
feel victimized. They take up a strong stance that they, in some way, have been mistreated and
deserve justice. Specifically, they feel as if not only their personal preferences have been
overridden but some great wrong has been done that even others should recognize. 65
One may view injustices contextually or personally. 66 From a contextual standpoint, acts
of injustice result from situational circumstances and expectations. On a personal level, injustices
are conceptualized as a breach in the normal function and expectation for how humans operate in
the world. To be “all in” in a relativistic system of morality would say that people cannot be
victims of injustice if a culture arbitrarily decides what is acceptable behavior or not. Personal
experience speaks otherwise. The victims of the holocaust or victims of egregious acts against
human dignity do not look to society alone for explanations and resolutions for how they are
being treated. Even the individual who exclaims, “That is not fair!” when treated contrary to
64
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their expectation appeals to something beyond what relativism is able to offer. The most
plausible explanation is that objective morality is to be taken seriously.
Cultural Consensus
Objective morality not only has a response to cultural relativism, it also is not
undermined by it. According to moral realism, moral facts are discoverable and people can be
mistaken about them. Simply because a different culture fails to acknowledge some moral fact
does not negate the existence of the objective fact. Morality, like science, is subject to
verification. Morality is discoverable just like mathematical principles. Whether one knows it or
not, a basic principle like 2+2=4 is a universal concept that anyone can discover. This explains
why people have been mistaken about moral issues throughout time. Relativism says that
morality can change over time and between cultures. However, this presents many logical
inconsistencies. If one holds that moral facts are discoverable, then it is not that facts change but
that people discover them. It is a universal, timeless fact that murdering is wrong. Just because it
was believed in previous generations that the sun circled the earth does not negate the actual
truth of reality. It was discovered and verified through scientific explanations that the earth
circles the sun. If morality is subjective, then it was right for previous generations to enslave
other humans and demean human dignity. People do not believe this is the case, and even though
some cultures may believe it today it does not make it right.
Many discrepancies between cultures are not over moral facts but over the application of
them. A moral relativist may look at a culture that believes it is morally inexcusable to kill a cow
and conclude that their stance on morality differs vastly from another culture that says killing
cows is amoral. However, the undergirding principle for why an individual feels strongly against
killing a cow is because they believe their departed ancestor resides in the cow. Therefore, it
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would be wrong for them to kill the cow because they are killing a relative. The basic principle
remains, but it is construed differently.
For one to conclude that morality must be subjective because different cultures hold
different moral principles is to place too much emphasis on the debates. “If scientific
disagreements don’t undermine the objective status of science,” Shafer-Landau explains, “then
moral disagreements shouldn’t undermine the objective status of morality.” 67 Therefore, the
difference between cultures does not undermine moral realism, but rather upholds the universal
principles found within it.
A Moral World
Moral obligations and judgments are a part of human experience in the world. 68 People
maintain the peculiar assumption they are expected to act in a certain manner and that they
would be judged if they did not. These obligations and judgments are universal and recognizable
regardless of how one feels about them. This says something about moral values and the human
ability to recognize them epistemically. This connects back to the argument for moral realism.
There are certain aspects of this world and reality that point to objective morality. As the
argument for moral realism advances below, emphasis will be placed on understanding moral
values, knowledge, judgments, and obligations.
How do anti-realists conceive of a world without objective morality? Richard Dawkins
boldly asserts that, “The universe that we observe has precisely the properties we should expect
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if there is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil, no good, nothing but pitiless indifference.”69
If Dawkins is correct, then “indifference” should be the accepted standard; however, this is not
the case. People do not see the world and its morals as a thing of indifference. The first six points
conflict greatly with his pessimistic view of reality. If the world only displays indifference, then
it is contrary to people’s perception of reality.
Summary
Six reasons have been given for taking objective morality seriously. Although a full
defense has not been given for objective morality, the above points at least provide a probable
case for understanding the objectiveness of morality. Time does not permit to address every
objection to the case made above, however, it is essential to bring to light how this impacts the
current discussion.70
How does the objectivity of morality relate to perfection? Elucidated above were reasons
people hold themselves and others to some kind of standard of morality. The expectation is that
the standard entails more than “do not murder” or “do not steal.” Paul Copan writes, “There’s
virtually no dispute that racism, theft, fraud, child abuse, murder, and rape are morally wrong.
Even despots who carry out such acts will publicly deny rather than own up to such heinous
acts.”71 If these were the only objective aspects to morality, then one could easily live a “perfect
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life” by not following through on these actions. However, there is much more at stake. Morality
not only involves avoiding evil, but also actively doing good. As one author commented, “Each
human being has an immense capacity for evil. Each human being understands, a priori, perhaps
not what is good, but certainly what is not. And if there is something that is not good, then there
is something that is good.”72 On some level, avoiding evil is a vital component of living a moral
life, but what would be said of the individual who saw a child drowning and decided not to act?
Would they be guilty of murder? Would someone hold them culpable for not doing good? The
expectation people feel to act upon some moral principle points toward understanding the desire
for perfection outside of purely humanistic explanations. Even though objective morality exists
why do people feel guilty for not living up to a particular standard? Before further explanations
can be given for what provides the best explanation for these beliefs, one must understand how
moral knowledge is acquired.

Moral Knowledge
If objective morals exist, how does one come to know about these moral facts? In the
present discussion, the case is being made that the moral law comes from a perfectly divine
being that expects individuals to live in a particular way; however, before a complete case for
theism can be made, attention will be given to secular substitutes that attempt to explain moral
knowledge.
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Epistemology
Humans possess different types of knowledge. In a basic form, humans have knowledge
about reality, the universe, and humanity. For example, it is possible to know that two hydrogen
atoms can bond with an oxygen atom to form water, 2 + 2 = 4, and George Washington was the
first president of the United States. Different methods may be employed to come to a knowledge
of these facts, but the facts are not necessarily dependent upon the method. Regardless, one can
test these facts to determine if they are true or false. This leads to two pertinent questions: Does
knowledge about moral facts differ from other facts of reality and are moral facts discoverable
like other epistemological facts?
A few limitations need to be mentioned before the study can proceed. First, conversations
about epistemology focus on what humans can or cannot know about the world and reality. In a
simplified account, people can know certain facts that are vastly different than a Matrix version
of reality.73 For the present discussion, it will be assumed that the Matrix model is invalid.
Second, another basic component of epistemology is that everyone has beliefs that are
either true or false. The range of these beliefs are vast and diverse. For this discussion,
epistemology will be narrowed down to what people can know about moral facts, and not a
general study of epistemology (although some foundational concepts will be referenced
throughout). If the case being made up to this point is to be valid, the argument rests upon people
knowing what is true or false about morality. In other words, objective morality rests upon the
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assumption that all properly functioning, rationale beings can know what is objectively right or
wrong. The issue comes when considering how humans come to know these moral facts. 74
Acquiring Knowledge
Humans gain knowledge by education, parental guidance, peer interactions, personal
growth, societal connections, and human flourishing. These are all valid ways of gaining
knowledge about certain aspects of the world and reality, but they do not tell the whole story for
understanding morality. Stephen Evans bifurcates ethical theories based on a distinction given by
the philosopher Gilbert Harman. In response to Harman’s observation that relativists, skeptics,
nihilists and non-cognitivists oppose advocates of absolute values and a universal moral law;
Evans compartmentalizes the views into moral realists and moral skeptics. Moral realists hold
there is such a thing as, “objective moral knowledge, where objective moral knowledge is
understood as knowledge of moral propositions whose truth is ‘stance-independent.’” 75 Moral
skeptics, on the other hand, do not believe humans can have objective moral knowledge. The
importance of drawing upon truths that are stance-independent is there is no equivocation. They
exist independently of someone’s personal beliefs or feelings. Even if someone does not buy into
moral realism wholesale, the potential still stands for them to understand that certain ethical
theories offer a weaker stance compared to other options—namely the version of theism offered
here.
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In continuation of Evans’ argumentation, he highlights an important point derived from
the distinction between moral realists and moral skeptics. On each side of the chasm, proponents
are convinced that their view is the correct view of reality. Does such a divide serve as a
counterexample to moral realism? Can both views of reality simultaneously be true? The law of
non-contradiction would say that both views cannot be right at the same time. One can be right
while the other is wrong or they both equally are wrong, but they both cannot stand together.
Aside from knowing that one or both views are wrong, the question may be asked, “Which one
offers the most explanatory power to answer the questions of moral knowledge?” The goal here
will not be to show that moral skepticism is wrong, but rather than moral realism offers a more
plausible solution for moral knowledge with one specific qualification elucidated below.
By way of reiteration, it may be important to show what morality is in other ethical
systems. Scott Smith gives a summarized list of basic views of morality outside of theism. He
says morality can be,
1. Physical things, or the product of evolutionary processes
2. Just ways of behaving, or moving our body parts
3. The results of our imposition of our self-legislating reason upon matter
4. Emotive utterances
5. The results of utilitarian calculations
6. Our constructs, individually or socially (relativist)
7. Just something due to how we happen to interpret (talk or conceive of) things (i.e.,
postmodern).76
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Given these options, how do these theories explain the knowledge of certain basic moral facts?
Suppose one was to inject one of the following statements—murder, rape, and torturing babies
for fun is wrong, and love and justice are virtues— into a given ethical system. 77 What would be
the response when asked if these statements are true or false? How does one come to the
knowledge these things are veridical or not? How one comes to know what is true is not nearly
as important as knowing the rock-bottom foundation for understanding some things are right or
wrong.
Two overarching categories in ethics is cognitivism and non-cognitivism. Noncognitivism holds there is no knowledge of moral facts. One ethical system in this category is
emotivism. Emotivism demotes statements about morality to statements of feeling. People do not
make statements about the objectivity of morality, but only speak in terms of emotion. “Murder
is wrong” is equivalent to saying, “Murder, yuck!” Statements about morality do not express
facts but only emotional feelings about a topic. Emotivism, sometimes confused with a
cognitivist subjectivism, does not believe morality can be said to be right or wrong. Conversely,
cognitivism maintains that moral statements have truth-values. Ethical systems like
utilitarianism, egoism, and virtue ethics believe in truth-values and can speak concretely about
morality although there are disputes about the objectivity or subjectivity of the action under
dispute.
would undercut morality, making it possible that (for example) these principles could have turned out otherwise or
are just descriptive matters of fact.” Ibid.
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A cognitivist theory may not buy into moral realism, but it does share in the fact that truth
claims exist. The question becomes, how does one come to a knowledge of these truth claims
especially regarding statements about morality?
Conscience/Intuition
When the case was made for moral realism above, the point was introduced that moral
realism is not dependent upon a theistic view of morality. In this section the topic of conscience,
and more specifically intuition, will be addressed as potential candidates to explain moral
knowledge. People appeal to conscience as a guide for making moral decisions, and while they
are correct in using that term, they typically are referring to intuition.78 Intuitionism looks to an
internal explanation for believing the rightness or wrongness of a moral matter.
The philosophers who align with intuitionism take conscience to a different degree. One
intuitionist, Jonathan Haidt, defines intuition as, “the best word to describe the dozens or
hundreds of rapid, effortless moral judgments and decisions that we all make every day. Only a
few of these intuitions come to us embedded in full-blown emotions.”79 He establishes that moral
judgment is a cognitive process. Robert Audi argues that, “[The moral property of an act]. . . is
grounded in a certain set of natural properties, roughly in the sense that when something has a
moral property, say being obligatory, it has this property in virtue of possessing the (grounding)
natural properties.”80 Audi’s view is that moral properties and their potential obligatory nature
78
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are just natural facts in and of themselves. 81 G. E. Moore comments on his understanding of
intuition by saying,
If I am asked “What is good?” my answer is that good is good, and that is the end of the
matter. Or if I am asked “How is good to be defined?” my answer is that it cannot be
defined, and that is all I have to say about it. . . . My point is that “good” is a simple
notion, just as “yellow” is a simple notion; that, just as you cannot, by any manner of
means, explain to any one who does not already know it, what yellow is, so you cannot
explain what good is.82
No doubt the simplicity of such a definition of intuition is appealing. It is appealing for some of
the same reasons given for understanding moral realism. People possess a foundational capacity
to understand and draw conclusions about morality. This is shared by both theists and nontheists
because it is a part of the fabric of the universe that humans understand without many other
qualifiers.
Consider the version of intuitionism touted by philosopher Erik Wielenberg. He argues
for a non-natural, non-theistic version of moralism. Wielenberg believes, “there are sui generis
objective ethical facts that do not reduce to natural or supernatural facts.” 83 In his defense he
states that these facts, “are not reducible to other kinds of properties, including natural properties
that can be studied by the empirical sciences and supernatural properties involving God.”84 He
contends that moral knowledge comes from intuition, and that some moral facts are simply brute
facts. These facts are just some things that all people know about morality that are nonreducible—they are part of the furniture of the universe. Wielenberg’s attempt at explaining
81
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moral knowledge is innovative and intriguing, but it lacks the ability to bind moral obligations on
individuals. What is the motivation and impetus for living a moral life in a non-natural, nontheistic version of morality? There are weaknesses here, but they will be explicated in a latter
section. It will suffice to say that Wielenberg’s account of moral knowledge falls prey to what
other naturalistic versions of morality suffer—a lack of grounding for moral obligations.
In contrast to an intuitionist account of moral knowledge, philosopher J. L. Mackie posits
a moral error theory. In response to moral realism he states, “If there were objective values, then
they would be entities or qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from
anything else in the universe.” 85 He then turns to intuitionism and states, “Correspondingly, if
we were aware of [objective values], it would have to be by some special faculty of moral
perception or intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing everything else.” 86
Mackie’s objection to objective moral knowledge is only “strange” if naturalism is true, but in a
theistic universe there is a proper explanation.
One may be asking at this point what is the issue with intuitionism? First, there is the
obvious issue that some versions of intuitionism are grounded in naturalism. The explanatory
power of naturalism to provide an account of objective moral facts is weak compared to theism.
Naturalism’s weakness is that evolution cannot account for non-natural forms without an infinite
regress of evolutionary hypotheses for explanations for the existence of intuition itself or
consigning it to a lower principle all together. Second, without some kind of foundation for the
grounding of intuition, people are left to decide what is right or wrong based on their feelings
about it. Herein lies one issue in epistemology. Can two people have differing views about moral
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issues? Take for example one person may believe throwing frogs alive into a fire is wrong while
another sees no moral issue. They may not agree on the morality of the issue—throwing frogs
alive into a fire—but are there other self-evident factors at play upon which they can agree? It
may be self-evident that causing unjustified pain is wrong, but applying that principle is different
between people. Intuition can justify some propositional statements about morality, but it fails on
many accounts to provide a full explanation for moral issues.
Theism and Moral Knowledge
Up to this point naturalistic explanations have been given primarily as potential solutions
for the issues created when examining moral phenomena. Little has been mentioned from a
theistic standpoint, which has been done strategically. The goal has been to show that naturalistic
explanations for the unique and strange nature of morality do not get someone all the way down
the road for a complete understanding of it. In this section theism will be offered as a possible
solution for understanding moral knowledge within the parameters of moral realism shown
previously.
No knockdown, end-all-be-all explanation has been offered to this point. Much of what
has been done in previous sections has been to offer possible solutions, and the following section
on theism will not differ much from this process. Even though theism will be introduced here,
one still has a long way to go before arriving at Christian theism. Minimally the goal will be to
show that theism offers some valuable insight for grasping moral knowledge.
It has been shown there are self-evident, objective moral truths in the world. Interrelated
with this has been the task of figuring out how humans come to a knowledge of these facts. A
nontheist, naturalist may posit that self-evident truths do not need an explanation. Theism usually
responds with the formulation of a moral argument.
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1. If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist.
2. Objective moral values do exist.
3. Therefore, God exists (probably).
The logical construction of this argument is valid, and although it does not go without its
opponents, premise two typically stands accepted. The challenge comes in proving premise one.
Is it true that without God objective moral values do not exist? This question involves a few
different responses. First, one may see that moral values have an ontological connection to God’s
existence.87 Second, how can someone know that moral values come from God? The second
question deserves further consideration, given the discussion of epistemology.
A basic account of theism holds that a completely perfect being created the universe and
designed humans for a particular purpose. The designer not only determines the purpose of
human creation, but also provides the needed faculties to grasp and comprehend their purpose.
The existence of objective moral values seems to be one of those basic designed components.
Humans stand out differently from the rest of the created world. More specifically, humans share
certain intrinsic values not found elsewhere. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, an atheist, shows the
distinctiveness of humans in contrast to lower animals,
Lower animals, such as lions, are not moral agents. They do not make free choices. Their
actions are not determined by any conception of what is moral or not. That explains why
moral rules and principles do not apply to lower animals any more than they apply to
avalanches that kill people. You don’t need to add that humans were made in God’s
image or that we are His favorite species or anything religious. 88
Sinnott-Armstrong makes his statement in response whether it is immoral for one lion to force
sex upon another lion. The difference between a lion forcing sex and a human committing rape,
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in Sinnott-Armstrong’s view, is that humans are moral agents who are able to make free choices.
This is a very interesting take, because naturalism is deficient in providing a reason why humans
are moral agents with free choice. This description of humans fits more in a theistic worldview
than in a naturalistic one. Theism says that humans are created as moral agents with the free
ability to choose to live morally or not. If humans evolved into moral agents, then it is equally
possible that humans could have evolved into believing that it is morally acceptable to rape.
However, if moral realism is true, there are self-evident facts about morality that transcend
human experience (nonnatural), which fit more within a theistic worldview where a transcendent
mind created humans as moral agents and provides further instructions for how they should live.
What is meant by “further instructions”? If the existence of a perfect being is
conceivable, then it is also plausible this being would also share information with its creation.
This is part of the value of a design argument for creation. 89 If something exhibits the qualities of
being designed, then it would be logically consistent to believe a designer is also involved. 90 This
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does not give a full proof for God, but it introduces the idea of a personal God who cares deeply
about His creation and expects it to function in a certain way.91
Theism supports the case that God has the ability and intentional desire to reveal himself
to his creation. Baggett and Walls say that theism can utilize several explanations for moral
knowledge: Natural law, conscience, moral intuitions, general revelation, [the way] minds are
structured, distinctive features of consciousness, how we use and acquire language, our natural
tendencies toward socialization, and the constitutive rules of institutions. 92 These explanations
are part of how God reveals himself and the information he desires humanity to know. It may be
observed that there are two components to revelation: general and special. When speaking of
general revelation, Boa and Bowman suggest, “. . .God gave us our faculty of reason and
directed his revelation to it.” 93 Human rationality then becomes a sign to point to God and also a
tool to be utilized by God. “Therefore, God expects us to employ our reasoning abilities” Boa
and Bowman continue, “both to recognize his true revelation and to detect the fraudulent
revelations of other religions.”94 This is evidenced throughout the preceding sections of this
chapter. It does not take much reworking to accept, if there is a God, that he utilizes aspects of
his created order for his own purposes.
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Why revelation? Richard Swinburne introduces the probability of revelation by
examining some of the evidence for God. He says, “[It is] quite likely that there is a God, all‐
powerful and all‐good, who made the Earth and its inhabitants, then. . . it becomes to some
extent likely that he will become incarnate at some time in human history for certain purposes,
and claims that he has done so require a lot less in the way of historical evidence than they would
do otherwise.95 The amount of evidence needed to get from God to the probability of him giving
some kind of revelation is quite reasonable to grasp. Different reasons may be supposed for why
God would do this, but one option fits the moral discussion. “There are matters which it would
be very good for us to know,” Swinburne elucidates, “which are such that either we could not
find them out for ourselves, or we have not previously proved persistent or honest enough with
ourselves to do so.”96 This is why the two views of revelation—general and special—are
important.
General Revelation
General revelation refers to “God's self-manifestation through nature, history, and the
inner being of the human person.”97 What is meant here is that God can place guideposts or signs
pointing to him that are universally available and the content is such that people can recognize it.
First, He may choose to manifest himself through certain aspects of nature; in those aspects that
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show a design. Second, He can also manifest through the details of history that show his
interaction throughout time. Third, and the most interesting for the current study, is that God
could manifest himself in the inner being—intuition or conscience—of humans so they may
know Him and certain parts of his will. Reasons have been given for why intuition alone is not a
viable option for gaining moral knowledge, but when considered with a more robust theistic
worldview, it can serve as a guidepost for the moral law.
Special Revelation
Special revelation is, “God's manifestation of himself to particular persons at definite
times and places, enabling those persons to enter into a redemptive relationship with him.”98
Erickson’s definition of special revelation focuses on God revealing himself in such a way that
leads people to know him on an intimate level. A key of special revelation is that God provides
information that is more detailed and specific than what is given through general revelation. The
moral code within all humans, identified through general revelation, is not as complete as what is
given through special revelation. The ultimate form of special revelation is when God manifested
himself to humanity through the incarnation, thus becoming a part of humanity to disclose
himself.
Morality and Revelation
Some may struggle with the fact that God has not given enough evidence to believe his
existence. Although the present discussion is concerned with morality, there is a consistent point
across arguments for God’s existence. Could God provide more evidence for his existence? Yes,
he could drop pamphlets from the sky every morning declaring his existence. However, within
98
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Christianity, these things are unnecessary. Christianity says that God has provided the exact
evidence needed for an individual to trust him. The goal is for humans to believe in God and
have faith in Him. The evidence presented from morality points to God as the likely best
explanation for its unique nature. Why would God require such a high standard of living? Could
it be that he requires such a high standard for living while knowing that humans cannot do it on
their own merit? Does this produce more or less faith and dependence on God? If living a moral
life is solely based on what humans are able to do, then there is little need for God. However, the
standard is so high that humans must depend on God’s assistance to live up to the standard that
not only God declares but also instills within humans. In reality, the standard is not solely based
on what humans do but also on what humans become. This will become more evident as a closer
look is taken at the standard God has set for people, which will show that God is concerned
about his creation coming into proper order with him.
Summary
This quick analysis of moral knowledge has been to point to something beyond the
material world for the grounding of morality. A handful of naturalistic options were given as
possible solutions for gaining moral knowledge. Finally, theism has been offered as a plausible
solution for gaining moral knowledge with the hope that it is seen as the likely best solution.
A few key concepts deserve reiteration. It has been shown that moral facts are knowable
like scientific facts, but they are not necessarily discovered by scientific means. Naturalism holds
that moral knowledge results from evolutionary, adaptive changes in the human race that enable
humans to function in a society together, reproduce, and flourish. Naturalism fails to ground
morality, to distinguish between competing morals, and to offer a viable solution for why
humans should live morally. At this point in the research attention will be given to the
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expectation humans have to live according to the moral law. How specific is the moral law and
to what degree are humans expected to live up to it? This will be accomplished by looking at
moral obligations.

Moral Obligations
There are two ways to talk about moral issues. First, one may speak about morality from
a theoretical standpoint. Conversations about morality are all well and good, but they are only
intellectual fodder unless they are carried from the theoretical to the practical. Thus, the second
way to discuss morals has to do with their practical nature. Much of what has been introduced in
this chapter has been from a theoretical perspective. Some philosophical peaks needed
traversing, but overall, the case made for moral realism has the advantage of appealing to one’s
practical understanding of morality. This section will take the conversation one step further by
dealing with moral obligations. The rubber meets the road when conversations about morality
turn to what one “ought” to do. The nature of obligations may cause one to ask a few questions.
What constitutes a moral obligation? Is naturalism able to produce moral obligations? What
explanation can be given for moral obligations that makes the most sense to human knowledge,
experience, and expectations?
The Nature of Obligations
“The moralities accepted among men may differ—though not, at bottom, so widely as is
often claimed—but they all agree in prescribing a behavior which their adherents fail to
practice.”99 This quote from C. S. Lewis introduces two critical aspects about moral obligations
that need further clarification. First, objective morals, founded on universally accepted
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principles, entail prescriptive behaviors. Second, although certain behaviors are prescriptive,
people do not always follow them. The first concept will be the focus of this section while the
second will be addressed further along.
When speaking of obligations, one may use one of three terms to convey the idea of an
obligation. First, something can be forbidden. A forbidden act is obligatory to avoid doing.
Second, an obligatory act is one that must be done. Third, a permissible act is one that is not
forbidden to do.100 These terms can be played out in many different contexts, for example in
business, law, or medicine. However, obligations addressed here concern moral actions and not
just ethical decisions. 101
Prescriptive behavior is about what is right and wrong to do.102 Someone may say, “it is
wrong to murder,” while someone else says it is “wrong to eat cereal with a fork.” The
distinction between these statements should be apparent. In the first instance a moral statement is
being made and in the second one is speaking of etiquette. By way of particularism, one can
conclude this. Particularism refers to the point that “One can know some things directly and
simply without having to have criteria for how one knows them and without having to know how
or even that one knows them.”103 However, not all statements are as easily identifiable. What is
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meant by stating, “It is wrong to drive on the left side of the road in America”? 104 Does this
constitute a moral issue or something else altogether? J.P. Moreland and William Lane Craig
detail a set of necessary conditions for defining morality:
1. A judgment is moral only if it is accepted as a supremely authoritative, overriding
guide to conduct, attitudes, and motives.
2. A judgment is moral only if it is a prescriptive imperative that recommends actions,
attitudes, and motives and not merely a factual description about actions, attitudes,
and motives.
3. A judgment is moral only if it is universalizable, that is, it applies equally to all
relevantly similar situations.
4. A judgment is moral only if it makes reference to proper human flourishing, human
dignity, the welfare of others, the prevention of harm and the provision of benefit.105
The nature of morality listed here and explained above, provide a platform for discussing the
binding effect of morality upon humans. Thus, considering the nature of morality, what is meant
by moral obligations?
Stephen Evans delineates four special features of moral obligations that make them
unique from other obligations.106 First, an obligation is binary—either it ought to be done or it
ought not to be done; 2. Once an individual identifies an obligation to be done, further
deliberation is unnecessary; 3. Moral obligations require accountability or responsibility; and 4.
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They are universal to all persons. Because of these special features, one has an obligation not to
torture babies for fun, while no such obligation is imposed on someone who eats cereal with a
fork.
The Ought Knot
A common difficulty is with the meaning of the word “ought”? “Ought” is used in
several contexts.107 For instance, an aesthetic ought deals in the realm of taste and beauty.108 An
operational ought may be referring to something performing or functioning according to its
intended purpose (this can be biological or engineered). A rational ought may be that something
should be believed because of some evidence. Finally, the one more pertinent to this discussion
is a moral ought. A moral ought maintains that some action, constituted as a moral act, must be
done. A moral ought, founded on moral realism, says that one ought to perform (or abstain from)
an action regardless of one’s thoughts, feelings, or emotions about it. By contrast, a moral ought,
derived from some other standpoint—cultural, personal, natural, etc.—may still consist of
expectations but from a subjective perspective. Clearly the different uses of “ought” bring about
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an issue in the present discussion. The confusion of oughts, especially in morality, creates a knot
of beliefs, perspectives, and issues. To untie the ought knot, further clarification is needed.
Specifically, clarification about what provides the best explanation for moral obligations that fit
within the provided context.
The German philosopher, Immanuel Kant, is attributed with the dictum, “Ought implies
can.”109 According to Kant’s philosophy, there are certain acts, derived from the moral law, that
all humans are expected to do. These imperatives, categorically identified, are universally
recognized and applicable to all people regardless of any one person’s beliefs or goals. These
imperatives constitute a duty, which are expected and able to be followed.
For Kant, an action ought to be done if it passes the categorical test; but does Kant’s test
provide the best explanation for moral obligations? From another perspective, the well-known
philosopher, David Hume, brought to light what has been called the “is-ought” challenge. The
challenge comes when trying to explain how one moves from the is of nature to the ought of
morality. An is can be derived from looking at science and the natural world. Some argue that
morality is an evolutionary adaptation like opposable thumbs, fingernails, and teeth.110 How can
these natural facts impose an ought upon humans? Within a naturalistic system, there is no
expectation for someone to live a certain way that is different from the expectation one has to
eat. “If naturalism is true,” Lewis asserts, “then ‘I ought’ is the same sort of statements as ‘I
itch.’”111
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When people speak about what someone ought to do, they are usually expressing a
statement that has more binding force than some subjective feeling or emotion. Evans, once
again, provides some help in understanding moral obligations. He shows that obligations push
one toward the right motivation to be moral. These obligations “[i]nvolve a kind of verdict on an
action,” Evans posits, “they make it possible to bring reflection on action to closure and make a
decision about the action by providing a decisive reason for action, they are the kinds of things
people are rightly held responsible for doing or omitting, and they hold for human persons just as
human persons.”112 Evans’ appeal is that obligations are held for humans because humans know
these facts to be true. Humans not only know what to do, they are expected to actually do what is
obligatorily binding.
Naturalistic Explanations
There are at least three naturalistic explanations for moral obligations.113 First, moral
obligations are part of biology and psychology. Second, moral obligations are a result of human
interactions in societies. Third, moral obligations are a result of rational demands humans impose
upon themselves as rational beings.114 Each of these points deserve their own comment, but for
the sake of space, a response will be given to them collectively.
Out of the number of authors mentioned throughout this work, theist or not, many have
had their own contentions with naturalism’s efficacy to explain obligations or not. Many of their
contentions have been against naturalism’s inability to produce a plausible and consistent
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explanation for moral phenomena. Their discontent results from them looking for an explanation
that matches human experience in a strictly materialistic world. The dissatisfaction comes from
the self-realization humans have that they are more than a group of atoms colliding into each
other. Although this seems to be the case, those naturalists who disagree have the burden of
proof.
One naturalist, Bertrand Russell, abandoned his cognitivist view of ethics for a noncognitivist perspective. Upon reflection of humanity’s beliefs and desires he concluded that they
are only, “the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms.” 115 Thus, beliefs and desires are
nothing more than humans being humans in a solely materialistic world. He shows that, “good
and bad are derivative from desire.”116 The obligations people feel are just the result of humans
interacting in social contexts. The only obligation humans have is to do “acts so as to produce
harmonious rather than discordant desires.” According to Russell, these acts are good because
they would not disrupt human interactions. 117
In a Russellian world, as George Mavrodes contends, it would be very strange to have
obligations like humans experience with pleasure, happiness, esteem, contentment, selfrealization, and knowledge experience.118 The obligations people experience are a “special
relation to certain actions,” Mavrodes concludes. 119 The strangeness of such expectations are
hard to justify in a world that has no grounding for morality.
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Although there are exceptions to the rule (e.g., Wielenberg’s defense), most naturalists
purport that moral values and obligations are potentially grounded with at least one natural
property.120 Those who hold to a non-natural belief must face the supervenience challenge. The
challenge results from holding to the belief that the normative supervenes on the natural and that
there are “metaphysically necessary connections between discontinuous properties.” 121 Recall
that Wielenberg holds that non-natural properties are sui generis; thus, they are of a different
kind of thing all together from natural properties. Since non-natural properties differ from the
natural; the non-natural facts, like one would expect for morality, must supervene on the natural.
However, how does a value like goodness supervene on a property like feeding the hungry? This
seems unintelligible, because a physical object cannot reach out to communicate with an abstract
concept like goodness for it to supervene upon it. Furthermore, how is it decided which property
is supervened upon another? The arbitrariness of this leads to many other challenges unless there
is a concrete standard or some other way to determine which value is placed on what property.
Assume for the moment that natural properties produce obligations (whether some nonnatural property supervenes on it or not). If moral obligations come from at least one natural
property, is there a common consensus and expectation for the action to be done? Even if
naturalism can produce a version of moral obligations, are these obligations enforceable and apt
to produce judgments, guilt, and accountability?
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Two of the unique qualities of obligations is that some actions are considered permissible
while others are forbidden. One may dismiss these distinctions insisting that moral obligations
are illusory. However, as it has been noted, moral obligations are insistent. Whether someone has
a theoretical explanation or not, people usually have a practical view of whether certain actions
should or should not be done. If an act is permissible or forbidden, who gets the final judgment
on the matter? It is hardly possible to demand someone to do something if it is just as possible
for them to say, “Who are you to tell me what to do?” As it has been said, humans do expect
other humans to behave in a particular way and even feel as if some great wrong has been done if
others do not live up to that same standard. Their feelings of outrage or disappointment may be
just as illusory as the original obligation, but one does not easily cast out their own convictions
and emotions of guilt, shame, and dishonor.
J.L. Mackie thinks that what humans feel is simply a “moral error.” He shows that moral
skepticism readily admits “a belief in objective values is built into ordinary moral thoughts and
language” but it also acknowledges, “this ingrained belief is false.” 122 Therefore, when people
feel obligations or have reasons for an action, it is from the “nature of the thing,” like playing
chess by the rules.123 This might cause one to ask: Who decided that humans are playing chess
and who made the rules? Mackie contends that humans do not discover the rules but create
them.124 Thus, it is up to each individual to determine the good in their own life. In a final
response to the matter, Mackie says,
My hope is that concrete moral issues can be argued out without appeal to any mythical
objective values or requirements or obligations or transcendental necessities, but also
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without appeal to a fictitiously unitary and measurable happiness or to invalid arguments
that attempt to establish the general happiness as a peculiarly authoritative end.
If one accepts Mackie’s conclusion, then moral obligations become no more than personal
preference, illusory feelings, and erroneous beliefs.
The above positions can be distilled down into two main views: 1. Objective morality
exists and entails moral obligations; or 2. Objective morality does not exist, and moral
obligations are illusory. These few naturalistic explanations for moral obligations face several
problems hinted at throughout this section. One major issue not brought to light is how
humanity’s desire for perfection fits into these views. In the first view, it makes logical sense that
humans feel the desire to live a perfectly moral life if objective morality exists. If people possess
the rational capabilities to identify what is good and have a pull toward them, then it would
follow that people would make them their end. On the other view, however, since there are no
moral obligations, humanity’s desire for perfection is either nonexistent or completely
subjective. This may appear to be in line with what humans experience, but it requires the
dismissal of both objective morals and moral obligations which is implausible given the facts
presented earlier. Therefore, the first view seems the more plausible reason humans feel the
desire to live a perfect life; but does naturalism offer the best solution or does it leave one
wanting?
To determine what offers the best solution for humanity’s desire for perfection in the
context of moral obligations, it is important to bring in another option besides naturalism. The
goal throughout this work has been to present an abductive argument for theism, namely the kind
found in Christianity. Some forms of naturalism provide a potential solution, but one must ask
the question does naturalism offer the likely best solution? Therefore, the next section will
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introduce a theistic explanation for moral obligations that will hopefully provide a more robust
solution.
Theistic Explanation
Can people be good without God? This question has been implied in a few ways leading
to this point. It will be the purpose of this section to consider the implications of a theistic model
for unwinding the ought knot. As it has been shown, there are issues with naturalism’s ability to
produce obligations and moral values to the extent that humans expect. In Dostoevsky’s The
Brothers Karamazov, Ivan Karamazov states that without God “everything is permitted.” This
famous statement has become the focus of many debates about theism’s relationship to moral
obligations. Can moral obligations exist without God? The atheist philosopher, Jean-Paul Sartre,
took this statement literally. Commenting on Dostoevsky, Sartre says,
Existentialists. . .find it extremely disturbing that God no longer exists, for along with his
disappearance goes the possibility of finding values in an intelligible heaven. There could
no longer be any a priori good, since there would be no infinite and perfect
consciousness to conceive of it. Nowhere is it written that good exists, that we must be
honest or must not lie, since we are on a plane shared only by men. . . . If, therefore, God
does not exist, we will encounter no values or orders that can legitimize our conduct.
Thus, we have neither behind us, nor before us, in the luminous realm of values, any
means of justification or excuse. We are left alone and without excuse. 125
In the sentiment of Nietzsche’s “death of God,” Sartre’s point is that when God is removed from
the picture there is no place for objective morality or value. If Sartre is right, does theism give
the best explanation for moral values and obligations? Mackie agrees in stating, “Moral
properties constitute so odd a cluster of properties and relations that they are most unlikely to
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have arisen in the ordinary course of events without an all-powerful god to create them.”126 Are
these writers correct in saying that theism produces the likely best solution for moral values
(even though they disagree with it)? One may frame the argument with these premises.
1. If there are objectively binding moral obligations, then God exists.
2. There are objectively binding moral obligations.
3. (Probably) God exists.
The famous dialogue between Socrates and Euthyphro in Plato’s Euthyphro, presents a wellknown dilemma: Does God command things because they are good, or are things good because
God commands them? This dilemma serves an important role in figuring out theism’s
relationship with moral obligations. The two horns of the dilemma can be illustrated in the
following scenario. Is murder wrong because God says it is wrong or does God forbid murder
because it is wrong regardless of what he commands?
Each horn has been defended by different forms of theism. On the one extreme is the
voluntarist perspective. This side concludes that God can command whatever he desires because
he is God. Therefore, if he wants to say that rape or torturing babies is good, then he could
command it to be done.127 Proponents of this view are labeled as “Divine Command Theorists.”
A radical version is sometimes called “Ockhamism” because of its extreme voluntarism. William
of Ockham took his view to the extreme in the sense that he believed God had the full right to
command whatever he desired without restrictions (although Ockham did not believe God would
do it). On the opposite extreme of the dilemma is the view that values of good and evil exist
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independent of God. If one holds to this stance, God becomes superfluous in discussions about
morality because he is not needed for goodness. According to this postulation, “God and
morality are distinct, and not just conceptually; God isn't the foundation of moral goodness, but
rather at most the source of some of our moral knowledge.”128 Consequently, God is simply
reporting the facts or pointing in the direction of what is good without any association to himself.
Such a view runs counter to an orthodox Christian version of theism.
This classic dilemma illustrates the two most common views of a theistic solution for
morality. As it can be seen, both sides are not without their points of contention. Most of these
contentions will be reserved for a more in-depth response in the next chapter. Until then, one
salient issue cannot go unaddressed. Undoubtedly, the discussion of moral values is the common
point of friction between these sides. To call something good or bad requires a definition for
goodness and badness.
There is a difference between calling something good and calling something right. The
latter concerns deontic obligations and duties, while the former is axiological about value. Robert
Adams does a masterful job clarifying this distinction. Earlier Adams was introduced as offering
a definition of the good that is synonymous with God. His alternate version of a typical Divine
Command Theory says that God is not only associated with the good, but He is ontologically the
Good. If God himself is the good, then what he commands as right is an extension of his
ontological goodness. Therefore, Adams’ solution to the Euthyphro dilemma is to say that God
will make no abhorrent commands because they would go against his very nature as the good.
Baggett and Walls agree with this distinction by arguing for a “nonvoluntarist account of the
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good and a voluntarist account of the right.”129 Those opposing this view reject the existence of
one universal good. For example, Wielenberg contests, “There is not merely one ultimate
Intrinsic Good from which all other good and evil in the world is derived; rather, there is a
multitude of intrinsic goods and evils scattered throughout our world.”130 Even though some may
reject the existence of an ultimate good, many ethicists speak of goodness as a foundation for
ethical decisions.
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics has become a standard reference point for many ethical
systems. A salient part of Aristotle’s philosophy identifies that every act or purpose, “seems to
aim at some good. . . .”131 The good of some actions may be found in the end of another action
while others may point to an end that many things share together. Thus, “the good is that at
which everything aims.”132 Greek philosophers, like Aristotle and his contemporaries,
distinguished between ends and an “end in itself.” Some actions that appear to be an end are
simply a means to get to another end. Therefore, what is the ultimate end to which all things
point? Aristotle believed the final end was happiness (eudaemonia). He sought to explain the
natural, innate desire in humans to pursue the good. This intrinsic pursuit of the good requires
goodness to be founded in some capacity which then makes it have a limit (if you can obtain it, it
is limited). For everything to point to a common good they must share common qualities, or
rather those things that are worth obtaining will share the same quality. Aristotle shows that
virtue (arete) is the correct character or quality needed to point to happiness as the ultimate good.
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Virtue, in the Greek mind, deals with potentiality. Consider an acorn. An acorn has the
potential to become an oak tree, and becoming an oak tree is its excellency. What is the
excellence of a knife or horse? Is the excellence of a knife to cut and of a horse to run? What is
the comparable understanding of humans? Do humans have some distinctive aspect to
themselves that is not found in other non-human beings? If taken in the Greek mindset, man is to
grow into the proper virtues that constitute a proper human nature. Aristotle argued that pursuing
the good is not an ought because it is a simple part of nature. 133
In this respect the ultimate good is limited. However, what has been argued up to this
point is that the good is not limited but infinite. To reach the ultimate good would be to reach
God or rather to be God. This would fit one definition of perfection in chapter one. Humans find
they do not reach perfection, which means the ultimate exists outside of one’s reach. One must
not miss the point that those things that share in the nature of the ultimate good, which is God,
are worth pursuing and are even a driving force to reach a greater end.
The good is more than an individual standard, it is universal, ultimate, and infinite; and it
applies to all humans at all times. Consider, again, one of Wielenberg’s discoveries:
Each of us is obligated to pursue the highest good. Yet we cannot sensibly pursue the
highest good unless we believe that the highest good is attainable. We cannot sensibly
believe that the highest good is attainable unless we believe that there is a being who will
make it possible that the highest good comes into existence—and a little reflection
reveals that the only being who could accomplish this is God. Hence, we cannot sensibly
pursue the highest good unless we believe that God exists.134
133
This point will be explicated in the next chapter. The connection humans have to the good in a theistic
worldview will say a lot about how the topic of perfection is handled. Moral values must be rigid for a standard to be
imposed on human actions. Without a standard, there will exist no drive for moral perfection.
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Although he rejects this conclusion, Wielenberg challenges the consistency of those who
advocate for the ultimate good. Therefore, he says, “Atheists must either act irrationally
(pursuing the highest good while believing it to be unattainable) or do something wrong by
neglecting to pursue the highest good.”135 Theism accepts this challenge and welcomes it as a
viable and consistent conclusion.
The version of theism advanced here states that humans are on a different plane than
God. God, who is the good, is not constrained by obligations because goodness exudes from his
being. He acts in such a way that accords with his very nature. Finite humans on the other hand
must act under obligation, which serves as training wheels, until humans can act fully according
to God’s plan for morality.136 John Hare, commenting on Kant, says, “The difference between us
is that God does not have obligations, because the function of obligation is to constrain
inclination, and God does not have inclinations to be constrained; God’s will is perfectly holy, as
ours can never be.”137 He further notes four aspects of morality derived from a Kantian ethic.
The fourth conception is that humans have “double motivation.” 138 The qualities of this double
motivation is that humans have, “an affection for advantage, which is directed toward one’s own
happiness and perfection, and an affection for justice, which is directed toward what is good in
Erik J. Wielenberg, Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2005), 81.
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itself independently of its relation to us.”139 The first component is an internal quality requiring
moral transformation to the degree advocated here that is only accomplished by unity with
Christ. The latter is a result of the first, because humanity no longer lives for self but realizes a
new priority of living (i.e., sanctification) that has its end in God alone. 140
Hare explains that the demands should motivate by showing “the route God has chosen
for us to reach the destination of being co-lovers with God.”141 Stephen Evans agrees with the
same concept from Hare but frames it in terms of pursuing the good. Evans’s focus is on moral
obligations, which takes a different approach from Hare’s focus on the commands themselves.
This method puts a spin on the motivation to be moral. According to Evans, God “has also given
[human persons] the potential for the greatest possible good, an eternal life characterized by
friendship with God and others who are friends of God and therefore love the good.” 142 To love
the good is to love God because God is the ultimate good.
Another aspect of motivation is that one may not be motivated to live morally because an
individual does care about God or does not care enough about him (volitional). Skepticism, even
within Christianity, is a detrimental mindset because it entails a reluctance to obey without a
satisfactory amount of subjective evidence to act. As it has been noted, one does not have to
believe in God to know that moral obligations exist. 143 One of the objections raised against
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Divine Command Theory is what Evans calls the “promulgation objection.” This objection raises
the notion that a command from God must be explicit and easily identifiable with God as the
source of it. Evans raises several responses to this objection. He appeals to the conscience again
but also elucidates the point that God can use different ways to make his plan or obligations
known. This introduces the topic of “divine hiddenness” and moral knowledge. To bring in the
previous discussion, different terms are used to describe how people perceive moral obligation in
their life. Two essential terms are conscience and intuition. Evans defines conscience as “a
faculty whereby humans can immediately discern the rightness or wrongness of particular acts or
of general principles about how one should act (perhaps by way of discerning the right-making
or wrong-making character of some general feature of the act or act-type).”144 The argument
from conscience seems to reconcile the “pull,” “call,” or “inner voice” humans feel or hear when
they know they need to do something or not. Furthermore, this conscience or intuition can be an
aspect of general revelation, which is meant to point to God.
One must wrestle with this theologically to grasp the relevance of God’s actions, given a
strong Divine Command Theory. The thrust of it is to show that moral obligations exist and are
inextricably tied to God and his nature. This does not mean that one who fails to connect these
truths is absolved from the culpability of sin solely based on ignorance, but rather that one has
the reasoning faculties to see that moral obligations must be seated somewhere outside of
humans and natural law.
A Divine Command Theory for the right, says that God can tell humans to act in a
particular way and that they ought to do it because it is right. Anything that is good will have
similar characteristics to God’s nature, which is why God will not command something that is
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contrary to his good nature since he is ontologically the good. Therefore, one must consider the
value of moral claims. Richard Swinburne explains three kinds of goodness and three kinds of
badness. First, goodness may be considered as the overall, the important, and the overriding.
Second, is a continuation of the first, but it entails that there are certain universal properties that
make it good. Third, goodness may be in respect to “exemplifying” or “forwarding” what is
good. With these in mind, Swinburne advances that, “To be ‘morally good’. . . an action must
minimally have. . . overall goodness, of overriding importance, deriving from universal
properties; and to be ‘morally bad’ as I shall define the term, an action must minimally have
badness of the second kind.”145 The moral life then becomes doing what has qualities of the
ultimate good and pursuing the good in itself as an end. “My proposed criterion for the goodness
of an action being moral goodness” Swinburne notes, “is now that it have overall goodness
arising from universal properties belonging to the set of standard moral properties, the positive
ones counting for and the negative ones counting against its overall goodness; a belief that an
action is morally good is a belief that its goodness is of this kind.” 146 Although a person may
disagree with a few of these points, there is a general consensus that a system for determining
moral values makes sense to human experience. Without getting caught in the metaethical
weeds, it is not too far-fetched to concede that moral values are important and are essential for
conversations about the point of morality.
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The goal of this section has been to show that moral obligations, of the nature humans
experience, are likely best understood in a theistic world. The goal has been to untie the ought
knot. It has been shown that naturalistic explanations present possible solutions, but the
weaknesses require one to look elsewhere for a plausible explanation. Herein lies the impetus for
introducing theism. In an introductory way, theism has been presented as a viable option,
because it provides a grounding of moral obligations in the existence and nature of God as the
ultimate good to which humans are driven.
Summary
In the previous sections of this chapter, the concept of moral realism was introduced by
showing that objective morality should be taken seriously and that humans need a grounding for
moral knowledge that is nonnatural. The idea was introduced that theism possibly explains moral
phenomena. By introducing God into the discussion, the bar has been raised for taking morality
seriously. Theism points to a God as the likely source for the grounding of objective morality
and the source of moral knowledge. If these two points have been shown, then it is a logical
extension to assume that God has a plan in place for humans to live moral lives. Minimally, the
bar has been set to show that if objective morals exist then it is logical for humans to follow
them. This has created a case for moral obligations. Since humans possess a pull or desire to be
good, the desire must be located outside of human nature because of the shared, universal nature
of morality that is objective rather than subjective.

Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter has been to lay a foundation for an abductive argument for
God based on moral phenomena. The moral phenomena under examination at this point are those
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that undergird the desire humans have for perfection. Humans possess a drive for perfection
because they experience the weight of moral realism and its invaluable intricacies that intertwine
with human nature. It has been proposed that humans live in a world that has a very high
standard of morality that cannot be explained as easily from natural properties. The objectiveness
of morality, the knowledge itself, and its subsequent obligations are likely best understood in
nonnatural, theistic terms. Therefore, when humans speak about other humans living and acting
in a particular way, they are appealing to something more than humanistic foundations. The goal
of the next chapter will be to show that theism resolves the perfection issue. It will be shown that
a generic version of theism is not enough, but the version of theism found in Christianity
provides the likely best solution.
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Chapter 3: Theism and Moral Realism
Few works have traced the history of the moral argument with its various adaptions and
developments throughout time. One such work, written by Baggett and Walls, creates a record of
major influencers who contributed to the advancement of the moral argument. In their work, they
cover writers from antiquity to modernity. Their purpose in chronicling the moral argument is to
show, “the abiding conviction that morality provides an indispensable and vitally hopeful
window of insight into ultimate reality.”147 The window into ultimate reality shows that morality
is inextricably tied to the human understanding of how the world operates.
Although it would be impossible for a dissertation to outline all the forms of the moral
argument, it is vitally important to identify at least a few individuals who effectively (1) identify
the objectivity of morality; (2) regard the demand of morality as extremely high; and (3) who
illustrate the finitude of humans to live by the moral law perfectly. After illustrating these three
points, a tripartite argument will be given in chapter four utilizing the three Christian forms of
the moral argument to show how a certain type of theism aptly replies to the need introduced in
chapter two.

A Theistic Argument for the Moral Law
The focus of chapter two was to establish the viability of moral realism in discussions
about the nature of morality. A key concept of moral realism is that moral facts are objective and
knowable by all rational beings and a part of the moral law. In H.P. Owen’s defense of morality,
he succinctly identifies three principles of morality established above:
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1. It is necessary to affirm the existence of moral principles and practices that theists
share with agnostics and that constitute what is called “natural law.”
2. We cannot claim with certainty that any element in Christian morality is wholly
distinctive to it and lacks any non-Christian parallel.
3. We must. . . conserve everything that is valid in the concept of moral autonomy. 148
The theistic perspective on these assumptions compounds the argument made in chapter two.
Theism contends that moral realism is a part of God’s creation of a moral code—general
revelation—within humans in a created moral reality. This created reality of morality is provided
for humans so they can know, identify, and respond to what is good or bad and right or wrong.
Humans can know through conscience or intuition aspects of morality, but there is still much to
explain about the moral law itself. This moral law is necessary and indispensable for any moral
theory because moral facts cannot, as Mark Murphy describes, be “danglers.”149 C. S. Lewis
describes moral facts as the keys on a piano, and the moral law serves as the sheet music
determining the way the keys are to be played.150 The purpose of this section will be to explain a
theistic argument for the moral law by focusing on key individuals and their contribution and
advancement of the argument with special focus on the three qualification mentioned in this
chapter’s introduction.
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Voices of Morality
Introduced above was the idea that Christian moral apologists have paved the way for
understanding how morality, properly construed, points to theism as the likely best solution for
humanity’s desire for moral perfection. This is the case because objective morality sets a
standard for how humans are expected to live. If there is any standard, it is extremely high
compared to what humans actually attempt to do in their lives. Thus, there is seemingly a gap
between the moral law and humanity’s finitude to live by it. The authors below have been chosen
because they serve as vital steppingstones along the path of human history. These individuals
may be seen as archeologists, discovering moral facts, instead of an architect creating them.
Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274)
A major key player in apologetics is Thomas Aquinas. Admittedly, Aquinas is not a
typical moral apologist, per se, because he does not have a full, definitive formulation of the
moral argument. However, the purpose of this chapter is to highlight individuals who meet the
three criteria elucidated earlier. Therefore, Aquinas serves a vital role as an apologist, but more
importantly one who makes a significant contribution to the argument advanced here.
To understand Aquinas’s defense of theism, and subsequently his view of morality, one
needs to consider his “five ways.”151 It is impossible to examine all five proofs here because they
are outside of the purview of this work; however, his fourth way will garner special focus. The
fourth way is an observation about the gradation found in things. For example, in human
interactions there are beings who are more or less good. If there is a comparison of things on a
scale of more or less, then there must also exist something that is considered “the most.” If there
Aquinas’ five ways about God are: prime mover, the first cause, the necessary being, the absolute being,
and the grand designer.
151
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are any degrees in something like goodness or perfection, then there must also be that which is
the most good or perfect. Aquinas’s theory builds from Anselm’s ontological argument
establishing the conceptual validity of an ultimate. 152 Thus, it is presupposed that one can
conceive of an ontologically superior concept like goodness or perfection. If this is true, then it is
also logically consistent to conclude that the ultimate cause of goodness and perfection exists.
Here is the value of Aquinas’s fourth way. His argument to the existence of God can be broken
down in these terms:
1. There are beings which are “more” good, true, noble etc. (in short: more perfect) than
others.
2. If such comparative terms like more or less are truly predicated of beings, then they
describe varying degrees of approximation with respect to (w.r.t) an existing
maximum of perfection.
3. According to Aristotle an existing maximum of perfection (or a maximum of truth) is
also a maximum of being.
152
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4. The maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; i.e. the maximum of
perfection and being is the cause of all things w.r.t. to [sic] perfection and being.
5. There is a thing which is the cause of all things w.r.t. perfection and being.
6. This we call God.153
Essentially, Aquinas boils down the nature of God as possessing all perfection by stating, “All
created perfections are in God. Hence, He is spoken of as universally perfect, because He lacks
not. . . any excellence which may be found in any genus.”154 In these terms God is the first cause
of all things including goodness and perfection since they extend from him. Therefore, “God is
the first principle, not material, but in the order of efficient cause, which must be most perfect. . .
. For a thing is perfect in proportion to its state of actuality, because we call that perfect which
lacks nothing of the mode of its perfection.”155 What Aquinas accomplishes here is a type of
moral argument, as Craig likewise identifies, because the ultimate being is what people call
“God.”156
The unique explication of Aquinas’s fourth way as a type of moral argument leads one to
connect the objectivity of goodness to both God and humans. Since there is a clear distinction
between God and finite humans, one may be led to ask how far that divide separates. In a series
of articles under the question of “the state of perfection,” Aquinas endeavors to ask whether
153
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humans can be perfect in this life or not. 157 In the objections, two main Scriptures are referenced
to show human imperfection. Aquinas’s response to these objections starts from a foundation of
Aristotle’s definition of perfection and the one established in the fourth way, which states, “The
perfect is that which lacks nothing.”158 To show human imperfection, he asks whether it is
possible to love all of one’s neighbors as commanded by Jesus (Matt. 22:39). It seems this would
be a failure on the part of every Christian because to love every neighbor according to the
expected degree of the second greatest commandment would be impossible. How does one
resolve Christ’s command to be perfect (Matt. 5:48) with man’s inability to live a perfect life?
These two scriptural references add complexity to the idea of human imperfection.
These objections are not easily dismissed because they are created by specific commands
given by God. If the command to love or to be perfect were human creations, then one could
argue against their obligatory nature; however, these verses show divine commands. Thus,
Aquinas responds to the complexity of these two objections by delineating a threefold perfection.
First, there is absolute perfection. Absolute perfection would involve loving God as much as God
can be loved. This type of perfection is unattainable by any being other than God. Second, there
is total perfection. Total perfection, on the part of the lover, is to love God completely, but this
once again is not attainable on this side of heaven. Third, is the lowest level of perfection, which
is the removal of obstacles that impede one’s love of God. At this point Aquinas answers,
Such perfection as this can be had in this life, and in two ways. First, by the removal from
man's affections of all that is contrary to charity, such as mortal sin; and there can be no
charity apart from this perfection, wherefore it is necessary for salvation. Secondly, by
the removal from man's affections not only of whatever is contrary to charity, but also of
whatever hinders the mind's affections from tending wholly to God. Charity is possible
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apart from this perfection, for instance in those who are beginners and in those who are
proficient.159
The perfection Aquinas explains revolves around the concept of love. Humans are to love God
and conform their lives to his standards. Since humans are imperfect, they cannot conform totally
and completely. However, they can reach some degree by removing sin and obstacles that
prohibit the love of God. This is accomplished with a lower degree of divine love that is, “to love
nothing more than God, or contrary to God, or equally with God, and whoever fails from this
degree of perfection nowise fulfils the precept.”160 Various degrees of goodness, love, and
perfection are attainable by finite humans, but the highest degree is reserved for God alone.
The unique relationship that finite humans have with the ultimate good is a result of
God’s creation. In another one of Aquinas’ works, he explains, “Created things are made like
unto God by the fact that they attain to divine goodness. If then, all things tend toward God as an
ultimate end, so that they may attain His goodness, it follows that the ultimate end of things is to
become like God.”161 “Moreover,” he continues, “all created things are, in a sense, images of the
first agent, that is, of God, ‘for the agent makes a product to his own likeness.’ Now, the function
of a perfect image is to represent its prototype by likeness to it; this is why an image is made.
Therefore, all things exist to attain to the divine likeness, as to their ultimate end.” 162 The fact
that humans are made in the image of the Creator forces one to confront the high demand of
morality. If a person does not live up to the prescribed standard, then he or she is not merely
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disobeying a command, they are going against their created purpose. The decision to act contrary
to the divine standard runs contrary to multiple instances of what Aquinas calls “Law.”
In an extended section on the Law, Aquinas distinguishes between four types of law.
First, there is the eternal law. The eternal law is the plum line for judging acts, and the standard
is derived from the divine reason of God the ruler. 163 Second, is the natural law. The natural law
consists of the eternal law imprinted upon the hearts of humans which enables them to determine
the proper execution of acts or ends. 164 Third, is the human law. The human law is created as the
result and application of reasoning through the natural law’s principles as they relate to human
interactions. Finally, there is the divine law. 165 The divine law entails those rules and guidelines
given to people that go beyond the natural and human laws.166 The natural and divine laws serve
a prominent role in establishing a Christian ethic because of their relationship to obligations.
Essentially, the two main sources of moral obligations are, “The natural law, which are the
dictates of God’s eternal practical reason to which we have epistemic access, and the divine law,
which are the special revelations of God’s will.”167 When taken together these twin components
help undergird a more robust approach for understanding the divine standard of morality.
This leads to a further discussion about moral goodness. In Aquinas’s work, goodness is a
part of being. Everything possesses its own goodness because of its being. He agrees with
Aristotle that goodness is that which all things desire. Aquinas shows that God is good because
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of his desirableness and his ontological existence as the ultimate good. He is the first effective
cause of all things, including goodness. As it has been identified, perfection is the completion of
a being’s goodness. Humans stand out differently because they desire to pursue some good
beyond their human nature. Aquinas explains in the following excerpt:
But since it behooves a man to do his utmost to strive onward even to Divine things, as
even the Philosopher declares. . . and as Scripture often admonishes us—for instance:
"Be ye perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect" (Mat. 5:48), we must needs place
some virtues between the social or human virtues, and the exemplar virtues which are
Divine. Now these virtues differ by reason of a difference of movement and term: so that
some are virtues of men who are on their way and tending towards the Divine similitude;
and these are called "perfecting" virtues.168
In summation, Aquinas raised the bar of morality by introducing his natural law theory. Once a
person understands the framework for what is good and the expectation to do it, then they can
consider how they are to live up to that good.
Immanuel Kant (1724–1804)
One of the more prominent moral thinkers is the German philosopher Immanuel Kant.
Kant is well-known for showing that the standard of rationality points to the ultimate principle of
morality. The appeal of such a system is that the emphasis is placed on human capacity for
making rational, ethical decisions based on universally recognized objective imperatives. Thus,
Kant’s development of a deontic system of ethics is both relatable and practical for humans to
understand. As introduced in chapter one, Kant is quintessential for understanding the high
standard of morality expected of humans due to his “ought implies can” dictum (OIC). Kant
believed that humans could know what to do and effectively do it. His litmus test for determining
the ethicality of a decision is the “categorical imperative.” The categorical imperative states that
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humans should, “act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time
will that it become a universal law.” An action is imperative if a person is expected to do it while
also having the freedom of choice or autonomy. It is categorical by being independent of any
subjective will a person may have regarding a particular action. If an action is identified by the
categorical imperative, it will possess the qualities of being universally recognized and upheld as
a universal law.
It was Kant’s belief this way of rationalizing and weighing decisions fits best with a
proper construal of the good. Kant drew upon conceptions of the good akin to an Aristotelian
teleological formulation. He contended that an action derived from the good maxim will have the
highest good as its motivation. This highest good is what leads to true happiness.169 Kant
distinguished between two senses of “the highest good” (summum bonum): the supreme good
and the complete/perfect good. The supreme good (supremum) is found in virtue and the
worthiness of happiness. Virtue is supreme because it, “provides ultimate reasons for action,
reasons which override all others.”170 Although virtue has a relation to happiness it does not
produce the ultimate form of happiness. Thus, the second sense of “the highest good” is the
complete or perfect good, formulated by impartial reasoning, which prioritizes morally lawful
conduct as a condition.171 Herein lies the robust nature of Kant’s ethical theory when
compounded with his theistic postulations.
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Kant recognizes that humans possess the desire to live a perfect life, while
simultaneously recognizing that the perfect life is unattainable by finite humans in this life. Thus,
the completion of the highest good must be located beyond human experience in this life. Kant
proposes,
There is not the least ground in the moral law for a necessary connection between the
morality and the proportionate happiness of a being belonging to the world as part of it
and hence dependent upon it, who for that reason cannot by his will be a cause of this
nature and, as far as his happiness is concerned, cannot by his own powers make it
harmonize thoroughly with his practical principles. Nevertheless, in the practical task of
pure reason, that is, in the necessary pursuit of the highest good, such a connection is
postulated as necessary: we ought to strive to promote the highest good (which must
therefore be possible). Accordingly, the existence of a cause of all nature, distinct from
nature, which contains the ground of this connection, namely of the exact correspondence
of happiness with morality, is also postulated. 172
Kant’s proposal is that humanity cannot create a world where morality and happiness harmonize
to the degree humans experience, without first placing the highest good beyond human
conventions. As he notes, there must exist the first cause that contains within it the ability to
ground the connection in pursuing the highest good. These items together make it necessary to
postulate God.
Kantian philosophers are familiar with the basic aspects of his moral theory, while few
consider the ramifications of the theistic foundation of his theories. Kant saw that the moral law
within humans was a guide or piece of evidence pointing to God. Naturalistic moral theorists are
quick to use aspects of Kant’s philosophy while simultaneously rejecting his theistic
underpinnings. To dismiss Kant’s theistic beliefs weakens his moral theory. When evaluating
proofs for God’s existence, Kant was not keen on the ontological or cosmological arguments.
Interestingly, however, in his Beweisgrund, Kant shows that God is a necessary postulate for
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understanding both the ontological nature of the moral law and to some degree, the designed
order of the universe. Although Kant is not viewed in the same light as other moral apologists, he
still constructed a variation of the moral argument. Considering the points presented earlier, one
may construct Kant’s moral argument in the following way:
1. Humans are morally obligated to conform their lives perfectly to the moral law.
2. A person is not morally obligated to do something he or she cannot do.
3. Therefore, moral perfection must be possible.
4. Moral perfection is not possible in this life.
5. Therefore, the moral self must survive death.
The case for moral realism in chapter two and compounded with OIC, shows the soundness of
the first premise. If humans have moral obligations, then they must also be expected to
accomplish them. This premise remains true even outside of a theistic argument. If there is a
moral law, it must be followed as if it were as simple as a law of nature.
The OIC dictum also establishes the second premise. No one can be expected to do
something they are not capable of doing. Capability is not based on one’s volitional acceptance
of an action. That would relegate an action’s obligatory nature to relativistic causes, and it has
been shown that relativism does not fit with moral realism. An action must be morally obligatory
if it is within a human’s ability to complete. Thus, one moves to the third premise.
If the first two premises are logically sound and valid, then they subsequently lead to the
third premise. Here both theists and non-theists alike raise objections. In theory, humans should
be able to produce not just one or a handful of examples of morally perfect people, but it should
be the majority. However, when people evaluate the morality of individuals, they can only
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produce a handful who might possibly be considered morally perfect.173 If moral perfection is
possible, how come there are not more morally perfect beings? It may be easier to conclude, as
the fourth premise states, that moral perfection is impossible in this life, because the desire for
perfection exists even with the knowledge and actuality of imperfection. If it is impossible in this
life, then there must be a point when it is possible or else the whole enterprise fails.
Thus, humanity’s desire for perfection extends beyond physical experiences to find its
completion. Since Kant places morality (along with other values) above other human endeavors,
the locus of goodness is placed beyond human experience. Kant’s conception of the good aligns
with much of what has been considered up to this point. The good becomes equivalent to God,
which means the fulfillment of good must be understood from a divine perspective.
Kant’s belief in God’s existence as a necessary postulate for understanding the moral law
resultantly raises the moral law to a higher plane. When speaking of this necessary connection,
Kant explains, “. . .there is in us not merely the warrant but also the necessity, as a need
connected with duty, to presuppose the possibility of this highest good, which, since it is possible
only under the condition of the existence of God, connects the presupposition of the existence of
God inseparably with duty; that is, it is morally necessary to assume the existence of God.” 174
Therefore, he continues, “The moral law is holy (inflexible) and demands holiness of morals. . .
.”175 When the moral law is seen as an extension of God’s nature it takes on a new nature of its
own. It is inflexible because it is an extension of God’s perfect, unchanging nature. Therefore,
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anyone who wishes to follow the moral law must understand God’s nature. This places the moral
law higher while also reinforcing humanity’s finitude. Kant further states,
. . .although all the moral perfection that a human being can attain is still only virtue, that
is, a disposition conformed with law from respect for law, and thus consciousness of a
continuing propensity to transgression or at least impurity, that is, an admixture of many
spurious (not moral) motives to observe the law, hence a self-esteem combined with
humility; and so, with respect to the holiness that the Christian law demands, nothing
remains for a creature but endless progress, though for that very reason he is justified in
hoping for his endless duration.176
The continual progress one makes (i.e., virtue) must be aided by divine supplementation and
seen as something that cannot be accomplished fully by finite humans. Kant’s solution for how
one is expected to get to this point is what he calls the “revolution of man’s will.” Before one can
understand his stance on the revolution of the will, it is important to see how he frames the
necessity of this revolution.
The revolution of the will occurs when the evil maxim is replaced with the good maxim.
That is to say that the prioritization of humanity’s desire is replaced with the pursuit of the good.
For Kant this revolution is the point at which the reprioritization of the evil and the good maxims
is accomplished, and thus a virtuous life begins. In Kant’s Religion within the Limits of Bare
Reason he introduces what makes a person good or bad. Kant takes the first step in explaining
that something is good or bad based on the maxims. “The rock-bottom basis for the adoption of
our maxims must itself lie in free choice, so it can’t be something we meet with in experience;
therefore, the good or evil in man. . . is termed ‘innate’ only in the sense of being posited as the
basis for. . . every use of freedom in experiences; so it is conceived of as present in man at the
time of birth—though birth needn’t be its cause.”177 Kant believes that humans have a propensity
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to evil because of the “subjective basis for the possibility of the maxims’ deviating from the
moral law.”178 He bases his point on three aspects of humans: 1. Frailty of human nature; 2. The
propensity of mixing immoral with moral incentives—impurity; and 3. The propensity to adopt
bad maxims, or in other words the wickedness of human nature or the human heart. 179 These
three aspects elucidate Kant’s theory that humanity needs to change to pursue the highest good.
What is the difference between a person of good morals and a morally good person? The
former does not have the law as the sole and supreme incentive of moral conduct while the
latter’s conduct always has the law as the incentive. The pursuit of the law stretches beyond duty
for duty’s sake. One pursues and lives for the law because of its connection with the supreme
good, which is best framed as God. The distance between God’s standard for morality and his
expectation for humanity’s obedience provides invaluable insight for the distinction between the
pursuit of the good over the bad. In a similar vein with H.P. Owen’s three observations about the
moral law explained earlier is moral autonomy. 180 Kant maintained that humans have moral
autonomy to live by the moral law. This makes the most sense in his argumentation for why
there is a departure from the good to the bad. A person may be spoken of as “bad” because, “he
is conscious of the moral law but has nevertheless allowed occasional departures from it into his
maxim.”181 The propensity to choose evil shows a bad decision but does not necessitate that a
person is bad enough to where he cannot choose the good.
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Kant’s proposition is that even the lowest person does not repudiate the moral law. He
further explains that any person would act according to the moral law if there were no other
competing incentives. Essentially, if the supreme maxim became the basis of his will, then he
would be morally good.182 Does the propensity for the reversal of incentives lie at the base of
human nature? Kant believes,
This evil lies deep, because it corrupts the basis of all maxims; as a natural propensity it
can’t be wiped out by human powers, because that would have to be done through good
maxims, and we’re discussing a situation where the ultimate objective basis of all
maxims is corrupted. Yet it must be possible for it to be outweighed because it is found in
man, a being whose actions are free.183
A person cannot override the evil maxim by doing more good. There must be something beyond
humans to make the initial change that opens the possibility of all other changes. The small
margin between an overemphasis on humanity’s abilities and the reduction of a person’s moral
accountability and expectation requires careful consideration. A proper balance between the two
fits within a Kantian framework since he likewise seeks to establish the same point.
Kant identifies that the lurking evil at the heart of a person, which is formed by a lifestyle
of relative morals, runs counter to the good because it seeks no other interest besides its own.
Admitting the incentives of a good maxim into one’s life is an arduous process, but it is required
for removing the evil maxims. Kant says that people are created good, which means they are
created “for” good. Some have found fault with this idea because they contend that Kant is
inconsistent and contradicts himself regarding this matter. 184 However, a more critical reading of
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Kant’s view provides clarity on the matter. First, Kant highlights three aspects of human nature:
1. As a living being, humans have a predisposition to animality; 2. As a living and reasonpossessing being, humans have a predisposition to humanity; 3. As a reason-possessing and
morally accountable being, humans have a predisposition to personality. 185 Second, Kant
explains that each one of these observations are basic facts of life. The facts prove that humanity
is good, but only when the moral law sets parameters and boundaries around these three aspects.
Is there an initial cause that brings about the reprioritization of the maxims? “Even if
some supernatural cooperation was needed for him to become good (or better)—some positive
assistance or reductive of obstacles—his own free will must come into play in two ways,” Kant
explains, “he must first make himself worthy to receive this help, and then he must accept it. . .,
i.e. he must admit this positive increase in power into his maxim.”186 Kant contends that
naturalistic solutions for how a naturally bad person turns oneself into a good person are
inadequate. Since it has been considered that humans turn to the evil, then the reverse must also
be a possibility. “For despite the fall,” Kant tells, “the command telling us we ought to become
better resounds in full strength in our souls; so it must be within our power to do this, even if
what we’re able to do isn’t in itself sufficient to achieve this, and only makes us receptive to an
inscrutable higher assistance.”187 The good maxim is not something that is regained due to being
lost, it is restoring the purity of the moral law’s ability to become the ultimate basis of all
maxims. How can a person become not merely a law-abiding individual but a morally good
possess a radical propensity to evil that makes evil deeds inevitable for us.” Seiriol Morgan, “The Missing Formal
Proof of Humanity’s Radical Evil in Kant’s ‘Religion,’” The Philosophical Review 114, no. 1 (January 2005): 63.
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person? “It has to happen through a revolution in the man’s attitude, a going over to the maxim
of the attitude’s holiness. He can become a new man only by a kind of rebirth, as it were a new
creation, and a change of heart.”188 Kant’s point was introduced earlier as “the revolution of the
will.” Consider the following lengthier quotation,
Because of the purity of the principle he has adopted as the supreme maxim of his will,
and because of its stability, he can hope to find himself on the good (though narrow) path
of continual progress from bad to better. For him who sees through to the intelligible
basis of the heart (i.e. of all the maxims of the will), and for whom this unending journey
towards being a good man is a single step, i.e. for God, this amounts to his actually being
a good man (pleasing to God; and to that extent this change can be regarded as a
revolution. But in the judgment of men, who can assess themselves and the strength of
their maxims only by how well they come, over time, to dominate the inclinations
generated by their way of sensing this change must be regarded as but an everlasting
struggle toward the better, and thus as a gradual reform of that perverted cast of mind, the
propensity to evil.”189
Kant’s solution for humanity’s ineptitude is to seek divine assistance and undergo the revolution
of the will.
The revolution of the will may be seen from two vantage points. The first viewpoint is
from humanity’s perspective. The revolution of the will from this angle is an ongoing process.
The gradual change from acting on the evil maxim to accepting the good maxim is a progression.
When viewed this way there is continual progress to be made that is never accomplished while in
this life. On the other hand is the view from God’s standpoint. From God’s view, the revolution
of the will is taken as one complete moment. God, the moral adjudicator, sees all the progress
and the future life as one whole. Thus, God declares an individual is blameless or innocent when
the parts are added together to make the whole. The bifurcation of views on the revolution of the
will, leads one to a conclusion that fits within Kant’s moral argument. A person never reaches
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moral perfection on this earth because all his or her acts are seen as moral progress waiting to be
completed in another life. Kant explains, “. . .Man’s moral growth has to start not by improving
his conduct but by transforming his way of thinking and laying the foundations of his character.
Yet customarily people tackle this differently, fighting abasing vices piecemeal while leaving
undisturbed their common root.”190 However, God sees the beginning, middle, and end. In
Christian terms, God see each person united in Christ, a new man, not just better.
Does Kant’s view of the revolution of the will fit within a larger framework of religion or
does he deviate from orthodox teachings? Kant distinguishes between two types of religion that
may result from his beliefs. First, one may ascribe to “favour-seeking religion.” This religion
finds happiness when a person flatters himself in believing that God can make him eternally
happy. It also involves the individual feeling this way without making any changes to himself in
becoming better. A favor-seeker believes, “God can make him a better man without his having to
do anything but ask for it, which amounts to doing nothing at all, because asking an all-seeing
Being for something is equivalent to merely wanting it.” The second religion is a “moral
religion.” Christianity fits this description because it calls an individual to live a good, moral life.
“It is a basic principle that each person must do everything in his power to become a better man,”
Kant says, “and that what is not within his power will be made up for through cooperation from
above—but only if. . . he has worked on becoming a better man through his basic predisposition
to good.”191 From a Kantian perspective, the heavy emphasis placed on humanity’s response to
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the moral law results from divine assistance and human free will. These two components
working together is what results in a moral life. “Now it is our universal human duty to elevate
ourselves to this ideal of moral perfection,” Kant concludes, “i.e., to this archetype of the moral
disposition in all its purity; and the idea itself. . . can give us power to this.”192 Perfection, in
Kantian thought, can only make sense from God’s perspective. If it were up to man alone,
perfection remains unattainable.
Kant’s contribution to the present discussion has provided valuable insight on the high
standard of morality expected of humans. An important component is his development of the
OIC dictum, which lays emphasis on human autonomy to live up to the moral standard.
However, humans can only get so far without further assistance provided by God. Kant has
brought to light that assistance is needed in shifting the evil and good maxims. Without the
revolution of the will and God’s assistance, humanity is left with no solution or remedy for the
desire and failure to live a perfect life.
William Sorley (1855–1935)
William Sorley’s moral argument builds upon Kant’s teaching of practical reason and his
doctrine of postulates. In his splendid book Moral Values and the Idea of God, Sorley seeks to
create an argument for understanding why moral values exist in the way they do. As he builds his
case, he shows that moral values require a moral lawgiver. He argues along the same lines as
Kant and concludes that God is a necessary condition for the moral law. In the spirit of Kant, he
priority, then the freedom to act is in God’s hands instead of the individual life and actions of a person. If it is
completely God’s responsibility, Kantian moral philosophy cannot stand because it folds in on itself due to the
major aspect of Kantian theory which is that reason provides the necessary tools to both identify the good and to
follow it. Therefore, a reasonable solution must be found that releases the tension.
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states, “The moral law, the inexorable fact of duty, requires us to assume the being of God, not as
a speculative truth for explaining nature, but as a practical postulate necessitated by the moral
reason.”193 The idea of God, to use Sorley’s phrasing, does more than present a possible response
to the complexities of nature. Although it serves this purpose, the idea of God is necessary to
make sense of moral values.
Throughout Sorley’s writings, it is plain to see he leans heavily on Kant for inspiration
and advances many parts of Kant’s theories. Although inspired by Kant, he wrestles with the
“performative aspect of Kant’s moral theory.” In one such instance, he notes that Kant, “was not
looking upon outward performance, but upon the inward law of goodness and the power it
revealed in the mind which is conscious of it.” 194 He connects that Kant’s view of theism did
more than provide practical reasoning for morals, it went deeper into the heart and mind of
people.
Based on the idea that God is a necessary postulate for moral values, Sorley endeavors to
expand Kant’s perspective to show how this impacts the lives of people. Sorley makes three
observations from Kant’s conclusion of God as a necessary postulate: 1. Freedom of man; 2.
Man’s immortality; and 3. The existence of the one perfect being or God. 195 First, it is necessary
for humanity to be free and autonomous. What does the moral life look like if a person has no
escape from impulse or desire that runs contrary to the moral law? Sorley explains, “Were man
not free from the compulsion of impulse and desire he would be unable to take the law as the
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guide of his will.”196 The moral law will have no effect if it is not allowed to affect the hearts and
lives of people. Second, Sorley deduces that immortality must play a significant role. “The moral
law demands perfect obedience from each individual,” he intimates, “and an infinite time is
required in order that the individual character with its sensuous desires and inclinations may
become fully subject to the categorical imperative: hence immortality is postulated.”197 Since no
one lives a perfect life—complete obedience to the moral law—in this life there must by
inference be a time when it may be accomplished. Third, there must exist a perfect being. Sorley
asserts this being must be God, because “without God our moral ideas would not be capable of
relisation in the world. We ourselves are unable so to realise them—that is, to make the worldorder a moral order—because the causal laws which constitute the world of experience are
entirely outside of and indifferent to the ethical laws which make up morality. 198 The moral order
of the world makes the most sense when it is ordered by a morally perfect being that determines
the parameters.
Sorley takes these points directly from Kant, but then contends with a major weakness he
finds in Kant. He separates from Kant because Kant did not believe that morality proved God.
This weakness is a result of Kant’s moral argument presenting a bifurcation between nature and
morality. The Kantian persuasion is that God is a necessary postulate to bring harmony between
the two. Sorley, however, contends that they are not two separate worlds, but rather one
harmonious world with nature and morality being two different aspects found within it. This one
world is, “The kind of world in which goodness can begin to grow and make progress towards
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perfection.”199 He even says that an imperfect world fits well with the idea that moral beings are
to grow. Since humans have free will, there will always exist aberrations from the good. A world
without freedom has only marionettes, “They might dance through their span of existence to the
amusement of a casual spectator. . . but their movements would be all predetermined by their
Maker; they would have neither goodness nor the consciousness of good, nor any point of
sympathy with the mind of a free spirit.”200 Sorley simply shows it is consistent to have finite
beings living in an imperfect world. This maintains the objectivity of morality, the high standard
of living, and humanity’s finitude to live by it perfectly. This builds upon Hasting Rashdall’s
moral argument to show that the moral law in the mind of humans requires the mind of God.201
In his conclusion Sorley returns to the emphasis on moral failure and imperfection of the
world. He states that imperfection in the world forms an argument that points to theism. “An
imperfect world’ he explains, “. . . was required for the making of moral beings; they had to be
tried in, and habituated to, all kinds of circumstances, in order that they might grow into
goodness.”202 If humans were free and perfect from the beginning, then there would be no need
to grow into goodness. However, humans live in such a place where they depend upon God. This
aspect of Sorley’s stance is valuable for this current study. When humans are perfected by God,
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then their direction is changed, and they utilize the imperfect nature of the world to grow in
goodness. Sorley explains, “The completely moral man or morally perfect man is the man who
would adopt this moral attitude in any possible circumstances.” 203 This individual would live in
such a way that their mind is set on the infinite. By way of comparison, a Perfect or Infinite
Mind is free because it has its own self-determination. Conversely, a finite mind, “limited in
knowledge and power and distracted by desires other than the will to goodness, may yet have
partial measure of that self-determination which is complete only in the infinite.”204 Although
humanity is finite, humans require and desire the infinite; therefore, humanity needs God to
complete their purpose.
A. E. Taylor (1869–1945)
A. E. Taylor, as an apologist, is known for two significant works. 205 The first is a book
called, The Faith of a Moralist. The original content of the book was part of a series of Gifford
Lectures Taylor delivered between 1926–28. The second work is a small book called, Does God
Exist? Taylor wrote this final book as WWII was beginning, which caused it to be released
posthumously after the war. These two works expound upon Taylor’s philosophical foundations
as they relate to theism. Although many of Taylor’s works have been overshadowed by his
esteemed contemporary—C.S. Lewis—they nonetheless provide indisputable insight for the
moral argument. Specifically, for this project, Taylor’s works will be analyzed to grasp how his
conception of the good impacts human actions.
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Taylor possessed a special interest in moral philosophy. As a professor at St. Andrews
University, he taught classes on moral philosophy, which then led to his opportunity to present at
the Gifford Lectures. The focus of his lectures was to discuss the timeless question of morality’s
relationship with religion. To answer this inquiry, he asks three questions which serve as the
outline of his work. First, what is the good for man? He poses the possibility that man’s heart is
in constant aspiration of an infinite good outside of the temporal order.206 Second, if man has the
desire for something eternal, what is man’s response to the eternal? Taylor asks, “is it
conceivable that it can be attained by a one-sided movement of endeavor on our part, or must we
think of our own moral effort as a movement of response, elicited and sustained throughout by
an antecedent outgoing movement from the side of the eternal?”207 This leads to his third
question about morality’s autonomous nature. Does morality exist separate from religion,
because of religion, or in conjunction with religion? The version of natural theology Taylor
addresses concludes that morality makes the most sense when taken in conjunction with a
personal, intelligent, and infinite being who upholds it.208 This foundational concept is elucidated
throughout his work.
Taylor begins with the supposition that objective morals and values exist. 209 The standard
of morality cannot be derived from humans, because it is an anomaly to find very good deeds
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and very good people. Simply because these cannot be found regularly does not negate their
actuality. The reality that people fall short of the standard cannot be a counterfactual against the
existence of the good. This is the case because the knowledge of the good runs hand-in-hand
with the knowledge of God. This can be seen as humans strive for the good, and do not settle for
what is simply “better.” Thus, Taylor utilizes this point to say, “What I ought to be, that I can
be.”210 This statement corresponds with the second major question of his work.
Taylor’s stance that humans can “be” what they ought to be is similar to Kant’s OIC
dictum. Taylor finds fault in Kant’s formulation, in favor of his own, because he sees a defect.
He contends that Kant focuses on the singular performance of what one should do versus what
they should be or become.211 He further explains that to focus on acts alone will not bring about
the satisfaction of pursing the ultimate good. The acquisition of something temporal does not
elicit the same satisfaction one would expect if the good can be obtained completely on this side
of eternity by doing acts. Taylor notes, “If the pursuit of temporal and secular good must
inevitably fail to satisfy moral aspiration itself, we may fairly infer that there is a non-secular
good to which moral endeavor is a growing response.”212 This may be illustrated by looking at
utilitarian rationale. A utilitarian can be considered good when he avoids some abuse (an action),
but this is only in motion to what is better (seeing that there is always more to do); which goes to
show that one has not obtained that which is fully good. Taylor says it this way,
The moral quest will be self-defeating unless there is an object to sustain it which
embodies in itself good complete and whole, so that in having it we are possessing that
which absolutely satisfies the heart's desire and can never be taken from us. The
possession must be possession of a "thing infinite and eternal", and this points to the
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actuality of God, the absolute and final good, as indispensably necessary if the whole
moral effort of mankind is not to be doomed ab initio to frustration.
This is the crux of Taylor’s moral argument. Human actions must be seen in conjunction with the
good that is God. The pursuit of good, along with the driving force and motivation for action,
finds its fulfillment beyond this temporal world.
Taylor explains that humanity’s failure to live according to the moral law results from sin
or the personality of man disjoined from the eternal. 213 It may be that an atheist can do good by
not stealing, lying, or killing; but the fulfillment of his personality will be lacking. He argues that
many moralists try to focus on the good without ever dealing with evil. As one may have
guessed, he believes that Plato and Kant do an adequate job of addressing this issue. “I do not
think I shall be seriously misrepresenting the habitual outlook of most moralists,” Taylor asserts,
“by saying that they take it very much as an obvious and regrettable incident of human life that
we so often do what we ought not to do, but as nothing more than a regrettable incident.” 214 To
focus too much on humanity’s moral mistakes as something they can get over if they wish,
without considering the devastating nature of sin, is to misunderstand the issue of sin. Morality is
living in such a way that says that humans can make the good real, while also saying that if
someone were to make the good completely real then humans would not have the incentive to
Taylor uses the term “personality” to refer to man’s internal condition or will. He speaks of it in a
number of different contexts, but many of his examples have to do with the change of will to follow God and his
commandments. In one place he says, “The making of a personality, like that of an omelet, requires the breaking of
eggs, and the first egg to be broken is a man's own heart.” Ibid., 147. In a footnote in response to Mill, he explains
this process in Christian terms as, “Remorse, in our language, seems to mean exclusively dissatisfaction with one's
own conduct, but it is a dissatisfaction which need have nothing to do with the moral quality of the conduct.
Genuine contrition involves absolute and unqualified self-condemnation of one's conduct, and of one's personality,
so far as expressed in that conduct, as evil or sinful. Hence its connection with the second stage of repentance
confession. The essence of confession is that it is recognition that an act which is absolutely to be condemned is my
personal responsible act, and that, in condemning the act, I am condemning myself, so far as the act expressed
myself, as guilty and evil without excuse.” Ibid., 86.
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keep doing good. “Morality is unremitting war against evil,” Taylor submits, “but where there is
no evil there can be no war against evil. The good person, therefore, must will at once that evil
shall exist, that it may be overcome, and also that it shall be overcome, that is that it shall not
exist.”215 The balance of wishing to do good, while still acknowledging the purpose of evil has
been a point of contention in Christian dialogues for centuries. However, Taylor sees benefit in
this paradox because it promotes the continual pursuit of the good even in light of the existence
of evil.
One may say that Taylor, along with Kant, focuses too much on works. This will be dealt
with further in chapter five, but it will suffice for the time being to note that Taylor is not
advocating for a works-based salvation. He identifies that there is a struggle to navigate between
the margin of humans doing all the work and God doing all the heavy lifting. One does not win
heaven by being moral, but there is still the expectation for one to be moral because it fits within
actualizing the good while on earth. If a person were to completely succeed in being good, or
perfect, he would, “no longer be a man, but a god, and this complete transformation of humanity
into deity. . . [is] impossible.”216 In Taylor’s view, a proper construal of morality includes both
γένεσις (becoming) and ἐνέργεια (working). This goes back to his view that the focus needs to be
on “becoming” what one is expected to be. This does, also, include acting in such a way that
brings about the good. “There is nothing in itself irrational in hoping for a stage in our existence
in which finality may have been actually reached,” posits Taylor, “so far as development of
personal character is concerned, and yet endless room left for the embodiment of the character so
won in varied action. With the disappearance of growth, or becoming, of character we should not
215
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have lost our unique personality; we should have at last come into complete possession of it.”217
Taylor reinforces this Christian paradox by concluding that no one will reach eternal life by his
own effort—it is the gift of God. However, one must fight for victory at times with unaided
efforts, while also knowing that the battle has already been won.218
In summary of A. E. Taylor’s contribution to the discussion, one can see he maintained
that objective morals and values exist. One can know these objective morals because of the
desire each person has to pursue the ultimate good. This raises the bar for a moral life, but it also
entails that a person does not actually live up to that standard. Taylor’s original purpose is to
explain the connection between morality and religion. The connection between the two is that
religion adequately describes why the bar is so high and why humans should strive to live for it
while simultaneously knowing they will not accomplish it.
C. S. Lewis (1898–1963)
Among the well-known moral philosophers stands out individuals like C. S. Lewis who is
best known for his development of the moral argument in such works as Mere Christianity.
Originally written as a series of radio talks, Lewis meticulously and practically shows the world
of objective morality. He makes two main observations, “First, that human beings, all over the
earth, have this curious idea that they ought to behave in a certain way, and cannot really get rid
217

Ibid., 418–9.

218
In a longer explication, Taylor says, “So long as we are within the bounds of the purely ethical, it may
be said, the moral conflict must be thought of as one in which man fights for himself and must win any success he
does win by his own unaided efforts. But according to any religion which is not a mere ‘Pharisaism,’ no one
achieves ‘eternal life’ by his own effort; it is the ‘gift of God.’ How, then, can we speak of it, as we have just
spoken, as the supersession of the moral struggle by a moral victory? I must not now anticipate the course of the
reflections with which we shall be occupied later. So I will only add that the paradox, if it is a paradox, is inherent in
the Christian religion itself. The fruits of the tree of life, and the hidden manna, are expressly spoken of as gifts, but
they are gifts said to be reserved for victors. ‘I have overcome the world,’ said One; but it is said in order that each
of us also may overcome. We are still the ecclesia militans, and our victory is still to be won.” Ibid., 434.

100

of it. Secondly, that they do not in fact behave that way.”219 The former has been covered, the
latter will receive special treatment in this section.
Why is it the case that people do not live according to the moral law? Lewis creates a
simple and pragmatic case in the first book of Mere Christianity by describing why humans have
such a pull toward living by a standard while simultaneously failing. His moral argument is only
a slight variation from other apologists considered here. What Lewis provides is a different
perspective, or rather advantage, due to his arrival at a more robust form of Christian theism.
Essentially, Lewis creates a case for the moral law that makes the most sense when framed
within a Christian theory of morality.
1. There is a universal moral law, which applies to all humans.
2. If there is a universal moral law, there must be a moral lawgiver.
3. The universal moral law requires a perfectly moral lawgiver.
The moral law is “hard as nails” and impartially applies to all humans regardless of opinions
about its strenuous rules.220 Various facts show this to be the case because humans respond to the
moral law in positive or negative terms. Lewis admits, “None of us are really keeping the Law of
Nature. . . I am only trying to call attention to a fact; the fact that this year, or this month, or,
more likely, this very day, we have failed to practice ourselves the kind of behaviour we expect
from other people.”221 The feeling humans have of the inescapable power of the rule of law
bearing down on their minds provides evidence for the proofs of the argument. The mere fact
that humans feel so strongly about this point echoes back to the validity of moral realism.
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Humans have two things weighing on them, “You have the facts (how men do behave) and you
also have something else (how they ought to behave).”222 The feeling of oughtness is more than
breaking a law, it is a perceived as a violation against a person. This breach in a relationship
typically produces feelings of guilt.
The feeling of guilt is a valuable sign pointing to God. This is one of the major strengths
for Lewis’s moral argument. His argument, effectively construed, points to the Christian God for
help. Consider the following point, “We know that if there does exist an absolute goodness it
must hate most of what we do. . . . If the universe is not governed by an absolute goodness, then
all our efforts are in the long run hopeless. But if it is, then we are making ourselves enemies to
that goodness every day, and are not in the least likely to do any better tomorrow, and so our
case is hopeless again.”223 How does one remove themselves from the vicious cycle of
hopelessness? Naturalistic explanations will say that the feeling of guilt or hopelessness is selfinflicted and illusory. A naturalist may insist that the solution for one’s feelings must come from
within the person themselves. This runs contrary to how humans actually feel about their guilt
when they violate a moral obligation. This point is effectively summed up in Lewis’s words:
My reason was that Christianity simply does not make sense until you have faced the sort
of facts I have been describing. Christianity tells people to repent and promises them
forgiveness. It therefore has nothing (as far as I know) to say to people who do not know
they have done anything to repent of and who do not feel that they need any forgiveness.
It is after you have realized that there is a real Moral Law, and a Power behind the law,
and that you have broken that law and put yourself wrong with that Power— it is after all
this, and not a moment sooner, that Christianity begins to talk. When you know you are
sick, you will listen to the doctor. When you have realized that our position is nearly
desperate you will begin to understand what the Christians are talking about. They offer
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an explanation of how we got into our present state of both hating goodness and loving
it.224
Lewis brings to light that Christianity helps make sense of the predicament humans are in with
the moral law. God is the powerful mind behind the law, but he is also personal when helping
people accomplish the law. Christian teachings, “tell you how the demands of this law, which
you and I cannot meet, have been met on our behalf, how God Himself becomes a man to save
man from the disapproval of God.”225 Lewis shows that God made humans with free will
because it enables them to act upon the law. If free will is part of the equation, then it makes
sense, from a standpoint of reward, that doing good will be rewarded when it is done freely;
while on the other hand if evil is done then punishment will ensue. The freedom of choice, or
autonomy, is a necessary requirement in the moral law. Autonomy affixes responsibility on
individuals and requires them to make the proper steps to fix issues in their moral actions.
The steps humans make toward fixing the broken relationship begins with the concept of
repentance. No one can take the next proper step forward until one changes their allegiance from
evil to good. Lewis notes that repentance means,
Unlearning all the self-conceit and self-will that we have been training ourselves into for
thousands of years. It means killing part of yourself, undergoing a kind of death. In fact,
it needs a good man to repent. And here comes the catch. Only a bad person needs to
repent: only a good person can repent perfectly. The worse you are the more you need it
and the less you can do it. The only person who could do it perfectly would be a perfect
person—and he would not need it.226
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The paradox elucidated by Lewis is part of the reoccurring vicious cycle in human experience
that calls out for help. The moral law requires humans to act in a particular way, and it calls
humans to seek the assistance needed to act in that way.
Lewis sees that some people want to call the Christian life an ideal. Some may say that,
“The moral perfection is an ‘ideal’ in the sense that we cannot achieve it. In that sense every kind
of perfection is, for us humans, an ideal; we cannot succeed in being perfect car drivers or
perfect tennis players or in drawing perfectly straight lines. But there is another sense in which it
is very misleading to call moral perfection an ideal.” 227 To call moral perfection an ideal is to say
that it is preferential and differs between people. “Perfect behaviour may be as unattainable as
perfect gear-changing when we drive; but it is a necessary ideal prescribed for all people by the
very nature of the human machine just as perfect gear-changing is an ideal prescribed for all
drivers by the very nature of cars.”228 Lewis encourages people to talk about rules and obedience
instead of ideals and idealism because that lowers the standard. We expect to make mistakes, and
we plan to make mistakes. People may make goals to tell no lies instead of telling a few less.
People say they are going to stop adultery instead of saying they will only do it seldom.
To drive the point to its culmination, Lewis provides an illustration of a fleet of ships.
The fleet of ships must each individually stay on course so they do not run into each other, and
the ships must be in good working order. This produces a threefold view of morality. First,
humans must be concerned about working together. Second, humans are to handle their inside
issues. Third, humans have to focus on their actual purpose as humans.229 The moral law
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provides the context for the what, how, and why for the reason humans feel compelled to pursue
the ultimate good.
Lewis has served a vital role in moral apologetics since the inception of his radio talks.
His influence has been magnanimous and continues to be just as relevant to the modern reader as
it was during his own time. The timelessness of his works has little to do with his popularity. His
advancements of the moral argument stand out differently from other writers, even his own
contemporaries. The value of his works is that he advanced the moral argument in a direction
toward the Christian God. His solution fits best within the framework of Christianity versus other
options. Thus, this study has been examining the high standard for morality based on the
objectiveness of morality while maintaining humanity’s finitude to live perfectly.

Conclusion
The purpose of this section has been to show examples of apologists who have made the
connection between the moral facts established in chapter two and the need for a certain type of
theism. Although it was not an exhaustive study, the authors selected were chosen based on the
three criteria introduced at the beginning of this chapter. First, these authors maintained that
moral facts are objective and knowable by humans. Second, they held that the standard for the
moral law is very high based on the knowledge humans have of objective morals and the law
itself. Third, humans do not live perfectly by the moral law because of their finite nature, which
is impaired by their desire at times to not live for the good. These three facts were chosen to
illustrate that a solution must be offered for humanity’s failure to live by the moral law and to
explain why people desire moral perfection. The next chapter will build a bridge between this
discovery to Christian theism by way of navigating three interconnected forms of a Christian
moral argument: Natural Law Theory, Divine Command Theory, and Virtue Ethics.
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Chapter 4: A Tripartite Argument for Christian Theism
Introduction
How does one get from moral realism to Christian theism? To answer this question, it
may be of some benefit to pursue what advantage a Christian hypothesis of morality offers. A
few key characters were introduced in chapter three that set up a possible case for Christian
theism. The task was accomplished by examining how they handled the relationship between
objective moral facts, a high standard for morality, and humanity’s finitude to live according to
the moral law. This chapter and the next will endeavor to introduce the advantage of a Christian
form of theism to determine if it can answer the major research questions of this project.

The Christian Advantage
What advantage does Christian theism offer to the discussion of humanity’s desire for
moral perfection? In the previous chapter it was shown that humanity’s desire and need for moral
perfection results from a high standard of morality derived from objective moral facts and
humanity’s failure to live up to the moral law. If Christian theism offers no advantage or is not
able to match the challenges presented by moral realism, then it will fail as a possible solution
for the issue.
The infamous German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche is known for his rejection of
Christian theism. Interestingly though, as Nietzsche grappled with finding moral value, given the
onset of nihilism, he lists four advantages of a theistic Christian perspective against it:
1. It bestowed an intrinsic value upon humans, which contrasted with their apparent
insignificance and subordination to chance in the eternal flux of becoming and
perishing.
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2. It served the purpose of God's advocates, inasmuch as it granted the world a certain
perfection despite its sorrow and evil—it also granted the world that proverbial
"freedom": evil seemed full of meaning.
3. It assumed that man could have a knowledge of absolute values, and thus granted him
adequate perception for the most important things.
4. It prevented man from despising himself as man, from turning against life, and from
being driven to despair by knowledge: it was a self-preservative measure.230
Nietzsche did not believe that Christianity was the likely best solution for the grounding of
morality, but he proffers it as an “antidote” to both theoretical and practical nihilism. 231
Nietzsche saw nihilism as an inevitable conclusion due to the erosion of truth and meaning in
societies. This insuperable conclusion is obvious when God, a staple of truth and meaning, is
dead. He saw the rushing torrent of nihilism leading to catastrophe in the twentieth century.
Little did Nietzsche know what awaited humanity within the span of the next one hundred years
after his death. The insight Nietzsche provided, although in some ways counterproductively to
the task initiated here, is a requisite for this chapter. It may be of more benefit to frame his
observation in a different light. Does theism, namely the kind found in Christianity, provide a
proper counterfactual to naturalistic explanations for morality? Does the removal of God from
the equation create a vacuum for the need of a proper grounding for morality? Can Christianity
offer a solution for humanity’s need for perfection, given humanity’s failure to live by the moral
law perfectly? These questions will direct this part of the study.
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A Tripartite Argument
What is the source of morality as it relates to theism? It has been shown that there is a
strong case for objective morality and that humans interact within its boundaries; but how does
theism explain moral facts, values, and obligations? The connection between theism and moral
facts is typically viewed between three systems of ethics: Divine Command Theory (DCT),
Natural Law (NL), and Virtue Ethics (VE). Each theory tries to answer two major questions: 1.
What makes something good or bad; and 2. What makes something right or wrong? Each theory
has its advantages and disadvantages while answering these questions. These theories will be
examined to determine their viability for providing answers to the major questions of this
chapter. The focal point of this chapter will be to show that Divine Command Theory, Natural
Law, and Virtue Ethics, when combined, create the likely best explanation for moral facts.232 The
theorists who advocate for these systems, at least those represented here, root the moral law in
the existence, nature, and commands of God founded upon natural law principles, and that point
toward a virtue ethic. When placed together, they present a reasonable case for why Christianity
presents the likely best solution for the issue of perfection elucidated throughout this work.
Natural Law
Natural Law theories are some of the oldest and most utilized in ethical reasoning even
outside of theism.233 A natural law argument for morality posits that morality can be deduced by
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natural facts or properties of persons or actions. In other words, one can know what ought to be
done by understanding the obligations humans have to act by nature according to what it means
to be human.234 There are two varieties of natural law theories: Theistic and naturalistic. A
naturalistic account of natural law asserts that humans have evolved into moral beings, and that
humans are to act according to their human nature as it currently stands.235 A Christian version of
NL says that humans are created by a moral designer with a defined standard for morality.
Features of this morality are derived from the structure of humans and can be known using
reason. Thus, there is a written code within the fabric and structure of human nature which is
placed there by a divine moral law giver.
It should not be surprising that many theists advocate for a natural law theory of ethics
versus Divine Command Theory or Virtue Ethics. John Finnis, a notable proponent, observes:
It must never be overlooked that, for nearly two millennia, the theories of natural law
have been expounded by theorists who, with few exceptions, believed that the uncaused
cause has in fact revealed itself to be all that the foregoing analogue model of creative
causality hypothesized, to be indeed supremely personal, and to be a lawgiver whose law
for human persons should be obeyed out of gratitude, hope, fear, and/or love. 236
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The classical figurehead for NL is Thomas Aquinas introduced in chapter three. Aquinas,
utilizing his four laws, concluded that the natural law results from God’s eternal law placed in
the creation of humans. His full ethical theory will not be rehashed here; however, two salient
ideas resurface: 1. Natural law is given by God; and 2. Natural law is part of practical rationality.
Aquinas’s two points are the basic foundation for a theistic natural law theory.
One natural law advocate, J. Budziszewski, contends that natural law theories lead one to
accept theism.237 Others advocates, like John Finnis, may hold to theism, but they frequently
detach their natural law theories from their theistic beliefs. 238 Since there is such a wide variety
of NL theories, even within theism, how can one expect for this study to proceed? The goal will
be to focus primarily on how NL responds to moral values and moral obligations. If humanity’s
desire for perfection results from a high standard of morality imposed on humans, then how do
they relate to values and obligations? If humans possess within themselves everything needed to
know what is good and evil, and right and wrong, then do they also have the full capability to
what needs to be done? Once again, the issue arises over the fact that humans do not live up to
the moral law, which then requires the active participation of the divine lawgiver to close the
gap.
There is a danger in NL theories to focus too much on human capabilities. If the form of
theism advanced is of a deistic formulation, then God is no longer needed after creating the
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initial structure of human nature. It is an even bigger issue when the theory is divorced from a
theistic belief wholesale, because humans are left with their own tools and resources to live
morally with no divine assistance. This neither fits with the characteristics of moral obligations
nor with Christian theistic teachings. A more robust view of NL entails a theistic explanation for
human experiences of living a moral life that requires continual assistance by the divine moral
lawgiver. This may be better explained by breaking down major components of the theory shared
across its variations.
First, natural law theories focus on human nature. The focus is more than biological or
physiological, although that is part of it. One would be hard pressed to conclude that an
individual that is deformed or handicapped is missing out on human nature.239 Human nature
cannot depend upon whether a person has all ten fingers or toes. Whether a person is missing
their thumbs or not does not impact value claims like love, justice, and guilt. When looking at
human nature there are components that are meant to enable humans to survive and others that
help humans thrive. Humans thrive or flourish when everything is working properly on an social,
individual, and existential level (i.e., a fleet of ships). Understanding human nature helps
determine what it means to be human.240 Furthermore, it shows that humans have intrinsic worth
that is recognizable by other humans. These things together make up the “human machine.”241 A
theistic version of natural law points to God as the creator of these natural facts about human
worth, which allows the human machine to work properly on all levels.
239
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Conversations usually turn to a discussion of teleology when establishing the perfect
definition of a human. Teleological theories insist that everything has a telos or an end or goal.
The telos of an eye is to see, a nose to smell, an acorn to grow; but what is the telos of a human?
Is it to grow, reproduce, and flourish? Or is there something else that human nature is driven
toward to find its completion? Finnis says there are seven basic goods all humans recognize and
seek to uphold: life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, sociability, practical reasonableness,
and religion.242 He argues for these basic goods instead of a singular, ultimate good that is the
human telos. If humans only strive for the perfection of human nature, then man should find his
fulfillment in himself. However, this does not fit with human experience. Human experience says
that the pursuit of the good is located beyond human nature and theism argues it is found in a
personal being beyond the present world. This requires one to ask: are laws derived from human
nature alone or do humans possess an inclination toward the good? How do humans know what
human nature produces? Can human inclinations be trusted? This leads to the second component
of a natural law theory.
The second major component of a natural law theory relates to how individuals know
moral facts. In chapter two it was introduced that moral facts are knowable and discoverable.
Theism contends that both general and special revelation are the two avenues for gaining moral
knowledge. Facts known by general revelation are those things placed within creation itself that
give knowledge of God, his nature, and his expectations. Facts known by special revelation are
242
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things that God chooses to reveal beyond general revelation. These may be further descriptions
of aspects of his nature, will, commands, or instructions. Out of the two avenues, NL focuses
extensively on general revelation. Claire Brown Peterson believes the connection between facts
about what humans are and the value claims about how humans should behave is primary. “What
humans are determines what they need to flourish,” Peterson asserts, “and needs have value
implications.”243 Value implications are not just individual fulfillment, they relate to humans on
a cosmic level.244 Things do not end here in theistic discussions. Once humans know that moral
values exist, they must determine their relationship to them. This leads to the third component of
a natural theory.
The third component of a natural law theory concerns obligations. If there is a law, it is
binding on humans which results in obligations. Jeremy Waldron argues that natural law is like a
law, but it is not a law itself. 245 Aquinas, on the other hand, calls it a law because it is derived
from a loving God who seeks to care for his community of people. 246 Aquinas believed that the
good—the character of God—is prior to the right. He took this stance for three reasons. First, the
theory of the good is that it is relative to human desire. Second, good is that which is the
perfection or completion of a thing. Third, the good comes from the form of things separate from
what humans experience. It has been shown that moral obligations are more than self-imposed
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rules and more than “doing what humans do.” Moral obligations have characteristics that make
sense if they are given by a divine, personal being.
If humans can know what they ought to do because it is derived from human nature, then
why do humans not act according to their nature more than they do? There must exist something
deeper within humans for them to understand moral obligations. Therefore, it may be possible to
use natural law to determine what is metaphysically good, while looking to another solution for
what is right. Even with this as an option, Natural law cannot stand alone on human nature
simply because human nature looks for something beyond itself for its fulfillment.
What role does human conscience play in determining what is good and right? Finnis
posits that moral obligations are a “demand of conscience.” 247 Conscience or intuition by itself
cannot be the deciding factor, however. Even if it is argued that conscience is created by God,
the supposition still has weaknesses.248 Is the conscience rigid and infallible or is it subject to
change? Aquinas did not take the conscious to be infallible, nor to say that it was a source of
knowledge.249 For him the conscience is the “application of knowledge to activity.”250 The
conscience is made or taught as one comes to know God’s will in its various forms. Therefore,
God’s revealed will must be seen in both general and special revelation. Knowing God’s
commands and purposes creates obligations for humans.
Throughout this section both advantages and disadvantages of natural law have been
introduced. It has not been an exhaustive analysis of natural law because the task is to use it as a
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foundation for understanding the next section which focuses on Divine Command Theory.
Minimally, the goal has been to introduce natural law in such a way that lays a foundation for
understanding a multi-pronged approach for a theistic argument by showing the value of
identifying aspects of the good derived from human nature. The major takeaway is that human
nature does build a case for understanding values and obligations, but they do not stand strong by
themselves without understanding God’s commands.
Divine Command Theory
A Divine Command Theory of ethics identifies things as good or bad based on God’s
commands. Things are wrong because God forbids them, or they are right because God
commands them. Divine command theorists explain that moral obligations result directly from
God’s command for people to live moral lives. Most DCT focus on obligations versus value
claims of good. Advocates of DCT share this foundational concept, but they also have
distinctions among themselves (i.e., causal, identity, prescriptivists, etc.). Although there are
distinctions between them, they collectively help create the case that moral obligations result
from divine commands. Each author offers not only their own nuance to the divine command
theory but also unique solutions for how to live a moral life.
John Hare begins his defense of divine command theory by explaining the ways God
issues commands.251 He suggests a proposal for divine command theory which does not include
commands as an ingredient of the obligation. 252 He asserts that his proposal offers a better case in
opposition to Philip Quinn, who posits a causal form (the commands cause the obligation); and
John Hare, God’s Command, Oxford Studies in Theological Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2015), 309–14.
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against Robert Adams, who suggests that commands constitute obligations. Since obligations are
neither caused nor constituted by God’s commands, Hare proposes obligations are produced by
God.253 The obligations being produced then become divine prescriptions.
Hare describes five types of divine prescription derived from William of Ockham’s list:
precepts, prohibitions, permissions, counsels, and directly effective commands. 254 “They are
issued with authority,” Hare explains, “and some kind of sanction is envisioned for noncompliance, ranging from blame to punishment.”255 In part, a person is expected to conform to
the moral law by obeying God’s specific commands—including moral obligations.
This invites the question: how can people know these commands are for them? Hare
explains that God reveals his commands to people so they know what they may do. He shows
God can reveal his commands in several ways. 1. Revelation—both general and special (i.e.,
Sacred Scriptures and the “inner testimony” of the Holy Spirit); and intermediate revelation—
empirical and conceptual truths accessible to all human unless they are prevented; 2. Conscience
or in his terms, “human capacity that serves as the vehicle for general revelation about
obligation;”256 3. The work of the Holy Spirit or some other divine agency; 4. Through other
people collectively, within one’s community and within the traditions of that community.” 257
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This list poses an interesting combination of solutions, because they build upon components of a
Natural Law Theory.
If Hare’s view of divine command theory depends on God producing commands, humans
must have some kind of ability to recognize these commands on a deeper level. This leads him to
note four points about epistemology in his system. First, there must be a receptor for the
“magnetic force” humans have toward what is good. 258 Second, Hare states, “there must be
enough general revelation of what is good that we can say. . . that we have the background of
many substantive beliefs about the good, independent of special revelation about God and God’s
goodness so that we can make the non-trivial judgment that God is good.”259 This leads to a
qualifier that makes up Hare’s third point. In the model Hare advances, he suggests that general
revelation is “defective.”260 He argues that it is defective because it does not tell the whole “story
of the good.” This does not mean it is defective ontologically, but defective in the sense of being
insufficient alone. Hare explains the defectiveness has to do with human inclinations that do not
fill the gap and fail to do the legwork necessary to arrive at the good. 261 Fourth, humans must ask
how much general revelation is enough for accountability. If general revelation is defective, in
Hare’s model, or incomplete, more information must be supplied to tell the whole story of the
good—the incorporation of special revelation.
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Epistemically, divine command theory offers solutions for knowing God’s commands as
they relate to human life, but this theory also allows further interaction between God and people.
“A direct divine prescription,” Hare explains,
Is one that is a gift, standardly received in prayer, but there is a spectrum here. A
prescription can present itself immediately as an ‘extraordinary’ divine gift (perhaps there
is an auditory sensation), or much more often it presents itself as an ‘ordinary’ part of our
reflection that we then recognize as God speaking to us, rather than our simply working
out what to do unaided.262
Richard Mouw opens up the possibility of God giving his command through more than one
venue. Mouw classifies these venues as natural law, the magisterium of an ecclesiastical body,
specific commands God might communicate to individuals in some way, “examining our natural
inclinations,” and listening to our conscience. 263 Both Robert Adams and Stephen Evans
elaborate on Mouw’s list of ways God reveals his commands. 264 One difference that Adams
makes to this list is the addition of social interaction. The lists of ways God communicates may
present issues for individuals on multiple levels, which will not be fleshed out in this study.
Regardless of one’s acceptance of these lists, there is a general consensus that the Scriptures give
the best and most reliable guidance for understanding God’s commands.
These forms of communication need further guidelines if they will fit into both an ethical
theory and an orthodox form of teaching. Therefore, Hare presents a phenomenology for his
prescriptions. Specifically, he has listed five ways to clarify this phenomenology: 1. It must be
clear and distinctive; 2. It must possess an external origin; 3. It must be a voice that is familiar,
but not one’s own; 4. It must possess a sense of conviction or authority; 5. It must appear to
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come from a loving and merciful source. 265 Although more can be said regarding his five points,
they do provide a good foundational assessment. Hare’s construal of the data is nested in his
overarching view of divine command theory, which insists that God’s commands can be
recognized by humans via multiple faculties.
If people can recognize these commands as coming from God, then the next logical step
is to perceive them as authoritative in someone’s life. This is a vital component in the version of
divine command theory Hare casts. God’s commands are not arbitrary or vacuous because they
are an extension of his nature. When God produces a command (in any of the forms detailed
above) he is producing an obligation. One may raise the typical Euthyphro objections, but Hare
dismisses them by working between both horns of the dilemma, and he essentially sees no real
threat from it.266 Hare’s version explains that God asks humanity to do things that are an
extension of His will and He would not ask people to do something they could not accomplish—
at least without divine assistance that is available.
Divine command theory rightly explains the nature and purpose of the commands God
has issued to humans. Regardless of whether someone knows the commands are coming from
God or not, they still feel the pull of them. A divine command theory does not require an
immediate link between moral commitments and religious commitments.267 However, many of
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God’s commands are to create or cultivate virtues, which also have significant connections to
religious duties. For these virtues to be established, one needs to make a connection using special
revelation, especially as it relates to cultivating virtues as they relate to living a moral life. This
allows the discussion to progress to Virtue Ethics.
Virtue Ethics
A Christian virtue ethic is a tricky system to identify. The basic features of a virtue ethic
begin with the three parts of any ethical decision. First, there is the action. Deontological ethics
focuses on the rules and actions of morality. Think of Kant’s ethical system and it will be more
apparent what is involved in the action of an ethical decision. Second, there is the outcome of the
action. Utilitarianism focuses on this component for its ethical theory. The focus on the outcome
of an action is what determines whether the action is good or bad. Finally, the more overlooked
component is the agent performing the action. This is where virtue ethics gets its starting point.
Virtue ethics places “[t]he emphasis. . . on inner character and motivation. . . . if we want to
decide what is right or ethical, we need to appeal to facts about human character, human
motivation, and human virtues and vices in order to ground or justify our conclusions.”268 Virtue
ethics entails that “rules/principles and the general results of our actions are relevant to moral
evaluation only to the extent that they illustrate or exemplify certain valued or disvalued
inner/psychological dispositions.”269 Thus, it results in asking the question: how important is the
character of the individual performing a moral action?
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Consider a man who does duties as one would expect: he gives to the poor, feeds the
hungry, and keeps his promises. One may look at him and determine that he is good because he
focuses on the correct actions and outcomes. However, what if this man also was bitter, angry,
and vile in his inward being? Is it possible to do the right actions, but negate them all by being of
the wrong mindset? What if it is said that the mindset of the individual determines the goodness
of the action itself? Once again, imagine someone who gives money to another person. The
action of giving money is amoral until it is determined that the man will use it later as blackmail
or a bribe. But the man could be giving the money as a simple act of benevolence or a token of
love. Aristotle intimates,
It is a hard thing to be good; for finding the middle or the mean in each case is a hard
thing. . . any one can be angry—that is quite easy; any one can give money away or
spend it; but to do these things to the right person, to the right extent, at the right time,
with the right object, and in the right manner, is not what everybody can do, and is by no
means easy; and that is the reason why right doing is rare and praiseworthy and noble.270
The importance of considering the person doing the action is valuable, and this seems to be a
consistent consideration even within other ethical theories.
Another challenge to virtue ethics is determining whether or not virtues create moral
obligations. Do virtues like kindness, loyalty, courage, or honesty create binding moral
obligations? How can one determine when certain acts should or should not be done?
Furthermore, how is it possible to know what is a virtue and what is a vice without some other
determining or grounding factor? Aquinas helps expand on this matter, because he utilizes both
natural law and virtue in his ethical theory. He makes the statement, “[I]t is evident that the
proper effect of law is to lead its subjects to their proper virtue: and since virtue is ‘that which
makes its subject good,’ it follows that the proper effect of law is to make those to whom it is
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given, good, either simply or in some particular respect.”271 Aquinas shows that virtue is an
effect of living by law, because the law helps promote the correct kind of end for humans.
When framed in this perspective, virtues can be seen as created habits. Brad Kallenberg
and Nikki Tousley posit that virtue ethics fits best with how humans function. Specifically, they
defend four claims that explain what they call the “the irreducibly bodily nature” of virtue ethics:
1. The quality of any human person’s knowledge is a function of the quality of that person’s
habits; 2. Forming habits is biological; 3. Humans form habits intentionally; and 4. Habit
formation is opposed by entropy.272 Their focus is on humans working to develop and achieve
the proper virtues, and this is an actual possibility for humans to do.
A key aspect for understanding virtue ethics revolves around identifying the proper
grounding for those virtues which set the moral standard to be followed. Typically, a virtue
ethicist appeals to the example of moral exemplars like Jesus and other religious figures for a
standard of morality. In Christianity, believers place Jesus as the moral exemplar par excellence.
Second to Jesus are the examples of other believers who have paved the way for moral
excellence based on their understanding of Jesus and his subsequent teachings as the ideal.
Specifically, Christians venerate those individuals who display an abnormal or an unprecedented
amount of moral character. These persons, sometimes named saints or heroes, are usually known
for some deed of supererogation, or seen as possessing an uncanny amount of virtue. The reality
is that these saints do not seem to be held as the standard, but are viewed as the exception. If they
271
Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I–II.92.1. The phrase “that which makes its subject good” is taken from
Aristotle (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II.6). Aquinas uses the quotation from Aristotle while talking about hope
as a virtue (ST, II–II.17.1). Aquinas says that a good human act must correspond to a good human virtue. Actions
and virtues are linked together, and one can know the goodness of a virtue if it attains to the ultimate good which is
God.

Nikki Coffey Tousley and Brad Kallenberg, “Virtue Ethics,” Religious Studies Faculty Publications, no.
59 (2011): 10–29, http://ecommons.udayton.edu/rel_fac_pub/59.
272

122

were the standard then more people would strive to identify with them, become saints
themselves, or no longer venerate such individuals. If sainthood is considered an anomaly, then
should Christians even strive for this level of perfection? Virtue calls for people to look to
heroes, saints, and exemplars, but can saints be held as the standard for morality, and do they set
the bar too high for perfection?
Kant says that making the example of people the standard for morality is “fatal to
morality.”273 He continues to say that even Jesus must, “be compared with our ideal of moral
perfection before we can recognize Him as such.”274 A pure virtue ethicist will find issue with
Kant’s observation. Linda Zagzebski, a virtue ethicist, purports, “The Incarnation and death of
Christ make possible a higher level of perfection than was possible for Adam and Eve before the
Fall. The Christian story combines the depths and the heights that humanity can reach with and
without grace. So, the imitation of Christ is not only an ethic meant to overcome the effects of
the Fall; it is an ethic of perfection. . . .”275 Zagzebski’s explains that the incarnation sets the
standard for a moral exemplar and grounds the metaphysics of morals in God, the Creator. This
creates an aspect of the motivation factor offered by virtue ethics. If Jesus is the moral exemplar,
he sets the standard for a moral life. Ideally, one should live to emulate Jesus in all aspects of
life—namely, regarding morals. Kallenberg says that a Christian virtue ethic, “analyzes moral
situations relative to the fit of its action as measured against the character of Christ revealed in
the Gospel narratives. For virtues ethics the metric is not so much effectiveness as faithfulness to
273
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the gospel.”276 Therefore, a Christian virtue ethic utilizes eternal moral truths exemplified in
Jesus to gauge and evaluate actions, agents, and outcomes of an ethical decision.
The goal of this section has been to show that the virtues of an agent is of utmost value
when considering the ethicality of a decision. Virtue ethics calls individuals to a standard of
morality already identified, lived out, and exemplified in the person of Jesus and other specially
identified individuals. The latter alone does not constitute a standard for the good, but shows that
the good has application and value in the lives of humans. As an ethical system, virtue ethics
does not give the best account for moral realism, as delineated earlier, because it needs to be
coupled with a system like natural law theory and divine command theory. The most salient
aspect of it as a system is that it aids an individual in getting to the application of moral truths
and allowing them to shape someone’s life.
A Multi-Pronged Approach
The crux of this section has been to introduce the three main ethical theories found in
Christianity and set up how they work together to create a fuller explanation for understanding a
solution for man’s desire for perfection. These systems have been presented as explanations for
why Christianity has a response to the metaphysical questions about morality. This has been
accomplished by melding together these theories into one multi-pronged approach.
Stephen Evans does a masterful job setting up a new perspective on divine command
theory. The approach he takes is the inspiration for this chapter. His version of DCT shores up
moral obligations by utilizing natural law and virtue ethics for an explanation and application of
the good. Evans connects the three in saying, “One might say that a DCT rests on a natural law
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theory (or something similar that can play the role that natural law theory plays) and points
towards a virtue theory.”277 The connection Evans makes between these three systems employs
advantages from all three while avoiding many of their weaknesses. This assumption maintains
that divine command theory presupposes a natural law or other theory of the good. Divine
command theory requires some understanding of a normative principle or principles universal in
all human persons (i.e., their created capacities). Since God created humans with these
universals, he also can direct humans toward a different character. “God through his commands,”
Evans explains, “wants to help his human creatures transform their characters to make it possible
for them to know God truly and relate to God properly.” 278 One may miss the value in Evans’s
statement by focusing too much on the relationship between commands and transformation. How
does a command cause transformation?279 The answer can be found if a divine command theory
rests on a natural law theory and points towards a virtue theory. This is the trajectory Evans is
mapping out, which will be supplemented in the next chapter. Human capacity alone cannot get
people where they need to be; there must be drastic changes taking place and a high expectation
for living. These changes can be delineated into three points that constitute moral transformation:
1. Becoming a new person; 2. Making God the object of love; and 3. conforming to the terms of
Evans, God and Moral Obligation, 54. He also sets up his proposition in the following way, “If A is
consistent with B, and A entails C, then B must also be consistent with C. Hence if a natural law ethic is consistent
with DCT, and a natural law ethic logically requires a virtue ethic, then it must be the case that a DCT is also
consistent with a virtue ethic.” Ibid., 75.
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the agreement (i.e., covenant). This is why Evans’s approach is unique; he uses natural law for
an account of the good and Divine Command Theory for an account of the right. This pairing of
theories helps point toward a virtue ethic for an account of following the good.

Conclusion
The central concern of this chapter has been to determine if Christianity can offer a
solution for the challenges produced by moral realism and its subsequent impact on human lives.
The proposed solution has been to show that the three main versions of Christian ethics can
provide a working solution, especially if they are taken together. The result has been that
Christianity calls for a transformation in the moral life and character of a person. The desire
humans have to live a perfect life results from the high demand of morality given by God, who is
the creator and arbiter of the moral law. Christianity explains that God’s standard for morality is
expected of humans, but there is also the case that humans do not live by it perfectly. The
Christian God calls humans to a standard and tells them he will provide the necessary tools for
the transformation needed in action, mind, and life.
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Chapter 5: Unity with Christ
Introduction
It was proposed at the end of chapter four that Christianity has a solution for humanity’s
desire and failure to live a perfect life. Christianity offers a solution by explaining how the desire
humans feel to live a moral life is due to created human nature, God’s prescribed commands, and
the desire to live a moral life conformed to Christ’s image. The succinct solution is moral
transformation or in Christian doctrine—unity with Christ. Unity with Christ satisfies humanity’s
desire for perfection by perfecting people in Christ by the indwelling of the Holy Spirit and
offering hope for a future perfection beyond what is experienced in this life.
For Christianity to be a viable solution it must offer an advantage for human flourishing
that fits reality. Blaise Pascal weighs that human happiness must fit within the boundaries of a
God who is able to bring about good. This solution “must give us an explanation of our
opposition to God and to our own good. . . .” Pascal then posits, “It must teach us the remedies
for these infirmities, and the means of obtaining these remedies. Let us therefore examine all the
religions of the world, and see if there be any other than the Christian which is sufficient for this
purpose.”280 In step with Pascal’s observation, Christianity stands out uniquely from other
worldviews. Nuances of this point can be found throughout this work, but it is the purpose of this
chapter to bring them to the forefront as it creates an argument for the necessity of God and his
assistance.
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Unity with Christ & Moral Transformation
A central tenet in Christian doctrine is the teaching of “unity with Christ.” The crux of
the gospel message is that Jesus came in the form of man to save humanity from sin. The saving
act was accomplished through Jesus’ death on the cross, burial in the tomb, and subsequent
resurrection from the dead. John Murray notes, “Union with Christ is union with him in the
efficacy of his death and in the virtue of his resurrection. . . .”281 One way to determine the
internal validity or soundness of the gospel message depends upon whether Jesus accomplished
what he said he would do and what was spoken about him. 282 If the sacrifice of Jesus cannot
respond adequately to the disparity humans face from the inability to live a moral life, then it is
invalid.
Christianity uses several related words to explain what Jesus did for humanity (along
with the work of God and the Holy Spirit): justification, atonement, and sanctification.
Constantine Campbell defines union with Christ as containing the terms: union, participation,
identification, and incorporation, which can be found within justification, atonement, and
sanctification.283 Each term has a significant theological teaching behind it, which makes them
all part of the gospel’s salvific message. For example, the connection between justification and
sanctification concerns one’s standing with God and one’s life and heart in response to the
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gospel. “Union with Christ,” Robert Latham explains, “is really the central truth of the whole
doctrine of salvation.”284 Union with Christ is the key moment when the solution for humanity’s
broken relationship with God is fixed or when one comes into “fellowship” with God through
Jesus and sealed by the Holy Spirit.285
The fact stands true that humans fail to live according to the moral law. God has also
revealed his will to humanity (through general or special revelation) for them to know what to
do. Even though humans fail to live for God, God is patient toward those failings and offers
grace. Baggett and Baggett state a form of the moral argument based on the performative aspect
of morality and morality’s relationship to grace. They say, “if classical theism and historical
Christian teaching provide the best explanation both of the diagnosis of the moral maladies of
people and the prescription for its healing, then this aspect of morality provides us at least some
good reason to infer its truth.”286 If God did not intend for humans to live moral lives and expect
them to live in that way, then his command “to be perfect as your Heavenly Father is perfect”
(Matt 5:48) would be vacuous. Lewis said that Jesus’ call to be perfect is not “idealistic gas,” but
a genuine call to be something God expects humans to be.287 “What is drawing us and our
desires, ” Hare intimates, “is God, what is constraining us is God’s command, and what is
coordinating the various ends of the members of the kingdom of ends is God’s impartial
benevolence.”288 Moral transformation is a necessity for human life, but it is also a logical and
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valid conclusion of divine command theory, natural law, and virtue ethics. Without God’s
explicit commands calling humans to be something new, they would be left to their own devices,
but that is not God’s plan. God offers an ontological change to individuals. Within this change
can be found the needed tools to continue according to God’s prescribed plan for humanity.
Moral transformation can take on a wide range of definitions and applications in moral
theories. Recall the three necessary points for moral transformation: 1. Become a new person; 2.
Make God the object of love; and 3. Conform to the terms of the agreement. Divine command
theory, combined with other ethical systems, gets a person to the beginning of these points but
does not take one all the way through the gate. For moral transformation to take place, there must
be both divine interaction and human response.
If viewed apologetically, the argument flows in the following way. God is the likely best
explanation for why objective morals exist. Morals are commanded by God and necessarily
require him.289 If morals are produced by God, he must also implement some way to enforce
them and hold people accountable to them. There is no example of a perfect human (except
Jesus) who has not violated one of God’s standards for morality. For a person to conform to
God’s teachings and obey him, there must be a transformation from the old person into the new
one (there has to be a standard for a new one as well). During this transformation, an individual
makes God the object of his or her love and agrees to the terms of the agreement between the
289
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two. The combination of natural law theory, divine command theory, and virtue ethics provides
breath for understanding the multifaceted nature of the solution, which reinforces how the good
and the right are intertwined with God and his plans for humanity’s perfection.
So far in what is being advanced, moral transformation involves both divine interaction
and human response. Divine interaction can take on several different forms, outlined earlier; but
each iteration shares a common principle—God offers the assistance needed for moral
transformation. Second, one is held accountable for how he or she responds to that divine
interaction. Each person will be held culpable for whether they accept the offered assistance or
not. For a person to know what he or she is to do, the divine creator must, in accordance with his
nature, provide the means necessary to meet his expectations or else people would not be
expected to do what they cannot do. The Apostle Peter explains that “[God’s] divine power has
granted to us all things that pertain to life and godliness. . .” (2 Peter 1:3). If God’s plan is to
provide humans with the ability to become partakers of the divine nature, it is not without his
aide. God’s divine power, which has been clearly displayed since creation (Rom. 1:20), was at
work when God raised Jesus from the dead (Eph. 1:19). The same enlightening Spirit is also at
work in believers (2 Pet 1:3–4; Eph 1:11–14; Phil 2:13). Therefore, moral transformation is a
response to divine commands, in alignment with natural law, and motivated by virtues.
The combination of the moral and ethical systems mentioned throughout creates a
multipronged approach for resolving the tension created between people’s inability to live
morally and God’s call to live according to his expectations. All three views point toward moral
transformation that involves God’s interaction and human response. Orthodox Christianity
believes that unity with Christ is the best solution to bridge this gap. To understand the
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implications and viability of unity with Christ, it will be of great value to chain together a few
major Christian doctrines that interconnect to make the case.

The Problem of Sin
If objective morality sets a standard for living, what offers the likely best explanation for
why people do not live that way? Christianity teaches that people have a sin problem. “Sin,”
Millard Erickson explains, “is any lack of conformity, active or passive, to the moral law of
God.”290 If the moral law is identifiable in multiple ways, then there are equally as many ways to
go against the moral law. Therefore, “if humans are corrupt or rebellious, and thus either unable
or unwilling to do what is right, a more radical transformation of the person will be needed.” 291
One cannot expect compliance to the moral law without drastic transformation. Oswald Allis
describes the problem believers face when they wrestle with the point that, “Man was created by
God and in the image of God; and the duty which God requires of man is ‘obedience to his
revealed will.’”292 He explains that believers have struggled with the challenge of obedience
since “. . .the Gospel does not abrogate the moral law as a standard of life and conduct but raises
it to a higher level both by example and precept. . . .”293 The struggle individuals feel as they
wrestle with the desire for perfection takes on an added weight when there is a clear example and
command to be something new.
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One may object at this point by saying this study is advocating for a version of
“perfectionism.” Moral perfectionism in philosophy can be found among the writings of such
individuals as Aristotle, the Stoics, Maimonides, Aquinas, Malebranche, Spinoza, Leibniz, von
Humboldt, J. S. Mill, F. H. Bradley, T. H. Green, Nietzsche, and Marx. 294 The basic premise of
perfectionism is “that what is good, ultimately, is the development of human nature.”295 David O.
Brink contends that perfectionism is a neglected aspect of moral and political philosophy, and
one that needs to be revisited. He argues that there are two major camps in perfectionist ideals:
biological and normative. Those who look to biological explanations for perfectionism appeal to
human nature along with its functions and essence. On the other hand, the normative view
“grounds perfectionist ideals in a normative conception of human nature, understood in terms of
moral personality or agency.”296 Regardless of which camp one takes, there is a missing
component. Human nature must be grounded in something beyond itself, and the ideals of human
nature require a higher standard outside of its own system. When this higher standard is
established, then there is also an explanation for why people fail to live by that standard. Allis
intimates that, “[Perfectionism] is biblical and sound when it recognizes and stresses the
demands of Scripture for perfect obedience to the will of God. . . .”297 The unbiblical and
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unsound aspect surfaces, Allis notes, when the standard for obedience is lowered or man’s
struggle with sin is minimized.
If the argument elucidated throughout this work remains sound, then it may be concluded
that the foundational problem with humanity is the denial of God’s moral standard. This
fundamental problem is shared between all humans. There is no one who lives a perfect life, but
there is still a universal expectation that humans ought to behave a certain way. The desire to live
in a particular way is derived from understanding God and his relationship to creation, namely
his relationship to humans. Cornelius Plantinga Jr. says that sin may be properly defined as
“culpable shalom-breaking.”298 Essentially, his argument is that sin is a disruption of “how
things ought to be.” The culpable disturbance of shalom, “suggests that sin is unoriginal, that it
disrupts something good and harmonious, that (like a housebreaker) it is an intruder. . . .”299 The
problem is that finite humans do not possess within themselves all the tools necessary to
complete a perfect life although it may be desired. Herein lies the thrust of this section of the
study. Humans can find solace when they become united with Christ, since he closes the moral
gap by offering moral transformation and the assistance needed to live the life God expects. The
moral law makes one become dependent upon God for the source of morals, but also desirous of
him to help reach the standard for morality.
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Theological lines have been drawn over the exact impact sin has had on humans. The
varying thoughts are vast and all-encompassing. A few preliminary delimitations need to be
placed on this aspect of the current study, given these thoughts. First, it is this author’s
supposition that the ability for rational thought and free will are intact even though sin is present.
Whether one believes these to be in place due to God’s prevenient grace or remain even after the
Fall does not adversely affect the current study. 300 If it is impossible for humans to employ
reason to draw necessary conclusions, then the abductive approach utilized throughout this
project will be rendered unsuccessful. However, it is the case that humans display a staggering
amount of evidence to show that rational thought and free will are not impaired but remain
intact. A second delimitation is that this research cannot cover all the nuances of the doctrine of
sin. This study shows that unity with Christ is the solution needed to fix the problem of sin. The
first delimiter rules out certain versions of original sin, while maintaining a shared conclusion
between varying and even disagreeing forms of sin. The common thread throughout teachings
about sin is that humans cannot perfect themselves.
The importance of these two delimiters may be weighed when asking the question: does
humanity have free will and ability to choose between doing good and evil? This highly
contested question has generated a lot of theological debates. However, if viewed apologetically,
300
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one may get to an answer quicker than examining the history of the doctrine.301 Alvin Plantinga
does a superb job intimating a concise argument for free will in relation to evil.302 His defense is:
A world containing creatures who are significantly free (and freely perform more good
than evil actions) is more valuable, all else being equal, than a world containing no free
creatures at all. Now God can create free creatures, but He can’t cause or determine them
to do only what is right. For if He does so, then they aren’t significantly free after all;
they do not do what is right freely. To create creatures capable of moral good, therefore,
He must create creatures capable of moral evil; and He can’t give these creatures the
freedom to perform evil; and at the same time prevent them from doing so. As it turned
out, sadly enough, some of the free creatures God created went wrong in the exercise of
their freedom; this is the source of moral evil. The fact that free creatures sometimes go
wrong, however, counts neither against God’s omnipotence nor against His goodness; for
He could have forestalled the occurrence of moral evil only by removing the possibility
of moral good.303
Plantinga sets up the position that free moral agents can actively choose between good and evil.
Those who wish to use this as an indictment against God will undoubtedly have to address
Plantinga’s free will argument as it relates to God’s nature. The reason evil exists in the world is
because God allows free choice, this results in humans differing from automata. If people can
301
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choose evil, then they can also choose good. However, the issue is that no matter the amount of
good chosen by an individual it does not correct the wrong done.
One can see the pertinence of this discussion when considering the two horns of the
Euthyphro dilemma. Some individuals swing to the voluntarist horn of the dilemma and run into
philosophical issues.304 These issues are explained by Baggett and Walls and will be stated here
for consideration. The first major issue with voluntarism is compatibilism. Compatibilism insists
there is no issue in affirming determinism and free will. Baggett and Walls find an issue with
compatibilism by stating, “to put it simply, moral duties make little sense given compatibilism.
Duties tell us what we ought to do, and ought implies can. But if we are fully determined to will
and to act as we do by causes outside our control, it is doubtful that there is any meaningful sense
in which we can do otherwise.”305 The objection to compatibilism can be broken down into five
secondary objections:
1. The obligation objection- This objection raises questions addressed in the “Ought
Knot” section earlier. Therefore, if humans are totally determined to will an act, then
there leaves no room for them to do otherwise.
2. The culpability objection- This objection highlights the inconsistency with saying that
if God determines a person to will an act, then he would hold them culpable for doing
the act he determined them to do.
3. The bad god objection- This objection rejects the view of a God who could have
saved everyone by violating their free will, but sends them to Hell, nonetheless.
These five objections are taken from Baggett and Walls, Good God, 65–81. “All five sub-objections
taken together constitute a major philosophical objection to Calvinistic compatibilism, an objection that ranges over
metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics.” Ibid., 72.
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4. The love objection- This objection focuses on the necessity of love to have an
element of volition. Some views of compatibilism leave no room for genuine love
because the volitional nature of love is removed when lives are determined.
5. Virtue objection- This objection finds issue with what is taught about virtues and
those taught by virtue ethicists. Some individuals start with virtue and work
backwards versus taking a view that thoughts lead to actions that shape character.
The second major objection against voluntarists is their use of euphemisms, or softening
their language, instead of calling something what it is. For example, a voluntarist may say that
God extends a genuine offer to humans for them to accept him. Ironically, it is not a genuine
offer if it is already determined. The third objection is the acceptance of an extreme voluntarism
in the Euthyphro. If a voluntarist concedes that nothing is higher than God’s will, then they must
agree that God could command anything—like rape—and it would be morally acceptable. The
fourth objection is the “terrible tenet.” This objection rejects the belief that the unconditional
reprobate has no hope and is consigned to Hell without a chance. Finally, the fifth objection is
based on a semantic phenomenon. Some individuals face a wide range of semantic problems
when trying to balance doctrines by using different terms. They twist the concept of love by
saying God loves the unconditional reprobate the same way he loves the elect. This does not
match the understanding of the word nor does the word “love” fit the doctrine they espouse.
These five philosophical objections against voluntarism, when paired with Plantinga’s
defense, create a reasonable case that free will is an integral part of human nature. The concept
of free will is vitally essential for explaining why it is possible for humans to live a moral life
and why they fail to accomplish it. Without free will, as some may espouse, people have no
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choice to follow the good and reject the bad. However, the view advanced here is that free will
does exist and is a requirement for moral transformation.
What remains concerning the effects of sin on humans? Minimally, humans have violated
the basic moral law of a perfect, divine creator. Any transgression of the moral law renders one
guilty and deserving of punishment. Blaise Pascal intimates,
For in fact, if man had never been corrupt, he would enjoy in his innocence both truth and
happiness with assurance; and if man had always been corrupt, he would have no idea of
truth or bliss. But, wretched as we are, and more so than if there were no greatness in our
condition, we have an idea of happiness, and cannot reach it. We perceive an image of
truth, and possess only a lie. Incapable of absolute ignorance and of certain knowledge,
we have thus been manifestly in a degree of perfection from which we have unhappily
fallen.306
To grasp concept of perfection lost, sin and its remedy will be examined by looking at how sin is
perceived by natural law, divine command, and virtue ethics.
Natural Law and the Broken Image
A natural law theory of the good proposes that man can know what is good based on the
created aspect of human nature. Therefore, a component of sin can be understood as going
against the prescribed model for human nature. In Stanley Hauerwas’ imagery, sin is going
against the grain of the universe. 307 Claire Brown Peterson succinctly makes two claims touted
by natural law ethics: 1. The possibility of ethics is rooted in human nature; and 2. The very
content of ethics is rooted in human nature. 308 Peterson’s point places a lot of emphasis on
human nature, as can be expected, by claiming that what can be known about ethics are a
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derivation of human nature. J. Budziszewski, a natural law lawyer, comments on knowable
moral facts. He states, “They are the universal common sense of the human race, as well as the
foundation of its uncommon sense.”309 He further explains the problem of human nature as it
relates to sin. His illustration is illuminating,
The Fall does not deprive us of our nature—a broken foot still has the nature of a foot—
but our nature is not in its intended condition. For natural law, this is no insignificant
consideration. If we had never seen healthy feet, it might have taken us a long time to
discover that broken feet were broken. . . . In the meantime we might have taken their
broken condition as normative. Even if we grasped that something was wrong with our
feet, we might have misunderstood what it was. We might have thought that feet are bad
by nature, or that they are good but corrupted by shoes. Apart from revelation we make
the same mistakes about human nature. 310
Budziszewski introduces that special revelation is essential for expanding an individual’s
understanding of the purpose of humanity. He shows that attention needs to be placed on the fact
that human nature needs revelation to clarify or fill in the gaps for what natural law cannot cover
by itself.
Natural law uses general revelation as an initial step to get to God’s will, but it must be
supplemented with special revelation. Bruce Birch attempts to show the power of special
revelation is not in detailed lists of commands and guidelines, but a narrative story detailing
one’s reaction to the character and nature of God. Birch writes along with several other authors
in a compendium that focuses on the imitatio Dei/Christi. Their view characterizes special
revelation as more descriptive than prescriptive. They contend, “The imitatio Dei/Christi does
not imply that we simply try to do what God or Jesus have done. . . . But through the testimony
of Israel and the early church in the witness of biblical texts, we can enter into the reality of God
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and Christ in ways that shape and form our character as moral agents and communities.” 311 The
crux of their points comes in saying, “The ethical course of action may depend on its effect on
others rather than its adherence to some divine absolute.” 312 They later state that the Bible “is
both formative and normative; it shapes the people of God and functions as a resource in
discerning how to live faithfully before God.”313 Their point is that “doing the right thing”
concerns aligning man’s nature with God’s intended purpose for it. If the image of God is
present in humans, then the task is to live by that intended purpose.
From a Christian perspective the explanation of human nature given by God is what’s
called the imago Dei. In theological discussions much ink has been spilled over the exact
meaning of the imago Dei.314 Predominately four main options are proffered as viable options for
understanding its meaning and purpose.
The first theory focuses on the structure of man. The structural model believes that man is
created with some kind of ability or capacity that is akin to God’s own nature. Normally,
defenders of this view believe the imago Dei to be humanity’s capacity for rational thought.
Humanity’s ability to form rational thoughts makes them unique from the rest of the created
world. This uniqueness is also found in God, who is the ultimate rational being and infinite mind.
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The emphasis in this model is on who a person is. Proponents of the structural or substantive
model agree on the locus of the image. “It is located within humans as a resident quality or
capacity. . . .” Millard Erickson notes, “Although conferred by God, the image resides in humans
whether or not they recognize God’s existence and his work.”315 If one thinks the image of God
is lost or at a minimum marred, then they would conclude that due to the fall there are some
noetic effects of sin. However, based on the previous discussion of sin, the noetic effects of sin
do not adversely affect one’s reasoning abilities. That is to say that one can still use reason to
draw proper conclusions about God. 316
Second, is the functional model. This model does not focus on humanity’s capacity, but
their role within the created order. The emphasis in this model is on what people are able to do.
“The human person,” Cortez explains, “‘reflects’ the divine reality by serving as God’s
representative rulers in the created realm.” 317 As representatives, humans are to be “little Gods”
in the world. In some respect, people can look at humanity and know there is a creator. This
relates to the natural law argument for morality. However, the implications run deeper. Humans
can fail to act in God’s image due to the pervasiveness of sin. Essentially, sin is the rejection of
the task instilled within each human to be active representatives of God on this earth.
Third, is the relational model. In this model humans are viewed in relation to themselves,
humanity, and the divine. “This is not an entity that a human possesses,” Erickson posits, “so
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much as the experience that is present when a relationship is active.” 318 Since God is a triune
God, he possesses within himself relational components. Thus, humanity is also relational to
itself and other humans but more important to God. Sin within this model focuses on the broken
relationship humans have with God due to their rejection of their connection to Him.
Finally, there is the functional-relational model. The combination of both functionality
and relationality seeks to amalgamate the benefits and applications of each view to create a fuller
model for the imago Dei. With any coalesced model, there is the picking and choosing of what
fits best with one’s own perspective. However, with the functional-relational model one can see
the benefit of what humans are and how they are connected to God. This model sees sin as a
violation against God’s intended purpose for man and his connection to the divine.
Why focus on the imago Dei in discussions of natural law? This brief analysis of the
variegated perspectives of the imago Dei illustrates the complexities involved in understanding
natural law and its approach to humanity’s need for assistance. John Hammett identifies at least
two biblical parameters about the imago Dei. He shows that the image of God is (1) unspecified
throughout Scripture and (2) remains even after the fall of man. 319 These biblical parameters in
Andrew Davison’s observation show that, “God’s power and craftsmanship do not simply confer
the designation—the label ‘image of God’—upon some already existing thing; it confers the
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image of God, as a living reality in the depths of the creature, by calling it out of nothing.”320
Davison sees a tight connection between natural law and virtue ethics because humans
understand a thing by knowing it at its best or most excellent. 321 Natural law focuses on “goodas-beneficial” and virtue sees “good-as-excellent.”322 Natural law theorists emphasize what a
person can do, since he or she is sufficient to some degree on their own to come to conclusions.
This is exactly the thrust needed when considering moral transformation, but it needs culling in
some of its views. Natural law gives weight to humanity’s potentiality to live morally and the
necessity of revelation (both general and special). 323 If God created humans “very good” (Gen.
1:31), then he had an original intent for humans to recognize this goodness; but also realize that
one has failed to live according to God’s expectations he created for them.
Unity with Christ within a natural law theory can zero in on Jesus’ response to the image
of God. A defining characteristic of Jesus is that he is the exact imprint (charaktēr) and image
(eikōn) of God.324 Thus, when one becomes united with Christ in his death, burial, and
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resurrection (Col. 2:12; Rom. 6:1–5), they, “. . .put off the old self with its practices and have put
on the new self, which is being renewed in knowledge after the image of its creator” (Col. 3:9–
10). Essentially, the process puts things back into balance and reunites man back into a
relationship with God. In this unifying moment, a believer becomes “partakers of the divine
nature” (2 Pet. 1:4), thus being transformed into something new along with indwelling of the
Holy Spirit.
Divine Command Theory and Disobedience
It has been shown that a Divine Command Theory of morals focuses on the good and
right in relation to God’s commands and his nature. God’s commands create moral obligations
since a good, perfect, and loving God commands morality. Therefore, sin comes into the mix
when individuals transgress or violate God’s explicit commands. Violating God’s commands not
only goes against what God has dictated, but more importantly it goes against his nature. Since
God’s goodness and his commands are one in the same and intertwined, a rejection of his
commands is a rejection of the good. 325
Divine Command Theory is not to be seen in conflict with Natural Law. When paired
together, Natural Law lays a foundation for Divine Command Theory. Accepting the premises of
the Natural Law argument for morality points to the necessity of God’s commands. Lydia
Schumacher advocates for an understanding of Divine Command Theory that cogently pairs with
Natural Law. “God himself ordained the natural law in accordance with his eternal law,” she
proposes, “which ultimately orders all things towards him as the highest good. In this account,

radiance of God. This is pivotal for understanding the Christological implications of Jesus and his ability to balance
the image of God within man.
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consequently, God could never command us to do wrong or to hate him, let alone to perform
seemingly arbitrary acts, the personal value of which is unclear.”326 Natural law is consistent
with directing one’s “orientation” toward the good which is God. When one understands the
natural law in this respect, then it is understandable to see that what God commands fits with
one’s well-being, while also providing the option to obey or disobey. 327 Natural law frames an
aspect of sin as disobedience from God’s prescribed order; Divine Command Theory conceives
of sin as disobeying God’s commands which extend from his nature.
God’s commands, which are inseparable from his nature, establish the parameters for his
expectation for his creation. The impetus behind a rejection of these is a lack of love for God the
perfect creator. If it is the case that humans have violated God’s commands, there must also be a
solution to resolve the violation. Simply because a person does good, does not fix the wrong
done. This is where unity with Christ offers a solution.
The challenging question to consider is: Are God’s commands unconditionally binding
on humans? One may ask, “Does God issue his commands knowing human abilities, created at
the beginning, and sees no defect or anything preventing humans from accomplishing his
commands?” When considering the doctrine of sin and its relationship to human actions, it’s
worth considering a leading example in Christian theological history from Pelagius and
Augustine. The Augustinian-Pelagian divide is a classic figurehead example of the battle
between human actions and the impact of sin. The debate between these two perspectives will
serve as a paradigm for considering God’s commands and the human response to them.
Lydia Schumacher, “Divine Command Theory in Early Franciscan Thought: A Response to the
Autonomy Objection,” Studies in Christian Ethics 29, no. 4 (2016): 475. The “eternal law” is a reference to
Aquinas’ four aspects of law. The eternal law precedes and confines natural law, human law, and divine law.
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Pelagius is described as an individual with a high sense of morality. He was “concerned
for right conduct and shocked by what he considered demoralizingly pessimistic views of what
could be expected of human nature.”328 He believed that “human perfection is possible;
therefore, it is obligatory.”329 Augustine, on the other hand, believed one could not choose good
nor reason properly without the initial aid from God’s Spirit.330
The debate between Pelagius and Augustine centralizes on whether man, created and
endowed by God, has everything needed to live a moral life. 331 Christopher Hall describes
Pelagius’ belief that, “In creating us, God has provided all that human beings need to live a
moral life of obedience: a soul, mind, will and body.”332 He continues, “We have a mind that can
comprehend God’s commandments, a will that can freely choose to obey them and a body
through which the divine life can be lived.”333 The struggle some have with this stance is that it
downplays the negative effects of sin. The delimiters on sin noted above, maintain that
humanity’s reasoning abilities and free will to choose are present to some degree. The contention
328
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is in determining whether this puts too much emphasis on human abilities while potentially
playing off the severity of sin. “A man’s free-will,” Augustine explains, “avails for nothing
except to sin, if he knows not the way of truth; and even after his duty and his proper aim shall
begin to become known to him, unless he also take delight in and feel a love for it, he neither
does his duty, nor sets about it, nor lives rightly.” 334 A person’s desire must be for God’s
commands, and his delight must be in the law of God. If a person’s will is only bent in on itself,
then can a person even choose to follow God’s commands or not?
Pelagius noted three elements of a moral action: 1. Humans must be able to perform the
action (posse); 2. Humans must be willing to desire to do the action (velle); 3. The action must
actually be performed (esse).335 Pelagius, “recognizes that God has endowed human beings with
the capacity (possibilitas) or ability (posse) for doing good, and in this sense this capacity or
ability is a grace, but he asserts that the desire for (velle) and realization of (esse) the good lies
within human power apart from divine grace.”336 Grace in this respect is found in the fact that
humans are created in a particular way, and do not need an initial catalyst to choose what is good
other than revelation. Conversely, Hall shows that Augustine believed, “We know the right,
affirm the right, but desire or will to do the very thing we know to be wrong.”337 Therefore, the
desire or the will to do the good and the right is skewed and needs divine assistance. Kant’s
revolution of the will is a proper fit to the assistance needed. Without moral transformation,
one’s desires are directed at the wrong end, thus a change is needed.
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Augustine’s contentions with Pelagianism can be seen in his rejection of those, “who
suppose that without God’s help, the mere power of the human will in itself, can either perfect
righteousness, or advance steadily towards it. . . .”338 Augustine rejects not only the category of
“puffing one’s capacity,” but also the belief that one can accomplish righteousness by mere
effort. He further explains those individuals who hold to this thought, when pressed, cannot get
away from their needing God’s assistance. In a longer excerpt Augustine explains,
But they [Pelagians] allege that such attainments are not made without God’s help on this
account, namely, because God both created man with the free choice of his will, and, by
giving him commandments, teaches him, Himself, how man ought to live; and indeed
assists him, in that He takes away his ignorance by instructing him in the knowledge of
what he ought to avoid and to desire in his actions: and thus, by means of the free-will
naturally implanted within him, he enters on the way which is pointed out to him, and by
persevering in a just and pious course of life, deserves to attain to the blessedness of
eternal life.339
One may see in this description an extreme view of perfectionism, which credits the individual
with the ability to close the moral gap. However, this gap cannot be closed without divine
assistance, which requires unity with Christ since a transgression of God’s commands has been
performed and needs a solution.
Two instances of the same problem are raised here. First, is the discussion of whether
grace or divine aide is needed before one can choose what is good. Second, is the point that the
good cannot be pursued perfectly unless one is granted divine assistance. When addressing the
former, it is imperative to confront the philosophical issues elucidated at the beginning of this
chapter. Minimally, one must accept there is a degree of freedom, ability, and capacity to
338
Augustine, On the Spirit and the Letter, 4. It is of value to note that Augustine had interactions with
Pelagius and also with Pelagianism. The distinction between Pelagius and Pelagianism is that individuals used
Pelagius’ teachings as a platform and created other beliefs beyond his initial points. Therefore, one should employ
caution when using Pelagianism and Pelagius interchangeably.
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recognize objectively defined morals which lead one to a moral lawgiver. Those who advocate
for other forms of assistance will at least have to navigate the philosophical complexities, and
then balance the performative aspects of their views. The second problem concerns the divine
assistance offered through unity with Christ. If the assistance offered through unity with Christ is
only epistemological, then all one must do is change their focus about morals. If that be the case,
then it was unnecessary to have Jesus come to the earth to be a sacrifice. Undoubtedly, the
sacrifice paid the price for sin, but it also opened the doors for a complete transformation. 340 The
divine assistance offered through unity with Christ is both epistemological and ontological. That
is to say that one’s entire being is changed or transformed in some capacity. Hare comments,
Because God is our creator, when we wrong each other and the natural world we also
wrong God. He cannot forgive us without requiring repentance and apology, because to
do this would be to condone our wrongdoing. God has. . . no duty to require reparation
and penance from us. It is none the less good that he do so, because it takes seriously the
wrong that we do. But we do not have the means to make reparation and penance. We
could only offer to God things we did not owe him already, and we do not have such
things. God therefore, like a good parent, gives us the means by which we can make
amends.341
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Hare’s demonstration for the need of atonement is important to grasp, but it is invaluable when
considering how it relates to unity with Christ. A price is not only paid for the wrong done, but
its efficacy can be found only in a proper unity with the one who provides the means necessary
to correct the wrong.
The Apostle Paul helps explain these epistemological and ontological changes throughout
his letters. In no less than twenty-seven instances Paul tells the Ephesians that being “in Christ”
offers: spiritual blessings (1:3), redemption (1:7), unity (1:10), inheritance (1:11), and the Holy
Spirit (1:13, 14). Paul reminds the Ephesians that when they heard about Jesus they also learned,
“to put off your old self, which belongs to your former manner of life and is corrupt through
deceitful desires, and to be renewed in the spirit of your minds, and to put on the new self,
created after the likeness of God in true righteousness and holiness” (Eph 4:20–24). Paul also
iterates the same message to the Colossians, “Do not lie to one another, seeing that you have put
off the old self with its practices and have put on the new self, which is being renewed in
knowledge after the image of its creator” (Col 3:9–10). The decisive moment when these things
became a reality to the Colossians is found a few verses back in Colossians 2:11–14. A careful
examination of the passage will reveal their unity with Christ began when they replicated the
death (2:11), burial (2:12), and resurrection of Christ (2:13–14). Among other references, the
same language is found in Romans 6:3–6, which speaks of the efficacy of Jesus’ death, burial,
and resurrection to free individuals from sin. This unity is possible due to the work of the Holy
Spirit. The same Spirit that raised Jesus from the dead also dwells in the Christian (Rom 8:11),
and provides the tools necessary to live a holy, sanctified life (Rom 8:13–14). Therefore, one
speaks of the Christian life as lived in step with the Spirit. The Spirit who unites us with Christ,
indwells each Christian and calls out to the Father when even human words fail (Rom 8:12–17,
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26–30; Gal 4:6–7). Thus, the sanctified life a Christian lives is in step with God’s own Spirit (1
Cor. 2:11–16).
What is the advantage of focusing on a divine command theory of morality in relation to
unity with Christ as discussed in this section? A divine command theory of morality calls
humans to a standard of living derived from God’s ontology. God asks humans to meet his
standard, but with the expectation they must be granted further assistance to meet his
requirements. God’s commands are not simply arbitrary rules, but an extension of his nature.
Therefore, when humans disobey his commands, they are going against his ontology (i.e., God as
the good). To meet God’s standard, one needs God’s assistance. A complete reliance on
individual effort would result in some variation of “puffing one’s capacity” akin to some portions
of Pelagianism. However, one cannot participate in “the divine nature” unless one is united with
that nature through the proper prescribed means.342
Virtue Ethics and the Lack of Growth
The argument has been made that a divine command theory of morals cogently pairs with
a natural law theory of morality. These two theories have been examined in light of their ability
to respond to the problem of sin and to establish the validity of unity with Christ. The case has
been made that natural law lays a foundation for becoming a new creation, while divine
command theory provides complimentary support for responding to the transgression of God’s
commands. These two theories point toward a virtue ethic, which identifies an aspect of sin as
Once again, Hare fitly reiterates this point, “If we assume that there is a God who is not merely human
moral perfection, but a divine person intervening in human history, we can think of him as enabling us to
accomplish a change of heart. What I have suggested is that he does so by incorporating us into a new kind of life,
which we did not have the capacity to live before his intervention. This was the function of God’s assistance in the
three-part structure of morality. . . the being who can live a holy life intervenes to make possible the improvement:
of our capacities so that we can live the kind of life he wants us to live.” Ibid., 270.
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failure to know God intimately and a lack of spiritual growth. Stephen Evans once again is
helpful in showing how a divine command theory can pair with certain versions of virtue
ethics.343 “Many of God’s commands” Evans intimates, “are commands to acquire or cultivate
particular virtues.”344 If part of the obligations humans experience is to grow and cultivate
virtues; then proper consideration needs to be given to how this is accomplished and how unity
with Christ helps.
One may recall that virtues in a classical Greek tradition are to be practiced habitually
until the excellencies of character are formed. A Christian conception of moral virtues builds
upon this foundation and expresses that humans should actively pursue virtues that display a
transformed life in God. Many virtue ethicists reject a purely deontological system of ethics in
favor of focusing more on “who should I be” instead of “what should I do.” 345 Stanley Hauerwas
argues that examining God’s story helps Christians because, “We know who we are only when
we can place ourselves—locate our stories—within God's story.”346 Within this model sin
becomes, “not some universal tendency of humankind to be inhumane or immoral, though sin
may involve inhumanity and immorality. We are not sinful because we participate in some
343
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general human condition, but because we deceive ourselves about the nature of reality and so
would crucify the very one who calls us to God's kingdom.”347 Thus, a person who neither
knows God nor grows in godly character is not following God’s prescribed order for his creation.
Some critics of this ideology find fault with a “form of human excellence that presumes
high-level reasoning, imagination, and willpower.”348 This has caused consternation with those
in the Reformed tradition because too much emphasis is placed on the human capacity to do the
good.349 However, one must consider that unity with Christ is the pivot point for the discussion.
Once a person is united with Christ, they are to pursue a life characterized by the fruit of the
Holy Spirit which is part of a virtuous life (Gal 5:16–26). Even though divine assistance is given,
there is still the need to pursue spiritual growth instead of reaching total perfection in
righteousness.350 Even if one could, in theory, live a perfect life, the probability of such an act is
not plausible. The probability of living a perfect life by avoiding every sin is infinitely small.
Consider the following point,
Suppose there's a .5 probability that you will resist each sin you encounter in your
lifetime. This would entail a .25 probability that you will resist the first two, a .125
probability you'll resist the first three, and so on. Imagine the probability of resisting
every temptation over the course of a seventy-year life. It becomes a statistical
unlikelihood so great that it defies description. Christians believe that only one man ever
did it, or ever truly could, even if each sin is in principle such that it can be resisted by
God's enabling grace.351
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Reality teaches that humanity struggles daily with living a completely moral life even after
conversion. This does not negate Christian teachings about the objectivity of morals but
reinforces the thought that growth and transformation lead to perfection in eternity (1 Pet 1:8–9).
When Christians speak of living a moral life it is typically referring to the doctrine of
sanctification. “Sanctify,” as used throughout the Bible, means to set apart or to make holy. In
New Testament doctrine, sanctification results from Jesus’ sacrifice (Heb 10:10) and Jesus
himself is humanity’s sanctification (1 Cor 1:30; 1 Thess 4:3; John 17:17). In step with many
other teachings, there are multiple variations of the doctrine of sanctification.352 Due to the
nature of this study, a full analysis of the differing views of sanctification will not be explicated
here. However, it will suffice to draw a few conclusions about sanctification based on aspects
shared between the various views.
Sanctification, defined by Erickson, “is a process by which one’s moral condition is
brought into conformity with one’s legal status before God. It is a continuation of what was
begun in regeneration, when a newness of life was conferred upon and instilled within the
believer.”353 By this definition, sanctification is the term given for continual growth in a justified
life. Therefore, even by diverse standards, sanctification will possess five aspects: 1.
Sanctification has both a positional and an experiential aspect; 2. Sanctification is the inseparable
twin to justification; 3. Sanctification is the manifestation of regeneration; 4. Sanctification is
compatible with full assurance of salvation; and 5. Sanctification is the focal point of the “now—
not yet” reality of salvation. 354 Taken together, the picture of sanctification found in the New
352

For a comparative dialogue between the various views of sanctification see Gundry, Five Views on
Sanctification.
353

Erickson, Christian Theology, 980.

354

These five points are taken from Daniel L. Akin, David P. Nelson, and Peter R. Schemm, eds., A
Theology for the Church (Nashville , TN: B & H Academic, 2007), 758. Of course one may raise objections at any

155

Testament is that unity with Christ changes the individual and sets them on a path toward
salvation (2 Peter 1:3–9), which causes the individual to pursue a life “led by the Spirit” (Gal
5:18).
In practical terms, one may say that in sanctification, “we have an active part in it, it
means we must work out our new identity daily, learning new habits, adopting new disciplines,
practicing the steps that will enable us to become the persons God intended us to be, manifesting
his image in the world.”355 This statement fits nicely with virtue discussed at the beginning of
this section. If unity with Christ does not provide a foundation for growth and movement toward
what is good, then it fails to meet the standard elucidated throughout this work. “Sanctification is
seen, therefore, in a comprehension of the ordered structure of the world and the ordering of
human action with it, as the grasp of a moral law, which norms action fittingly to the world.”356
Through Jesus’ sacrifice, humans have justification and atonement; but they also have
sanctification that sets them apart as holy for God’s work (Eph 2:10). Even the misguided
Corinthians are called saints by Paul in 1 Corinthians 1:2. There Paul writes, “to the church of
God that is in Corinth, to those sanctified in Christ Jesus, called to be saints together with all
those who in every place call upon the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, both their Lord and ours.”
Even though the Corinthian church was imperfect, they were called “saints” and charged to live
as a holy people along with everyone who has been united with Christ. 357
one of these points, but they appear to offer a somewhat middle of the road perspective that allows for further
discussion and consideration.
355

Kelly M. Kapic, ed., Sanctification: Explorations in Theology and Practice (Downers Grove, IL: IVP
Academic, an imprint of InterVarsity Press, 2014), 30.
356

Ibid., 160.

357

See 1 Peter 2:9

156

Another challenge under the heading of virtue ethics is in relation to supererogation. Is
there a limit or an expectation for how much good a Christian is to perform after conversion?
Although a misnomer, often people refer to a person who is morally good and worthy as possible
as a moral saint.358 Susan Wolf has written an essay titled Moral Saints which has left a
significant impact on the discussion of supererogation and saints. She takes the view that a saint
(whether a Loving Saint or a Rational Saint) is untenable and is an anomaly. 359 Essentially, she
dismisses the validity of a saint and determines that the life of a saint is not worth pursuing and is
even counterproductive to its own standards.360 Her complaint is that it may not always be
“better to be morally better.”361 Robert Adams addresses the topic from another standpoint.
Adams insists that sainthood is best understood from within the bounds of Christianity because it
offers the fullest picture and explanation for why being a saint is a real goal.
In Adams’ defense of the good, he focuses on how discussions of the good are usually in
negative terms: “God is not. . .” or “God would not. . .” Some speak of saints in the same
manner. When spoken negatively, some say a saint would never do such and such a thing.
Adams says, “We often think of the saint in essentially negative terms, as someone who never, or
almost never, does a no-no; or in terms of universal quantifications, as a person all, or almost all,
To call some people “saints” and to venerate them runs counter to biblical teachings. Yes, there may be
individuals who stand out uniquely as examples, but in no way should they be placed on a level higher than other
individuals. The topic of saint as discussed in this section is used paradigmatically to discuss the possibility of living
a life of such moral fortitude that one seems to be without fault. Susan Wolf, “Moral Saints,” The Journal of
Philosophy 79, no. 8 (August 1982): 419.
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of whose actions meet a high moral and religious standard.” 362 However, if a saint is viewed as
someone who continually progresses in virtue, then they fit into a qualitative versus quantitative
open-endedness of virtue. Qualitative open-endedness makes sense of the virtuous acts of the
saints who appear to be “transcending the morally ordinary in a positive direction.”363 One key to
understanding virtue ethics, and the moral law defended in this work, is a combination of what is
right and good. An exclusive focus on deontological perfection, would say that perfection is the
fulfilment of obligation.364 The type of morality explained here is based on rules and teleology. If
the good, which is God, is an ultimate telos, then humans must strive for living like God. Since it
is impossible to become God, one must understand the limit. However, God calls humans to a
higher standard of living derived from his goodness. Aristotle in Nicomachean ethics, along with
his discussion of virtues, says that the good is limited. Conversely, if we take goodness to be
equivalent to the infinite, as Adams advocates, then there is no limit to virtue. Therefore, if one
were to reach the limit, they would be God.
Adams further posits, “Since ‘ought’ implies ‘can,’ it may be argued, it must be possible
to do everything one is morally obliged to do; and when one does that, and is disposed to do it,
there is no way to go farther in virtue, if virtue consists wholly in moral dutifulness.”365 Upon
comparison between a deontological and consequentialist system, one will find that utilitarianism
has no way to limit how much good one should do. If the goal of a consequentialist is to do more
good than harm, how can they justify not giving all their money to help feed the poor? A
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utilitarian may have to advocate for something that is more extreme than anyone is willing to
admit or to do. On the other hand, a Christian teaching like, “love your neighbor as yourself” has
limitless possibilities too. The difference here is there is a qualitative open-endedness, which
allows individuals to continue to strive in this category knowing that perfection is not possible
but a goal, nonetheless. “For one cannot live morally without intending to do so, and one cannot
exactly intend to do what one believes is totally impossible.” 366 This is a useful insight into what
virtue’s relationship is with a perfect life.
Joseph Kupfer assesses both Adams and Wolf’s view of moral saints and seeks to find a
balance between them. He insists that “saints have a real or perceived relationship with God.” 367
What would be a person’s motivation for living such a life of dedication and service unless they
believed they were doing it for God? He further explains that sainthood makes sense within a
Christian paradigm because, “belief in God and one’s relationship to Him are especially
conducive to sainthood.”368 Kupfer’s task is not to focus so much on the individuals who are
considered saints, but to show the significance of an ethic that allows for moral progress that is
open and directed toward God. In a summative note, Kupfer explains,
The individual who has faith in a perfect being may be less apt to strive for perfection
than a secular agent. The very perfection of God serves as a curb on perfectionist
aspirations that might be entertained by the religious person. She would accept her human
limitations and be grateful for whatever strengths she may possess, realizing that to seek
perfection could well be prideful.369
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Kupfer’s stance is that one needs to possess the right motivation in living a moral life. This once
again reinforces one of the many “paradoxes” found in Christianity. The balance in action and
attitude is what makes up a Christian virtue ethic. To focus too much on perfection can be
unproductive but understanding the desire for perfection found within all humans points to a
perfect God. When a Christian is united with Christ and indwelled by the Spirit, they are set
apart to pursue the good and to do the right.

The God of All Perfection
It was argued at the beginning of this chapter that God is the likely best solution to
address humanity’s desire for perfection by offering a remedy or solution for humanity’s failure
to live a perfect life. It was discovered that the problem of sin is the issue at hand, and Christian
theism offers a unique solution for the problem. The solution elucidated throughout this work is
that a person needs to be united with Christ to receive the prescribed remedy for the problem of
perfection. The prescribed remedy is not disjointed from human experience or knowledge; but it
is itself part of the created reality of a divine moral lawgiver.
The Christian God is most frequently referred to by his divine nature or qualities (Rom
1:20). Specifically, God is ascribed qualities like omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, and
omnibenevolence.370 Establishing an argument for God’s divine qualities is central to many
370
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apologetic arguments, but it can be seen in moral arguments. “If the moral argument works,”
posit Baggett and Walls, “it may well offer evidence not just that God exists and is good, but that
God necessarily exists and is perfectly good—stronger claims that move the operative
conception of Deity into closer proximity with the God of Anselm.” 371 Moral arguments can lead
individuals to a specific type of God that other arguments cannot produce until later in their
construction. The moral argument advanced in this work has been directed toward an all good
and perfect being who created humans with the desire to pursue what is good and perfect.
Passmore postulates three modes of human perfection. The first is technical perfection.
Technical perfection concerns how one performs a specialized task to its full efficiency. Second
is obedientiary perfection. According to obedientiary perfection, one must complete a task by
obeying the commands of a superior authority like God. Third is teleological perfection.
Teleological perfection “consists in attaining to that end in which it is one’s nature to find final
satisfaction.”372 If the argument from humanity’s desire for perfection creates an apologetic
argument for God, it is based on all three conceptions of perfection. Humanity’s obligation to
perform certain tasks or to obey particular commands is requisite to the created order, but it is
humanity’s desire to reach final satisfaction that can be fulfilled only in a good and perfect being.
Hare connects perfection to human living by showing that “Perfection is the principle of human
motivation.” It is related to human motivation because “pleasure is the apprehension of
perfection, and the degree of pleasure we feel is proportional to the degree of perfection we
intuit.373 If God possesses the qualities one would expect from an ultimate, personal being then
371
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his design, commands, and plan for humanity are intricately correlated to his nature. Therefore,
when God sets perfection as a goal, it is not an arbitrary or a vacuous goal; but rather a standard
derived from his own ontology. Thus, what God has set before humanity is infinite (Matt 5:48),
which means “absolute perfection must be forever beyond, not only any human, but any finite,
being; it is a Divine ideal forever shining before us, calling us upward, and making endless
progression possible.”374
Although infinite perfection seems so far out of reach, it is the very thing that draws
humans to desire a relationship with God. Once a person realizes that the only fulfillment for the
desire for perfection is God, then a door is opened to receive his assistance or “positive increase
in power” according to Kant.375 Hare provides a delightful, but lengthy, illustration to drive
home this point:
A person who is only moderately good at the piano may be invited to play duets with an
expert. He may find that he is able to play much better than he ever thought he could,
because she draws abilities out of him by her own excellence. In part, he simply imitates
her, perhaps her phrasing of key motifs in the piece. In part, though he will never play
like her, he pushes through with bravura the passages that his fingers cannot in fact
articulate. In part, his own unique musical taste shines through, even though imperfectly,
and even this difference between them is stimulated in response to her playing. In part, he
wants to impress her, and not to make a complete fool of himself. This motivates him
independently of the music itself, so that his playing is never completely transparent but
W. L. Walker, “Perfect, Perfection,” in The International Standard Bible Encyclopedia, ed. James Orr et
al., vol. 4 (Chicago, IL: The Howard-Severance Company, 1915), 2321.
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always mixed with concern for himself. Finally (though the analogy creaks here) she may
communicate energy to him by a kind of osmosis or contagion. 376
Hare’s illustration is illuminating and one that speaks to the core of the message elucidated
throughout this work. The greater picture at work is that a perfect God is willing enough to set a
standard and to provide the means necessary, in whatever form that may be, to lead individuals
into a more intimate relationship with him that will continue into eternity.

Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter has been to examine and analyze the doctrine of unity with
Christ to see if it adequately responds to the problem of sin present with humans. This was
accomplished by introducing the doctrine then analyzing how it fits with the three Christian
systems of ethics. First, it was shown that a natural law theory treats sin as an aberration of
God’s intended plan for man. Man was created in the image of God and needs to be recreated
into the image of Christ. Second, divine command theory explains God’s commands for people,
and demonstrates why humans are to respond obediently to them. Third, virtue ethics provides a
platform to understand God’s intent for growth after being united with Christ. These three
systems cogently work together to explain man’s problem with sin and how unity with Christ
effectively responds to the issue. Man’s desire for perfection has a solution and fulfillment in
Christian theism that points to Jesus as the way to a properly construed perfection.
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Chapter 6
“. . .human responsibility is a fact, and a very solemn fact. Man’s responsibility to his Maker is,
indeed, the fundamental fact of his life, and it can never be taken too seriously. God made us
responsible moral agents, and he will not treat us as anything less. His Word addresses each of
us individually, and each of us is responsible for the way in which he responds— for his attention
or inattention, his belief or unbelief, his obedience or disobedience. We cannot evade
responsibility for our reaction to God’s revelation. We live under his law. We must answer to
him for our lives.”377
J. I. Packer
Summary of Arguments
The goal of this project has been to create and develop a new apologetic argument based
on humanity’s need to strive for moral perfection. This has been accomplished by examining the
theoretical foundations for morality and their response to the problem of moral perfection. It was
demonstrated that theistic moral realism provides the likely best solution for the existence of
objective morality. These objective morals also create moral obligations to which all humans are
accountable. The pressure humans feel to live by these standards is also in conflict with how
humans actually behave. If all humans can recognize these obligations, then one may ask, why
are there no perfect humans? This led to evaluating different moral philosophers who have
pointed the way to Christian theism as a solution to the desire of moral perfection and the failure
to accomplish it unaided. It was shown that Christian theism offers a multi-pronged moral
argument created from a divine command theory founded on a natural law theory that points
toward a virtue ethic. This multi-pronged approach fits cohesively with the Christian doctrine of
unity with Christ. Without the unity with Christ, there would be no remedy for humanity’s desire
for perfection and no solution for the moral failures of all humans.
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Potential Objections
The first objection that may be raised against this study may be from those who wish to
find a comparable solution outside of Christian theism. Evolutionary theories were considered in
chapter two, but other worldviews outside of Christian theism and naturalism were not
addressed. Therefore, can an objection be raised from another worldview—like pantheism—that
offers a comparable solution for man’s desire for perfection? A major distinction between
pantheists and theists is that a pantheist rejects a “personal” God with personal
characteristics.”378 At first glance Pantheistic beliefs may appear to be similar to theism based on
the belief of: moral realism, moral and value judgments, and non-naturalistic moral beliefs.379
Even though some versions of pantheism may share similar components with theism, this does
not mean they offer a comparable solution to the issue elucidated throughout this work.
Pantheism falls short of a viable solution due to its rejection of a personal God. Michael Levine
says that “personality and consciousness are not required.” 380 A rejection of a personal God
rejects God taking on flesh personally to fix the problem of sin (which has been explained
above). A secondary rejection espoused by pantheists is there is no need to establish a right
relationship with God (i.e., for salvation).381 If humans objectively feel the weight of sin, there
must also be a personal solution to the sin problem. There can be no moral transformation
without the problem of objective guilt being handled. The death, burial, and resurrection are not
to be separated from their purpose. The Gospel message is that Jesus came to fix the sin problem.
378
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Pantheism must handle the apologetic evidence for the death, burial, and resurrection of Christ
which establishes an ethic.382 If the resurrection happened, then the Gospel message is validated,
which delineates the necessity of salvation. Thus, Pantheism cannot serve as a plausible solution
for addressing humanity’s desire for and failure to reach perfection.
The second objection to this study may come from individuals who wish to confront the
performative aspect of morality presented throughout this project. In modern atheism several
proponents have risen to prominence in popularity due to their approach for defending
naturalism. Four specific individuals have garnered attention. These new age atheists (called “the
four horsemen”) each make a similar response to Christianity’s truth claims about morality by
criticizing Christianity’s ability to have people live by a moral standard. Although each has their
own approach to the topic, three will be considered here. 383
Sam Harris in his book, The End of Faith, argues that Christianity has caused a
devastating amount of harm to society by its absurd standards. When speaking of morality,
Harris contends,
Saving a drowning child is no more a moral duty than understanding a syllogism is a
logical one. We simply do not need religious ideas to motivate us to live ethical lives.
Once we begin thinking seriously about happiness and suffering, we find that our
religious traditions are not more reliable on questions of ethics than they have been on
scientific questions generally. 384
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Can happiness and suffering, as Harris asserts, offer the best motivation for living an ethical
life?385 The insistence that a good ethical decision is one that maximizes the most good and
limits the most harm is foundational for a utilitarian system. Harris’ argument for saving a
drowning child is paradigmatic for anyone advocating for utilitarianism. They insist there is no
need to identify morals as objective because their objectivity does not necessitate proper
motivation. One may ask, does one really need a religious argument to save a drowning child?
A multi-pronged theistic moral argument explains that the pull people feel to save life is
innate and intrinsic to human nature. Naturalism posits that scientific insights are what give
breadth to how humans understand happiness and pain. This form of naturalism, espoused by
Harris, is a pragmatic ethic. As humans learn and understand new scientific discoveries, old
hypotheses are replaced. If morality is based on scientific discovers, then ethical issues like
abortion are equivalent to deciding whether it is wrong to cause rabbits pain. Therefore, one may
say, something is “right or wrong in our beliefs about them.”386 At the conclusion of Harris’
book he makes the following statement,
A kernel of truth lurks at the heart of religion, because spiritual experience, ethical
behavior, and strong communities are essential for human happiness. And yet our
religious traditions are intellectually defunct and politically ruinous. While spiritual
experience is clearly a natural propensity of the human mind, we need not believe
anything on insufficient evidence to actualize it. Clearly, it must be possible to bring
reason, spirituality, and ethics together in our thinking about the world. This would be the
beginning of a rational approach to our deepest personal concerns. It would also be the
end of faith.387
385
“We experience happiness and suffering ourselves; we encounter others in the world and recognize that
they experience happiness and suffering as well; we soon discover that ‘love’ is largely a matter of wishing that
others experience happiness rather than suffering; and most of us come to feel that love is more conducive to
happiness, both our own and that of others, than hate. . . . “The fact that we want the people we love to be happy,
and are made happy by love in turn, is an empirical observation.” Ibid., 186–7.
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For Harris, there is no need for religious faith, because science and reason create a fuller case for
the motivation to live ethically. Pragmatists, like Harris, believe that all one must do is change
their rational approach. This change would say that the pains of child labor are received much
differently in a normal healthy birth versus if they were inflicted by a mad scientist for torture. If
one solely focuses on pain and happiness as the determiners of right and wrong, then could it be
said that a mad scientist is right if he has more happiness than his victim has pain in torture? The
absurdity of such a belief is irrational. There must some grounding for morality that makes the
most sense to all aspects of human nature.
The second horseman is an openly critical opponent to Christianity—Christopher
Hitchens. Hitchens, a popular and controversial author, brandished his polemical sword against
Christianity in his well-known book, God is Not Great. Throughout his book he affirms that
Christianity has consistently done no more good than other ethical systems. “We do not believe
in heaven or hell,” Hitchens argues, “yet no statistic will ever find that without these
blandishments and threats we [atheists] commit more crimes of greed or violence than the
faithful.”388 The case Hitchens makes is akin to C.S. Lewis’ point quoted earlier. Lewis creates a
positive case for Christianity by saying, “Fine feelings, new insights, greater interest in ‘religion’
mean nothing unless they make our actual behavior better. . . .389 Hitchens, on the other hand, is
making a negative case for atheism by pointing out that individuals in Christianity live lives
contrarily to its principles. Therefore, can Christianity be considered wrong because there are
388
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those who do not wholly live by its standards? Furthermore, does Christianity offer a better
performative case for the good and the right than a secular theory?
How does a secularist, like Hitchens, address the intricacies of living a moral life
perfectly or not? Hitchens states,
We speculate that it is at least possible that, once people accepted the fact of their short
and struggling lives, they might behave better toward each other and not worse. We
believe with certainty that an ethical life can be lived without religion. And we know for
a fact that the corollary holds true—that religion has caused innumerable people not just
to conduct themselves no better than others, but to award themselves permission to
behave in ways that would make a brothel-keeper or an ethnic cleanser raise an
eyebrow.390
Is it true that Christianity has caused people to be immoral and to accept immorality as the norm?
To substantiate his point, he attempts to show those individuals touted as examples of good faith
throughout the Bible were not worthy to be used as moral examples. He goes as far to say that
Christianity’s “moral exemplar” Jesus, was not one to follow, because he did not even follow his
standard of morality. By contrast, Hitchens says, “American freethinkers and agnostics and
atheists come out the best” for who is more moral.391
In a final complaint against Christianity, Hitchens says people are asked to follow
impossible tasks. He identifies two extreme teachings impossible to do perfectly: 1. The
prohibition not even to think about evil (2 Cor. 10:5); and 2. To love your neighbor as yourself
(Mark 12:31). The first task, along with similar prohibitions, is what he deems as “impossible
restraints on human initiative.”392 For him, there are only two plausible ways to do such a task,
The first is by a continual scourging and mortification of the flesh, accompanied by
incessant wrestling with “impure” thoughts which become actual as soon as they are
named, or even imagined. From this come hysterical confessions of guilt, false promises
390
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of improvement, and loud, violent denunciations of other backsliders and sinners: a
spiritual police state. The second solution is organized hypocrisy, where forbidden foods
are rebaptized as something else. . . .393
Hitchens enunciates the issue at hand. These seemingly stringent prohibitions make sense within
a Christian framework that places a high priority on morality, but provides the help necessary to
accomplish it. Interestingly, from a humanist perspective, there is a limitation on man’s ability to
accomplish moral feats. Either one must dismiss the moral standard, as Hitchens has done, or
else offer some other comparable solution for morality. Hitchens comments that the golden rule
is a,
Sober and rational precept, which one can teach to any child with its innate sense of
fairness. . .[and] is well within the compass of any atheist and does not require
masochism and hysteria, or sadism and hysteria, when it is breached. It is gradually
learned, as part of the painfully slow evolution of the species, and once grasped is never
forgotten. Ordinary conscience will do, without any heavenly wrath behind it. 394
Like Harris, Hitchens believes the motivation to live a moral life can be established away from
Christianity. A difference here is that he also believes one can discover the right motivation by
intuition and conscience.
The third voice among the Four Horsemen is Richard Dawkins. Dawkins, like the others,
begins his section on morality with pointing out the inconsistencies with Christians and their
moral standards. The thrust of his chapter posits that “the selfish gene” is what prompts morality.
This means that not the species or the individual is selfish, but rather there is something innate
that drives one toward selfishness. Dawkins leans a lot on Darwinism for his case. He explains
that “The logic of Darwinism concludes that the unit in the hierarchy of life which survives and
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passes through the filter or natural selection will tend to be selfish.” 395 Darwin’s survival of the
fittest sets up the case for pursuing happiness and the avoidance of pain are both to be for selfinterest. He further states, “There are circumstances. . . in which genes ensure their own selfish
survival by influencing organisms to behave altruistically.” 396 He gives two examples of this:
kinship and reciprocation. These two points serve as “twin pillars of altruism in a Darwinian
world, but there are secondary structures which rest atop those main pillars.” 397
Although kinship and reciprocity are valid reasons for cases of altruism, they are not the
only reasons. Dawkins himself acknowledges this and responds to the Good Samaritan motif as a
counter example to his case. He dismisses the Good Samaritan by saying, “Could it be our Good
Samaritan urges are misfirings [sic], analogous to the misfiring of a reed warbler’s parental
instincts when it works itself to the bone for a young cuckoo?”398 If cases like the Good
Samaritan were rare occurrences, then his case can be understood; however, Christianity not only
assumes this will happen but expects it to be the case. That others recognize this and teach it to
be a standard for morality show it is more than a “misfiring.”
Dawkins continues to explain that, “For me, this demonstrated that our morals, whether
we are religious or not, come from another source; and that other source, whatever it is, is
available to all of us, regardless of religion or lack of it.” 399 Here Dawkins says that religious
395
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people do not think in a biblical way anymore. They have sought some other explanation for
their own book of religion. “A wolf, no matter how big and bad, cannot be evil. In distinction, a
wolf in sheep's clothing is pure evil. Therein lies the problem. The Bible is sold and bought as a
guide to how people should live their lives.” 400 Dawkins overstates his case and enacts an
oversimplification. He touts, “From the present point of view, the interesting thing is that most
people come to the same decisions when faced with these dilemmas, and their agreement over
the decisions themselves is stronger than their ability to articulate their reasons.” 401 To assume
that people come to the same conclusion regardless of religious conviction is interesting. This is
exactly what is being advanced in moral apologetics. Arguments are made to show that morals
are universally recognizable to all individuals with properly working reasoning faculties. On the
other hand, his dismissal of religion as a part of the process is what needs addressing. His
attempt to divorce religious teachings (he focuses on Christianity, not other world religions) is
impossible. This is where one must create a robust view of morality from a theistic standpoint.
Depending on whether morality is defended in a Divine Command Theory, Natural Law, or
Virtue ethics (or a combination of all three) is vitally important for how one answers Dawkins’
point.

Areas of Further Research
There are two potential areas of further research not covered in this project. First, more
research can be done in the field of psychology and its response to Christianity’s high standard
for morality. Specifically, how do psychologists and counselors handle the mental health of an
400
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individual who feels as if they can never meet God’s standard for morality even with God’s
assistance? For a primer on the subject consider the article by Robin Heise and Jean Steitz titled,
Religious Perfectionism verse Spiritual Growth. Other pertinent questions will follow from this
starting point. Such questions as: Does Christianity put too much emotional strain on individuals
that results in unhealthy physiological and mental states? How can Christians do a better job
ministering to people, given God’s standard for morality and man’s failure to live by it?
A second place for further research is an examination of Francis Schaeffer’s observation
that the perfectibility of man has potentially been instrumental in the crash of evangelicalism. He
references this topic in his book The Great Evangelical Disaster. His point is that too much
emphasis on man’s abilities has caused an erosion in evangelical teachings. Robert Dworkin
highlights this same issue by stating, “Mainstream American Christianity has absorbed
expressive individualist ideals and, by doing so, provides almost an exact replica of the Pelagian
heresy attacked by Augustine fifteen centuries ago.”402 In a similar vein, McGrath says,
“Pelagianism continues to have a deep influence on Western culture, even if its name means little
to most. It articulates one of the most natural of human thoughts—that we are capable of taking
control of ourselves and transforming ourselves into what we would have ourselves be.” 403
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